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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to identify and analyse in an historical context the major 
changes to the United States’ Internal Revenue Code during the period 1981-2001. This 
qualitative study relied on historical and legal interpretative approaches to better understand the 
political forces, personalities, and interactions that helped shape the legislative changes during 
this time period. The study focused on deep analysis of primary sources that best illuminated the 
latent narrative of four major tax actions: The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and The Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.
Archives, periodicals, and political rhetoric were examined in order to help shape the 
historical narrative. In addition, this study sought to identify major trends and paradigm shifts in 
the way United States tax policy was formed during the time period examined. The study 
identified several key trends that emerged in United States’ tax policy during this period: the use 
of budget deficits as political tools; factors associated with accomplishing tax reform; gaps 
between political rhetoric of individual politicians and their political action; and the virtual 
disappearance of a political middle ground in United States budget politics. The study concluded 
by noting the economic and political significance of budget deficits and stressing the need for 
fundamental changes in voter responsibility in helping achieve lasting, broad-based tax reform 
and budgetary responsibility in the United States.
Key Words: Taxation, United States of America, budget, deficit, tax reform, historical 
perspective, Reagan, Bush, Clinton
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CHAPTER 1
Study Rationale
1.1 Goals of the Research
The main purpose of this research was to analyse the major changes to the United States Internal 
Revenue Code, as it evolved during the period 1981-2001.
The goals of the research were as follows:
• To identify and analyse significant changes to the United States Internal Revenue Code 
from 1981-2001, in order to describe and characterize the changes in terms of major 
policy shifts.
• To chronicle the historical forces, including social, political, and professional, that 
influenced the Internal Revenue Code changes in their final form.
• To understand why changes to the Internal Revenue Code were made, including both 
successful and unsuccessful efforts by politicians, lobbyists, and other participants in the 
process.
1.2 Problem Statement
Examining the United States tax code in effect for a particular time period provides a 
historical glimpse into public affairs at the time of the change. In many ways the evolution of the 
Internal Revenue Code tells a richly-detailed story about the underlying political environment in 
which it was forged. Though prior research has been conducted retrospectively on the topic of
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the Internal Revenue Code, much of this research falls into two categories: broad economic and 
behavioural analysis and examination of the technical effects of changes. Limited academic 
research has been done to bring to light the personalities, stories, rhetoric, and interactions that 
underpinned the historical development of the Internal Revenue Code and its evolution since 
1981. We know a great deal about concrete elements of tax changes, from the perspectives of 
both economic experts and practitioners. However, we know much less about the rich, detailed, 
personal elements of how these legislative shifts came to fruition. Did political leaders achieve 
their goals through these changes? Why did these particular changes succeed while others failed?
Accordingly, this thesis sets out to address this gap in the literature in two ways. First, the 
proposed research will identify and analyse significant tax changes from 1981 to 2001, with the 
goal of describing and characterizing major shifts in policy. Second, the proposed research will 
seek to chronicle with depth and accuracy the historical forces that shaped these changes.
The Internal Revenue Code is the United States’ primary system of taxation, by which 
the income of American corporations, individuals, trusts, estates, and other legal entities are 
subjected to taxation by the Federal Government. Since its inception in 1913, the United States 
income tax has been a fixture in American life, and the filing of the annual income tax return is a 
common experience shared by the majority of Americans. Few issues in the American 
experience generate more interest, debate, and calls for reform than the Internal Revenue Code.
The Internal Revenue Code and accompanying Internal Revenue Regulations are both 
complicated and controversial, so much so that even the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue 
Service reportedly hired a preparer to assist him with his own tax returns (Ballasy: 2010). The 
Internal Revenue Code changes frequently, for social, political, and economic reasons, spawning
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its own cottage industry around continuing professional education for tax return preparers, 
individuals, and corporate officers who must understand and navigate its murky depths. The 
Internal Revenue Code has a long and colourful history, governing a politically charged but 
fiscally effective system of taxation.
Accordingly, the importance of analysing the role of taxation, in its historical socio­
political context, cannot be underestimated. Taxes represent, in tangible fashion, the individual 
citizen’s stake in government, policy outcomes, and sense of community (Cobham: 2005). The 
use of tax dollars toward a public good represents a connection between the citizenry and its 
governmental representation (Cobham: 2005). As a result, understanding and cataloguing 
technical shifts in tax policy over time is important, but it is equally important to understand the 
forces, policies, and personalities that helped shape the United States Internal Revenue Code into 
its current form.
1.3 Scope
The United States income tax code has changed significantly since 1981, with the 
executive branch of government signing into law more than 30 tax bills that directly concerned 
taxation since that time (Tax Policy Center: 2011). A number of these bills were “ad hoc” in 
nature, intended to respond to emerging crises, such as the 2008-2009 banking collapse, 
Hurricane Katrina in 2004-2005, and specific periods of high unemployment and economic 
crisis, such as the period following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, some bills represented 
major tax reform efforts, involving more novel, substantial provisions. Other bills have been 
purely political efforts, to cut taxes for preferred economic groups, or to favour spending on
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preferred social programs. This study chose four major legislative actions and examined the 
context and means by which they evolved.
This study examined four major legislative actions: The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and The 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (Tax Policy Center: 2011). Each of 
these acts either included tax principles as a primary consideration, or made substantive changes 
to the ways in which taxes were administered. Major tax changes in the United States have 
historically shared some similarities, such as fluctuation in tax rates and changes in exemptions, 
which invariably shift with the political climate. However, certain legislative acts were “game 
changers” in the sense that they addressed tax issues in unique ways and in terms of true reform.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act, enacted in 1981, came at a time of economic turmoil 
in the United States. It sought to stimulate the economy, lowering marginal income tax rates, 
estate tax rates, and capital gains tax rates. At the same time, it ushered in ACRS, or the 
“Accelerated Cost Recovery System” to allow businesses faster recovery of capital expenditures. 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was the first major move toward easing of the 
individual tax burden under President Ronald Reagan (Tax Policy Center: 2011).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is considered to be a landmark piece of tax legislation in 
that it was a major attempt to capture and tax effectively true economic income, though it came 
at the cost of complexity (McClure: 1988). The Act increased low-income tax credit programs, 
raised rates on large estate and gift transfers, and decreased carve-outs for passive activities. It 
also was part of a movement toward lower overall tax rates, particularly for high income
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individual taxpayers and those who benefited most from the standard deduction (Tax Policy 
Center: 2011).
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was an important piece of legislation in 
that it began a move away from the Reagan-era approach to taxation, primarily in an effort to 
increase revenue and reduce budget deficits during the Clinton administration. The Act increased 
top individual and corporate tax rates, while relieving taxpayers who qualified for earned-income 
tax credits. The act also expanded the taxable reach of otherwise exempt Social Security income 
for individuals with higher taxable incomes (Tax Policy Center: 2011).
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 was a series of tax cuts 
begun under President George W. Bush. (Tax Policy Center: 2011). The centrepiece of this 
legislation was a rollback in individual income tax rates, intended to jumpstart the economy in 
line with “trickle-down” economics, as originally popularized under President Ronald Reagan. 
The legislation was unique in that it included nearly a decade of phased-in tax reductions, but 
with many of its provisions scheduled to “sunset” by 2010. It also included increases in credits 
for working families, across-the-board rate cuts for all income levels, and a rollback and 
ultimately a repeal of the death tax.
These tax code changes have addressed many different areas, including the underlying 
tax rate structure, tax bracketing, types of tax preference items, perceptions of fairness, technical 
complexity, and allocation of the tax burden across demographic groups and types of entities 
(Tax Policy Center: 2011). With respect to complexity, in 1981, Form 1040, the standard form 
for individual citizens to file personal income tax returns, contained 66 lines. In 2013, it 
contained 77 lines and numerous additional informational blanks, many of which pertain to
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emerging preferences, deductions, or special adjustments that had evolved into the Internal 
Revenue Code (Internal Revenue Service: 2014b; Tax Analysts: 2014). It is clear that the 
modern tax code, as evidenced by the volume and type of information acquired on the 
administrative filing forms, is taking on many more tasks and gathering many different types of 
information than it did in 1981.
Despite the fact that the United States income tax code has changed substantially since 
1981, the American legislative process is complicated and resistant to change. In order for a 
proposed bill to become law, it must pass successfully through a number of significant hurdles, 
both formal and informal. Bills must first be drafted and introduced by a sitting member of either 
the House of Representatives or the Senate, collectively referred to as “Congress.” Once a bill is 
introduced, it must be considered and tabled by a committee vote, and subsequently placed on 
the legislative calendar for a full vote, further debate, or amendment by the legislative body (US 
House: 2014). A simple majority is required for a bill to pass each legislative body, but even this 
process can be more difficult than it appears.
Many pitfalls await new and proposed legislation, including the threat of filibuster, 
presidential veto, or subsequent amendment of key provisions that could undermine the bill’s 
effectiveness (US House of Representatives: 2014). Once bills are passed legislatively, they must 
be signed into law by the president. Further review of particular laws often takes place in the 
judicial branch of government.
An illustrative example of how complicated the United States’ legislative process can be 
is the Affordable Care Act of 2010, commonly referred to as “Obamacare.” This legislation, 
ultimately determined to be a “tax” bill by the Supreme Court, greatly expanded governmental
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health care coverage, and was extremely controversial. The bill narrowly passed the House, and 
eventually passed the Senate by way of an uncommon legislative process known as “budget 
reconciliation.” Ultimately, key provisions of the law were reviewed by the Supreme Court in 
National Federation v. Sebelius (2010) and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014). The former case 
upheld most commercial provisions of the law and treated the law as a form of taxation, while 
the latter called into question certain mandates in the law under grounds of religious freedom 
(National Federation v. Sebelius: 2010; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby: 2014). In both cases, all or 
parts of the law were subject to review and invalidation at the discretion of the Supreme Court.
While the particulars of these cases are not critical to purposes of this study, 
understanding the levels of review that proposed and even final legislation must endure is critical 
to analysing the success or failure of reform efforts. In the United States, it can take a significant 
amount of time to pass a bill, and in the end, the bill may be ultimately rendered ineffective or 
inapplicable due to judicial review. A great deal can be gleaned by analysing the legislative 
process, even if the process results in no changes to current law.
1.4 Review of the literature
Historically, most major pieces of United States tax legislation have been researched 
from two primary perspectives: economic or behavioural impact, and technical application. As 
an illustrative example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is considered one of the most important 
pieces of tax legislation in the history of the United States, and has been researched exhaustively. 
In many ways, the body of research around the 1986 Act is representative of how tax legislation 
in the United States has been traditionally researched.
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From an economic and behavioural perspective, the 1986 Act is understood to have 
significantly shifted the tax burden from the household to the business sector, and at the same 
time reduced incentives for private-sector investment (Evans & Kenward: 1988). Other 
researchers have reported that the 1986 Act resulted in widespread “portfolio adjustment” with 
respect to foreign investment, timing of transactions, and the legal form of business entities 
(Auerbach & Slemrod: 1997). However, some researchers posit that the act itself had a more 
limited effect on observed reduction in capital investment than other factors, such as dampened 
productive output during the time period (Bartlett: 2011). Specific behavioural elements of the 
1986 Act, such as the impact of low income tax credits buried within the legislation, have also 
been considered. Burman and Phaup (2012) determined that tax expenditures, as opposed to cash 
expenditures, have become increasingly popular due to their avoidance of the traditional 
budgeting process. Using the low income tax credits in the 1986 Act as an example, the 
researchers showed the political and economic expediency associated with tax expenditures 
(Burman & Phaup: 2012). As demonstrated by the existing body of research, the ways in which 
the United States economy has responded to most significant tax legislation in economic and 
behavioural terms is well-documented.
From a technical perspective, much has been written about the 1986 Act. Its relationship 
to financial accounting standards has been examined (Bierman: 1987). In addition, research has 
catalogued its practical tax effects, including broadening of the tax base, more progressivity, and 
increased personal exemptions and earned income credits (Pechman: 1990). Other analysis has 
discussed the 1986 Act’s changes in the context of the international community. The United 
States’ effective corporate tax rate, reduced significantly under the 1986 Act, was also found to 
be higher than many of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Countries
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when both tax base and tax rate were taken into consideration (Mucenski-Keck: 2012). Further, 
simulated calculations and projections in the literature have shown that the tax had a 
disproportionally positive effect, dollar-for-dollar, on couples and individuals with children 
(Weinberg: 1987).
Nearly every significant legislative act in the United States has been analysed in these 
two primary contexts, as illustrated by the body of research surrounding the 1986 Act. However, 
a much more limited body of research has been performed that helps bring to light the 
individuals, interactions, and personal stories that helped forge these changes to the tax code. 
This research seeks to achieve deeper understanding of the personalities and political forces that 
helped form the Internal Revenue Code over time. What did political leaders, as well as their 
opposition, believe, state, and write about the efforts to create these changes?
Understanding the political culture that has created changes to the United States Internal 
Revenue Code is illuminating in a number of ways. As legal changes to the code are made, they 
leave a historical trail and create precedent for future changes. They also establish baselines for 
what is considered to be customary behaviour in government, such as whether a budget needs to 
be balanced; what constitutes a fair tax rate; and, the relationship of a taxing authority to its 
constituents. Tax code changes also mark departures from historical trends, such as Ronald 
Reagan’s dramatic cuts to individual tax rates in the early 1980s. One of the fundamental 
functions of government is to properly manage a budget that reflects the priorities and political 
will of the electorate. Examination of the tax code provides insight into what society values, and 
why, and how those values shift over time.
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Prominent in the United States are also various ideas about increasing unfairness and 
unnecessary complexity in the United States Tax Code. For example, in 2014 the Obama 
administration stressed fairness and minimising complexity as key elements of the official 
position of the President’s policies (White House: 2011). While the purpose of this thesis is not 
to state conclusively which views or policies are most fair, it does seek to understand the 
historical viewpoints by which legislative changes and tax policies were fashioned.
In addition to considering political rhetoric, significant tax law changes are difficult to 
understand without analysing the economic context and social climate at the time when the 
change was made. For example, with respect to tax rates, the highest individual tax rate, as 
applied to married couples filing jointly, was 70% in 1981; 28% in 1989; 38.6% in 2002; and, 
39.6% in 2013 (Tax Foundation: 2013). This large change in tax rates, along with myriad other 
technical shifts during the same time period, represent starkly different theoretical approaches to 
the tax code. However, it is no surprise that these changes were influenced by economic 
conditions.
For example, in 1980 the United States was experiencing historically poor economic 
conditions, which improved gradually through the decade. In 1980, just weeks before his election 
victory over democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter, former Governor of California Ronald Reagan 
gave a televised campaign address which typified his administration’s approach to the Internal 
Revenue Code. Reagan called for across-the-board rate cuts and simplification (Reagan: 1980). 
In this speech, Reagan also provided a surprisingly high degree of technical detail for a public 
address targeted for the average American, calling for less complex depreciation schedules to 
encourage economic development and modernization (Reagan Library: 1980).
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Just a few months later, in his final State of the Union address and after his election 
defeat in November of 1980, President Carter also discussed his “take” on tax policy as it relates 
to growth. Despite historically stark differences in posture between Carter and Reagan on issues 
of taxes and finance, Carter supported many of Reagan’s positions as part of the 1982 budget 
proposal (Carter Library: 2014). Would Carter’s conformity with Reagan’s positions have 
persisted had he won the election? Or was Carter merely conceding defeat and attempting to 
begin the political reconciliation process in a public way?
The era of Reagan’s term of office also brought to the forefront the idea that the economy 
is often managed politically, with tax policy as an important tool in that process. The office of 
the President is well-positioned to set fiscal policy, and history has demonstrated that the chief 
executive should reasonably expect Congress and the public to fall in line with their policies 
(Peterson: 1985). For example, Reagan realized, as did other leaders, that running budget deficits 
have few consequences with respect to the voting public, and may empower the executive to use 
such deficits as a platform to push for further austerity programs (Peterson: 1985). Taxation is 
deeply connected with politics, and one of the goals of this study will be to paint a more 
complete picture of the political forces behind major legislative actions.
In terms of how tax reform occurs, an empirical study conducted by Castanheira and 
Nicodeme (2012) identified key factors that contribute to viability of large-scale tax reform 
programs. The study found that, among other variables, existing political incentives encourage 
targeted reforms rather than broad ones, and that economic crises foster increased likelihood of 
reform (Castanheira & Nicodeme: 2012). Other research has offered a more comprehensive 
proposal for tax reform, particularly in an international context. It is apparent that international
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competition on the basis of taxation may prohibit a more holistic approach to achieve true tax 
reform (McClure: 1992). However, deeper analysis of source documents and legislative history 
is required to better understand both the nature of the subsequent law changes and the political 
theatre which surrounded them.
1.5 Overview of the Chapters
The following is an overview of the contents of each chapter of this research. Chapter 2 
discusses the methodological approach to the research. The research paradigm, a historical and 
legal approach, is described in detail. In addition, the appropriateness of the research paradigm, 
in the context of the research questions, is defended along with the research questions 
themselves. Finally, this chapter highlights the reasons for the selection of the four major 
legislative acts that were chosen for detailed analysis, and the ways in which these Acts typify 
the period under study.
Chapter 3 contains analysis of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 in its historical 
context. This chapter introduces the economic and political conditions of the late Carter 
administration that gave rise to the 1981 Act. It also considers the perspectives of President 
Ronald Reagan and the democratic Congressional leadership in crafting the legislation, as well as 
the Act’s standing as an example of bipartisan tax reform.
Chapter 4 analyses the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a piece of legislation widely considered 
to be a model for tax reform in the history of American taxation. The unique interplay of 
personalities that made this reform possible is illuminated, including the perspectives of 
President Ronald Reagan, House Speaker Tip O’Neill, and Illinois Congressman Dan 
Rostenkowski. Predecessor legislation to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is also considered,
12
championed by reformers like Jack Kemp. The chapter also considers the unique set of 
conditions that laid the groundwork for this ground-breaking legislation.
Chapter 5 details the development of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, a 
critical piece of legislation passed under President Bill Clinton. This Act is chronicled as an 
example of the American political movement away from bipartisanship, passing without a single 
conservative vote. This chapter describes the late presidency of George H.W. Bush and the 
economic stagnancy that Clinton and his administration sought to improve. The Act, in 
conjunction with actions taken by President George H.W. Bush, represented the beginning of a 
shift toward closing the budget gaps that had begun to grow under President Ronald Reagan. The 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 would lead to the last budget surplus in United 
States’ history, in 2001.
Chapter 6 discusses the historical significance of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001, passed in the first term of President George W. Bush. The 
implications of this Act, particularly the inroads it made into and reversing the existing budget 
surplus created under the Clinton administration, are highlighted. The drastic long-term 
implications of this Act are outlined, in particular a return to Reagan-era deficit spending.
Chapter 7 concludes the research and discusses a number of long-term trends observed 
from 1981-2001 in the development of the United States’ tax code. These trends are considered 
in the context of possibilities for future tax reform; polarity in American politics and its impact 
on tax policy; and potential conflicts in the way the American public views and votes on tax 
reform and tax policy. It also concludes by assessing the role of the tax code provisions, in each 
particular area, in affecting the budget deficit and the size of government.
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CHAPTER 2
Methodology
2.1 Introduction
This research is qualitative in nature, drawing on both legal interpretative and historical 
research approaches. Qualitative research seeks rich details, authenticity, and depth of inquiry, 
while consciously sacrificing generalizability of the findings to do so (Patton: 2002; Glesne: 
2011). It is focused primarily on understanding, relying on non-numeric data to describe 
phenomena (Brikci: 2007). Qualitative research lends itself well to questions of why, how, and 
what, rather than questions of yes or no, as would be the case with quantitative methods. The 
selection of method and the research paradigm in which it was situated was driven by the nature 
of the goals of the research, which were as follows:
• to identify and analyse significant changes to the United States Internal Revenue Code 
from 1981-2001, in order to describe and characterize the changes in terms of major 
policy shifts;
• to chronicle the historical forces, including social, political, and professional, that 
influenced the Internal Revenue Code changes in their final form; and
• to understand why changes to the Internal Revenue Code were made, including both 
successful and unsuccessful efforts by politicians, lobbyists, and other participants in the 
process.
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From an ontological perspective, the use of a legal interpretative and historical approach was 
necessary to accomplish the goals of the study and answer the research questions. The research 
questions in this study demand a depth of understanding and detail that cannot be provided by 
merely analysing, for example, the enacted changes to tax law during the period researched, or 
by quantifying changes to tax rates, tax collections and spending outlays. Chronicling such 
events only illuminates part of the story, the final action or outcome. It does not take into account 
the forces that shaped the final outcome, such as the feelings and thoughts of the “winners and 
losers” in the process, and the way the legal and political outcomes were viewed before and after 
they were enacted. Accordingly, this research was situated within the qualitative paradigm and 
took a legal interpretative and historical approach to understanding the evolution of the United 
States’ Tax Code from 1981-2001. The legal interpretative approach to the research provided the 
necessary framework for determining what changes had occurred to the tax structure. At the 
same time, the historical approach, framed as a biographical and public affairs enquiry, provided 
deeper understanding of the processes and participants that created political change. Using this 
two-faceted method, this research sought to understand where the Internal Revenue Code began, 
how it evolved, and why it followed the particular path that it did.
2.2 Assumptions and Epistemological Approach
The undergirding principle supporting this approach is that synthesizing the accounts, stories, 
and circumstances surrounding historical events is a way of better understanding how and why 
the events unfolded, as well as understanding the implications of those events in social and 
political context. In adopting this view, this research began by making several assumptions:
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• First, the evolution of United States Tax Code during the time period under study, 1981 - 
2001, is a construct of the people who participated in the process, their interactions with 
one another and their respective positions and institutions, as well as conditions, 
decisions, and political groundwork that may have been created previously. These social 
interactions, and reactions, would have political and legal consequences, and would shape 
the outcomes of the process.
• Second, by understanding the historical evidence that was generated as the United States’ 
Tax Code evolved, a deeper of understanding of why it exists in its current form would 
be developed, or alternatively, why it did not follow a different evolutionary path.
• Third, the perspectives of the participants in the process, and their writings, thoughts, 
speeches, and memoirs can be interpreted as a constructed view of historical truth 
surrounding concrete legal and political actions. Stated differently, historical events can 
be interpreted by better understanding the thoughts of those who helped influence them, 
or who were affected by them.
In addition, any study that involves historical research as part of the research design must take 
into account that the sources selected for study could impact the narrative that emerges and the 
conclusions the researcher might draw. In this sense, developing a “historically-accurate” 
narrative may only be possible from a certain point of view, as evidenced by particular sources. 
Other sources and viewpoints could paint a different picture of the same historical event. This 
research focused on primary and secondary sources, chiefly including speeches, papers, 
memoirs, and secondary newspaper accounts of the lawmaking process. These sources helped to 
develop the narrative around the personalities and processes that helped the United States tax 
code evolve.
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The legal interpretative research aspect of this study was conducted in the “fundamental” 
tradition, designed to provide deeper understanding of law changes in their social, political, and 
economic context (Babbie & Mouton: 2009). Each change in the law, observed in a vacuum, 
provides very little qualitative meaning. While, for example, an individual’s income tax liability 
at an existing rate of tax, and at a prior rate, can be calculated, there is tremendous value in 
understanding why political authorities sought to change the rate. Was it to encourage a 
particular behaviour? Was it to close a budget gap? Or, alternatively, was it viewed as a mistake 
or as a success, when judged retrospectively?
2.3 Methods: A Legal Interpretative and Historical Approach
The proposed study drew on a legal interpretative and historical approach, using primary and 
secondary sources in order to determine how historical events transpired, who was involved, and 
why particular Internal Revenue Code changes ultimately came about (McKerchar: 2008; 
McDowell: 2002). It is notable that hundreds of changes to the United States’ Tax Code are 
made every year, and while each one has an impact, this research could not possibly contemplate 
them all. Accordingly, in attempting to interpret the period from 1981-2001, it was necessary to 
make qualitative selections as to the most important legislative activity upon which to focus. 
While many legislative acts involve tax or budget changes as an element, this research focused 
on acts that were principally focused on tax or budget matters. In selecting these acts, 
consideration was directed towards the severity or gravity of the changes made in the bill; the 
historical impact or legacy of the bill itself; and the extent to which the bill was a departure from 
policy, or blazed new political trails with respect to taxation and budgeting. Using these criteria, 
four key acts were selected:
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The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981;
• The Tax Reform Act of 1986;
• The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; and,
• The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.
These acts each are of generally accepted significance, and represented important political 
milestones. They were not only important from a tax standpoint, the aforementioned bills were 
also signature pieces of legislation for the sitting president who sponsored and signed each one.
In analysing the historical record surrounding each piece of legislation, this research drew on 
the following data sources, all of which were openly accessible to the general public.
• the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, including available legislative history since 
1981, as well as Regulations, Policy Statements, and Procedure Manuals;
• Supreme Court, Tax Court, and US Court of Appeals cases;
• the United States Congressional Record, including committee reports and discussion;
• memoirs, speeches, and policy statements for political participants in the IRC, including 
presidents, senators, members of Congress, and aides; and
• peer-reviewed and professional articles addressing the IRC and its history.
Efforts were made to internally validate each source or item selected, in historical tradition. 
Artifacts were selected, reviewed, and documented in order to establish their historical accuracy 
and to understand and place into appropriate context their political nature. Stated differently, 
political sources are inherently situated in a particular political paradigm, and are by definition 
biased. With each document, the author or participant was considered in appropriate context. For
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example, a former adviser to a president may be inherently biased in favor of his or her former 
employer. Accordingly, throughout the research process, attempts were made to triangulate the 
primary and secondary source data to achieve a balanced view of the event, and to take into 
account any diverse perspectives that were available. As narratives and themes emerged within 
the historical record, those themes were developed to construct an overall view of the opposing 
views and perspectives of the event, as well as to develop a sense of the legacy of the bill itself.
Finally, once the four major acts were thoroughly analyzed, and once data saturation was 
achieved, the data were re-interpreted and synthesized to identify significant themes and shifts 
that characterized the entire period under study. In this way, the research not only created a 
historical narrative of what had occurred, and why, but it also illuminated historical shifts that 
transcended the individual acts themselves. For example, while Ronald Reagan’s administration 
and the two acts he presided over during his tenure typified tax reduction efforts and deficit 
creation, it became clear through the historical record that, 20 years later, President George W. 
Bush would adopt many of Reagan’s approaches to tax policy. In another instance, it became 
clear through analysis of the entire period that George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, though from 
different political parties, agreed fundamentally on the importance of fiscal budget responsibility. 
Each Act was also analyzed through the lens of the effect of the legislation on the budget deficit, 
as well as the overall size of government, as defined by governmental expenditures. This 
research also sought to draw conclusions about the period under study in terms of tax fairness, 
successful tax policy, and what constitutes and contributes to real tax reform.
2.4 Limitations and Ethical Considerations
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The limitations of this study are known: qualitative research is inherently subject to the 
bias of the researcher. It is possible that different researchers would choose different acts upon 
which to base similar analysis. It is also possible that the researcher’s own political affiliation 
might bias the selection of source material. Also, the qualitative nature of the research makes it 
strictly contextual: it is time and place bound, and cannot be generalized to any other 
circumstances (Patton: 2002).
In addition, all the data used in this study was in the public domain, and accordingly, no 
ethical considerations arose. Interviews were not conducted; opinions were considered in their 
written or spoken form. Historical documents and artifacts were validated to the extent possible 
using sourcing and contextualization: that is, contemporaneous records were given substantial 
weight, while later records were viewed as secondary sources.
Finally, this study sought to analyze a particular period in the history of American tax 
policy, specifically the time period from 1981-2001. Though the four major legislative changes 
discussed in this study are all generally understood to be of landmark importance, it should be 
understood that historical analysis during a specified time frame is difficult. For example, the 
development of The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 would have likely been impacted by 
the political and economic conditions that had developed during the Carter administration, and 
possibly before. By further example, though this study identifies certain parallels between 
Reagan and George W. Bush’s approach to budget deficits and tax policy, both presidents would 
have been influenced by both their own tax philosophy, and by the social and political 
conditions, favourable or unfavourable, under which they inherited the presidency. While this
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study considers these factors in reaching its conclusions, this is a noteworthy limitation of any 
historical research which analyses a particular time frame.
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CHAPTER 3
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
3.1 Introduction
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 represented a major a turning point in United 
States tax policy. The bill was President Ronald Reagan’s first major attempt at tax reform, and 
came on the heels of a deep recession that had begun under President Jimmy Carter (Tax 
Foundation: 1983b). Passed in August 1981, the Act was considered to be a “watershed event in 
the history of Federal taxation.” (Tax Foundation, 1983a:1).
Since beginning his presidential campaign, Reagan had watched the unemployment rate 
increase from around 6.2% in 1980 to nearly 8% in 1981 (Bureau of Labor Statistics: 2015). 
Before the recession began to slow, unemployment would ultimately reach 11% in January of 
1983 (Bureau of Labor Statistics: 2015). It is clear that the economic situation Reagan inherited 
from the Carter administration was dire, and economists have since debated whether this was in 
fact the worst economic crisis in the United States since the Great Depression of the early 1930s. 
In a 2009 article in the Washington Times, Richard Rahn analysed the economic situation in the 
context of the 2009 economic crisis in the United States (Rahn, 2009: 1):
Both President Reagan and President Obama inherited an economy suffering from a year o f no 
growth, along with rising unemployment. The numbers are almost identical. But Mr. Reagan 
faced a far direr situation in that inflation was in the double digits and the prime interest rate was 
at 20 percent. In contrast, Mr. Obama inherited an economy in which inflation was falling. In
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fact, inflation has been close to zero for this year and interest rates were very low. A situation in
which the number of jobs available is falling is bad enough, but if  inflation is also destroying
purchasing power, the misery is compounded.
It is clear that Reagan understood that the United States was in a critical economic situation that 
would likely get worse before it improved. In a 1980 campaign speech, he spoke about the 
economy and his strategy to grow it (Reagan, 1981: 1):
At the heart o f that strategy for economic growth are eight major steps:
1) We must keep the rate o f government spending at reasonable and prudent levels.
2) We must reduce personal income tax rates and accelerate and simplify depreciation schedules 
for business in an orderly, systematic way to provide incentives to work, savings, investment, 
and productivity.
3) We must review regulations that affect the economy, and change or eliminate them to 
encourage economic growth.
4) We must establish a stable, sound, and predictable monetary policy.
5) We must promote the export o f American products abroad.
6) We must revitalize American industry.
7) We must adopt an energy policy that will allow our economy to grow, and our standard of 
living to rise.
8) And we must restore confidence by following a consistent national economic policy that does 
not change from month to month.
Reagan emphasized two key tax policy goals: reduction in individual tax rates, across all tax 
brackets, and more aggressive, simplified depreciation schedules to relieve corporate taxpayers. 
Underlying both of these concepts was the idea that Reagan wanted tax changes to be easily
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understood, simple to implement, and consistent. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, 
Reagan’s operating philosophy was in line with principles associated with “broad-based” tax 
reform. Broad-based tax reform is an approach to tax policy that is generally understood to stress 
lower statutory tax rates that apply to all, or nearly all situations uniformly, with fewer carve- 
outs for individual and corporate taxpayers. This is in contrast to more targeted tax policy, which 
may produce high statutory rates of tax, yet allow for numerous carve-outs and exceptions which 
erode the effective tax rate. The latter approach arguably distorts the tax system by producing a 
less efficient tax result. Under a more targeted system, taxpayers can achieve disparate results, 
either through planning or avoidance, and the costs of voluntary compliance, as well as 
enforcement, appear to grow. Though notions of what constitutes “good” tax reform vary, this 
study focused on broad-based tax reform as the ideal standard by which other tax reforms or 
changes may be compared, due to its focus on simplicity and equity. The 1981 Economic 
Recovery Tax Act would take shape as a step toward broad-based reform: across-the-board, flat 
cuts in individual tax rates, and additional depreciation conventions that would promote growth. 
The former certainly contributed to simplicity. The latter, though stimulating growth and capital 
investment, did little to simplify tax depreciation rules.
As this research will discuss, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduced tax 
revenues significantly and created large budget deficits. Further, driven by a significant strategic 
defense buildup under Ronald Reagan and political opposition to domestic spending cuts, the 
stage was set for an era of unprecedented deficits (Pollack: 1996). As a direct result of the 1981 
Act, tax policy and legislative activity in the mid-1980s would be characterized by a new 
paradigm: deficit politics, a reduced tax burden, and a quest for revenue neutrality (Pollack:
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1996). Forces on both sides of the political aisle would be forced to justify, account for, and 
manage the deficits that their policy proposals created.
3.2 Background
By 1980, the economic conditions in the United States had shifted dramatically away 
from the era of “easy finance.” (Brownlee, 1996: 115). Booming economic conditions prior to 
the oil crises of the 1970’s had created a period during which raising tax revenues was relatively 
easy: inflation was low, tax bases were high, economic activity was robust, and likewise, tax 
rates could necessarily be low as well (Brownlee: 1996). However, as these conditions began to 
change, raising revenue also became much more difficult: high inflation and a struggling 
economy led to low tax bases and limited the possibility for rate increases (Brownlee: 1996). 
This myriad of conditions necessitated a new approach: enter Ronald Reagan and his supply-side 
approach to economics and taxation.
Reagan’s campaign platform advocated for smaller government and increased reliance on 
the private sector in an effort to improve the economy. This was a classic conservative stance, 
but at the time many considered this approach to be counterintuitive (Robson: 2015). Not only 
was this counterintuitive from an economic perspective, it arguably defied natural management 
tendencies. When difficult circumstances arise in a management environment, the logical 
conclusion often reached is for authority figures to seek more control, to intervene and manage 
the problem more closely (Henderson: 2006). This type of close intervention may seem logical, 
but it does not necessarily transmit to better outcomes as the increased scrutiny does little to 
solve the underlying problem (Henderson: 2006).
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Alternatively, Reagan clearly believed that intervening less in the economy could actually 
jumpstart consumer activity and improve public confidence. Buoyed by the backlash against the 
Carter administration’s failures, and rising anti-government sentiment among voters, Reagan 
moved ahead with an economic plan that would shrink the size of government, give rise to new 
budget deficits, and reduce the power of the income tax in American public policy (Brownlee: 
1996).
3.3 Timeline
The timeline of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, and its movement through the 
legislative process, is outlined below (Govtrack: 2015b):
• July 23rd, 1981 introduced
• July 29th, 1981 House version passed
• July 31st, 1981 Senate version passed
• August 3 , 1981 Senate Conference report adopted
• August 13 th, 1981 signed by the President into law.
3.4 Key Figures in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
Four figures were most important to the development of the 1981 Act—President Jimmy 
Carter, President Ronald Reagan, Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill, and Illinois Representative 
Dan Rostenkowski. Carter and Reagan epitomized two distinct policy approaches. Carter 
stressed the importance and value of equality, fair taxation, and a strong role for the Federal 
government. Reagan believed in the individual, and the rights of individuals to make their own 
economic decisions. These leaders were from markedly different walks of life, with Carter, a
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former peanut farmer; Reagan, a Hollywood actor; O’Neill, a career public servant who made 
easy caricatures for the political right; and, Rostenkowsi, an awkward speechmaker with a gift 
for working a “deal.”
James Earl “Jimmy ” Carter, Jr.
A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Jimmy Carter was born into a family of peanut farmers, 
and hailed from the state of Georgia. He was deeply religious, of the Baptist faith, and began his 
political career in 1962, ultimately becoming Governor of the State of Georgia (White House: 
2016). Carter was known to be a soft-spoken champion of the average American. Despite his 
unpopular and largely unsuccessful presidency, Carter was ahead of his time on a number of 
political issues, such as the environment, energy efficiency, and equality under the law (White 
House: 2016). Carter would serve just one term as President, from 1977-1981. In 2002, he was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for “work to find peaceful solutions to international conflicts, to 
advance democracy and human rights, and to promote economic and social development.” 
(White House, 2016: 1).
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan served two terms as President of the United States, and is known as one of the 
most influential Presidents of the 20th century. A champion of individual liberty, economic 
growth, and limited government, Reagan became known as a proponent of “Reaganomics”, a 
conservative version of supply-side economics. A former actor and governor of the state of 
California, Reagan was a renowned speechmaker and left his second term as one of the most 
broadly popular Presidents in history (White House: 2014). Reagan played an important and very
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public role in positioning tax reform for success, particularly in signaling to both political parties 
that tax reform was both possible and necessary. However, Reagan’s approach to budget deficits, 
tax policy, and deficit spending remain controversial to this day even among experts (White 
House: 2014).
ThomasP. “Tip” O ’Neill
Born in 1912, Tip O’Neill was a powerful and well known Democratic Speaker of the House, 
and a Representative from Massachusetts (Biographical Directory of the US Congress: 2015d). 
O’Neill was elected to Congress seventeen times, serving as chair of the Select Committee on 
Campaign Expenditures, as majority whip, majority leader, and Speaker of the House of 
Representatives (Biographical Directory of the US Congress: 2015d). His reputation as a 
dealmaker and artist of political compromise was legendary, and he detested above all other 
things a political stalemate when action was needed (O’Neill: 2012). In the words of his son, 
O’Neill was also champion of the less fortunate, and a foil for Ronald Reagan when he needed to 
be (O’Neill, 2012: 1).
As speaker o f the House, he was obliged to fight what he and his party believed were disastrous 
steps being taken by the Republicans. My father fought tirelessly to see that Reagan’s policies did 
not run roughshod over the disenfranchised.
O’Neill would retire from Congress in 1986 without losing an election. He forged a strong 
relationship with Ronald Reagan, and despite their political differences, O’Neill and Reagan 
would become legendary for their ability to compromise (O’Neill: 2012).
Dan Rostenkowski
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Dan Rostenkowsi was a Democratic Congressman from Chicago, and was known as an 
unmatched Capitol Hill “dealmaker” He epitomized the slightly greasy feel of a traditional 
Washington insider, plain-speaking, a bit rough around the edges, but willing to do whatever it 
took to move his agenda forward. He was elected to Congress at the age of 30, and remained the 
youngest member for a number of years (New York Times: 2010). Rostenkowski was 
unpretentious and blue-collar, a product of Mayor Richard Daley’s Chicago political regime. 
Rostenkowski had a checkered record as a speechmaker and lacked public relations agility. 
Reportedly, a speechwriter had once given Rostenkowski a speech with the word “hyperbole” in 
it. Rostenkowski proceeded to pronounce the word “hyper-bowl” when he delivered the address. 
(Birnbaum & Murray: 1992) He was also master of mixed metaphors, claiming once that guiding 
the 1986 Tax Reform Act through Congress was like walking through an “egg field” instead of 
“mine field.” (Birnbaum & Murray: 1992). A “machine politician”, he eventually became 
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and a gained a reputation as powerful 
broker of compromise, with friends on both sides of the political aisle. He played an instrumental 
but unexpected role in moving the Tax Reform Act of 1986 forward. True to his roots, he lived 
in his childhood home until his death at 82 in 2010 (New York Times: 2010). A significant stain 
on Rostenkowski’s career was his indictment and conviction on fraud charges, which effectively 
led to his unseating in Congress and the end of his political career.
3.5 Major Provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was arguably most influential as a sea change 
in tax doctrine. It introduced a counter-narrative, one that insisted on smaller government, in the 
hope that lower individual tax burdens would free the economy to grow and expand. However,
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specifically, it consisted of several important and influential provisions (Tax Policy Center, 
2015b: 1-3).
1) the Act replaced Asset Depreciation Range guidelines with the Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System; provided faster write-off o f capital expenditures, with most equipment written off 
over 5 years, structures over 15 years, and liberalized "safe-harbor" leasing rules;
2) reduced marginal tax rates by 23% over 3 years, and indexed brackets for inflation;
3) reduced the maximum estate tax rate from 70 to 50%;
4) increased the estate tax credit to exempt all estates less than $600,000 in value;
5) extended eligibility for IRAs to include active participants in employer pension plans; 
increased Keogh annual contribution limit to $15,000; and
6) reduced the capital gains tax to 20%.
Of these changes, the most significant, both economically and politically, were the changes in 
individual marginal tax rates; indexation of tax brackets; reduction in the capital gains tax rate; 
and the introduction of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System.
3.6 Reagan’s Revolution
Reagan’s tax policies would become widely known as the “Reagan Revolution.” 
(Pollack: 1996). This name seemed to stick because these policies were in fact revolutionary: 
they were in stark contrast to historical approaches to taxation in the United States and gathered 
momentum with surprising speed and vigor (Pollack: 1996; Brownlee: 1996). Professor John 
Robson recounted Reagan’s “hands off” approach to managing the economy and some of the 
initial impressions it generated (Robson, 2015: 00:30-3:00):
It’s hard now to remember just how revolutionary it was at the time, and what mockery Reagan 
endured while campaigning for president on the theory that government should get out o f the way
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and let the economy create wealth, instead of taking responsibility for it. Ever since the early 
1930’s people have been convinced that it was up to the government to make sure that we were 
prosperous. That private firms were somehow short-sighted, stupid, greedy, and destroyed wealth 
rather than created it.
Reagan’s move away from “big government” echoed the views of the American public at the 
time. In a Pew Research Center poll taken in 1981, 65% of Americans believed that “government 
had gone too far in regulating business, while another 62% agreed that “they rarely trusted the 
government in Washington.” (Pew Research, 2010: 1). Accordingly, Reagan’s tax proposals, 
particularly his proposed reductions in marginal individual tax rates, appeared to tap directly into 
this sentiment.
Reagan also viewed taxes as a barometer of freedom: increases in taxes effectively 
removed autonomy from the individual and placed it in the hands of government (Meese: 2006). 
He believed that individuals would make better decisions about how to spend their money than 
the government, and as a result, whenever possible, they should keep what they had earned 
(Meese: 2006). Former Attorney General Edwin Meese recounted Reagan’s strong opinions on 
this issue, and the families that played a role in strengthening his convictions (Meese, 2006: 
20:30-21:30).
The key element in all o f this, without which none o f them would have worked, was the tax rate 
reduction, which we are celebrating today. He (Reagan) was very well aware o f President 
Kennedy’s tax rate reductions, which he started, and which were enacted shortly after his 
assassination. Cutting taxes was not a new idea with Ronald Reagan. He had talked about the 
excessive rate o f taxation when he was doing the GE Circuit. Part of his contract when he was 
doing the GE Theatre was to meet with the various employees at the GE plants around the
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country during the weeks between the showings o f GE Theatre, which came on once a week. In 
those meetings with those workers, and also talked about with them, he learned the importance of 
low tax rates as a means for helping America’s families. For him, taxation was not just a matter of 
revenue-raising for the government, or a matter o f what people had to pay out o f their budget. For 
him taxation was a matter of freedom. Because he felt the more money people had for 
themselves, the more they made the decisions about what to do with that money.
As Meese suggests, Reagan viewed taxes as much more than a budgetary duty or requirement to 
pay as a citizen. Rather, it is clear that Reagan had begun to craft a much more fundamental 
ideology surrounding taxes and budgets: that taxes equated more government, and more 
government had not worked in the Carter years and would not work now. This was a political 
position Reagan would take frequently during both of his terms: that he was on the side of the 
American people, not on the side of the government, despite being a government employee 
himself (Reagan: 1982). He also believed strongly in the rightness of the individual to make 
decisions that were in the individual’s own best interests, and that the collective power of 
individuals, acting alone, were greater than that of the government (Reagan: 1982). Reagan had 
very effectively tapped into a strong anti-government sentiment, which naturally travelled hand- 
in-hand with anti-tax sentiment (Brownlee: 1996).
While Reagan was to become the face of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, and 
ultimately, the face of 1980s tax reform, he was not the first to consider rolling back the power of 
the income tax (Pollack: 1996). As early as 1977, President Jimmy Carter had shown interest in 
tax reform, particularly with respect to reducing the tax burden on middle-class Americans. 
Carter had placed tax reform high on his administration’s priority list, even calling for a 
complete overhaul of the United States’ tax system in his acceptance speech before the
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Democratic National Convention (Pollack: 1996). He had on numerous occasions expressed his 
deep disgust with the tax code’s particularities and inequities (Brownlee: 1996). Carter had also 
seriously considered alternatives, such as a consumption or value-added tax, as a supplement or 
replacement for the regressive, small base, piecemeal system that was then in place (Brownlee: 
1996). However, no consumption or value-added tax had ever gained traction at the Federal level 
in the United States, though such taxes were common at the state and local level. Carter was also 
unsuccessful in moving toward other types of Federal taxes that might displace the income tax.
Earlier, in 1977, Senator William Roth and Representative Jack Kemp had introduced a 
tax reform bill known as “Kemp-Roth I.” This bill called for a 1/3 reduction in individual income 
tax rates, as well as a 3 percent reduction in the corporate tax rate, though the bill was ultimately 
voted down (Pollack, 1996: 88). Notably, Reagan would subsequently use a more modest form 
of Kemp-Roth I as the foundation for his tax proposals (Pollack, 1996:88). In 1978, Carter did 
sign into law a relatively weak tax relief measure, a bill which had been “de-fanged” and 
debilitated by political fighting (Brownlee: 1996). However, Carter’s efforts, and those of others 
stopped short of adopting any other substantive alternatives to the system in place. This, coupled 
with the anti-government movement that had begun to coalesce, quashed the possibility of 
substantive reform as desired by Carter (Brownlee: 1996).
In the push for the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, both on the 
campaign trail, and after his election in November of 1980, Reagan was effectively asking the 
nation to take a gamble in order to fix the ailing economy by departing from traditional 
Keynesian economic principles (Robson: 2015). Many politicians, particularly Democrats, felt 
Reagan’s positions were risky in terms of their projected revenues and costs (Roberts: 1981). 
Reagan sought to strengthen his political position by pulling all necessary political levers,
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including taking his case to the American people, as he did in a speech on February 5th, 1981 
(Reagan, 1981:1).
Good evening. I'm speaking to you tonight to give you a report on the state o f our Nation's 
economy. I regret to say that we're in the worst economic mess since the Great Depression. A few 
days ago I was presented with a report I'd asked for, a comprehensive audit, if  you will, o f our 
economic condition. You won't like it. I didn't like it. But we have to face the truth and then go to 
work to turn things around. And make no mistake about it, we can turn them around. I'm not 
going to subject you to the jumble o f charts, figures, and economic jargon of that audit, but rather 
will try to explain where we are, how we got there, and how we can get back.
Reagan established a strong populist tone in this speech, and interestingly, rhetorically “turned 
the tables” on the Federal government. As Reagan portrayed the situation, the Federal 
government was not auditing the American taxpayer anymore; Reagan and the American people 
were auditing the Federal government. He also took a can-do, positive tone, a departure from the 
negative tone often set by the realistic but pessimistic Carter administration (Brownlee: 1996). 
This speech was concise, and its message was clear: America’s problems could be fixed; they 
were no longer a mystery; brighter days were ahead. Reagan went on to lay groundwork for how 
significant the economic problems were, and why reform was needed (Reagan, 1981: 1).
First, however, let me just give a few '' attention getters'' from the audit. The Federal budget is out 
of control, and we face runaway deficits o f almost $80 billion for this budget year that ends 
September 30th. That deficit is larger than the entire Federal budget in 1957, and so is the almost 
$80 billion we will pay in interest this year on the national debt. Twenty years ago, in 1960, our 
Federal Government payroll was less than $13 billion. Today it is 75 billion. During these 20 
years our population has only increased by 23.3 percent. The Federal budget has gone up 528
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percent. Now, we've just had 2 years o f back-to-back double-digit inflation -- 13.3 percent in 
1979, 12.4 percent last year. The last time this happened was in World War I. In 1960 mortgage 
interest rates averaged about 6 percent. They're 2 1/2 times as high now, 15.4 percent. The 
percentage o f your earnings the Federal Government took in taxes in 1960 has almost doubled.
In this speech, Reagan had addressed complicated and frightening economic matters, faced them 
head on, and made the case for lowering the individual taxpayer’s Federal tax burden. It is clear 
Reagan hoped that his proposed reduction in individual taxes would help the economy. 
Borrowing from Kemp-Roth I, the centrepiece of Reagan’s proposals was an across-the-board 
cut in the marginal personal tax rate, designed to infuse cash into the pocket of the average 
American (JEC Report: 1996; Pollack, 1996:88). Further, Reagan’s proposals for the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, followed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, ushered in an era of 
reduced marginal rates for individual taxpayers (JEC Report: 1996).
Conservative consultant Arthur Laffer captured well the conservative ideology under 
which the Reagan administration undertook its efforts to collectively reduce individual tax rates 
(Cato Institute, 1991: 7:30-8:15):
Likewise, remember what things were like back then when you judge the whole policies. In 1980 
at the end o f the year, the prime interest rate was 21.5% at the beginning o f ’81. The highest 
marginal rate on unearned income, 70%. I mean, the Soviets were still a major threat to the world. 
The conceptual framework that we had been living on before this was that you can tax workers 
and producers, and pay people not to work and not produce, and you expect more people to 
become workers. It just doesn’t make sense.
Laffer summarized well the position of the Reagan administration. Clearly Reagan believed that 
by reducing tax rates across the board, individuals would be able to spend more of their money,
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or increase their rate of savings, both of which would jumpstart the United States’ economy. 
Reagan’s opposition to high individual marginal tax rates was clear. The question was, what 
would be the effects of such a cut, and would it stimulate the struggling U.S. economy without 
triggering insurmountable budget deficits?
3.7 Criticism of Carter
In a speech in October of 1980, Reagan outlined his criticisms of the Carter 
administration’s approach to taxes and fiscal responsibility. Specifically, he had consistently 
sought to paint Carter as out of touch with the average American taxpayer, and as someone who 
believed “big government” was the only solution to the nation’s problems (Reagan, 1980: 4-5).
The symbol o f this administration is a finger pointing at someone else. And on October 14th, after 
spending most o f the first part of the campaign running away from his economic record, he 
finally made a speech on the economy. And he came up with a new list o f who, or what, to blame 
for inflation. The number one item on his list was, and I quote: “the failure to raise adequate 
revenues at a time o f greatly increased public spending.” What that means in plain English is that 
he didn’t raise our taxes enough. Now, Mr. Carter has already imposed the two largest tax 
increases in our nation’s history. And by 1981, he will have succeeded in doubling the tax load on 
the American people—the equivalent o f a tax increase on a family o f four o f more than $5,000 a 
year. Now, I’d like to ask him: isn’t that enough? Apparently not— according to his economic 
plan, annual taxes will go up $86 billion next year alone, and $500 billion over the next five 
years.
Reagan’s approach seemed to be to free up the American consumer to spend or save, rather than 
pay taxes into the Federal budget. He was counting on an unrestrained economy to produce 
enough growth and consumer confidence to allow him to run budget deficits in the short-term in
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order to create better long-term results. Reagan also criticized Carter’s spending approach 
(Reagan, 1980: 4-5):
He’s increased government spending by nearly 60 percent in four years. It is this incredible 
increase in spending that has caused inflationary deficits—not low taxes. We don’t have inflation 
because we are living too well. We have it because government is living too well. Mr. Carter is 
acting as if  he hasn’t been in charge for the past three and a half years; as if  someone else ran up 
nearly $200 billion in federal red ink; as if  someone else was responsible for the largest deficit, 
including off-budget items, in American history; and, as if  someone else was predicting a budget 
deficit for this fiscal year that began October 1st o f $30 billion or more. Finally, he blames “the 
long decline in our productivity growth.” I would like to ask him: which president has presided 
over six straight quarters o f falling productivity? Which president by 1981 will have increased the 
punitive tax burden on our economy by some $300 billion? Which president has created two new 
cabinet departments and has increased the burden of federal regulations?
Reagan’s criticism is interesting, if not ironic, given that both he and Carter would run deficits 
throughout their presidencies, both in constant dollars and inflation-adjusted numbers (White 
House: 2016). Despite this, one can identify a clear political opening for Reagan given these 
circumstances, particularly with respect to his goal of instituting a “supply-side” approach to 
revenue and taxation. With the economy struggling, nearly any departure from Carter’s policies 
would likely be seen as a viable alternative. Reagan sought clear contrast between his own fiscal 
approach and Carter’s: he positioned himself as trusting the American taxpayer with their own 
money. Carter, on the other hand, was portrayed as on the side of government, “smarter” than the 
average citizen. However, many of Carter’s late-term policies echoed Reagan’s. In his January 
1981 State of the Union speech, shortly after his massive November election loss to Ronald
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Reagan, Carter called for changes to the tax code, favouring corporate reductions rather than 
individual ones (Carter Library, 2014: 2-3).
I have declined to recommend such actions to stimulate economic activity, because the persistent 
inflationary pressures that beset our economy today dictate a restrained fiscal policy. 
Accordingly, I am asking the Congress to postpone until January 1, 1982, the personal tax 
reductions I had earlier proposed to take effect on January 1 o f this year. However, my 1982 
budget proposes significant tax changes to increase the sources o f financing for business 
investment.
Carter recognized the dangers of inflation, but also recognized the need to promote new capital 
investment in order to get the economy moving again. Other than Carter’s curtailment of the 
individual tax benefit, there is striking similarity between these proposals and Reagan’s 
proposals during the 1980 campaign cycle (Carter Library, 2014: 2-3).
The level o f investment that is called for will not occur in the absence o f policies to encourage it. 
Therefore, my budget proposes a major liberalization o f tax allowances for depreciation, as well 
as simplified depreciation accounting, increasing the allowable rates by about 40 percent. I am 
also proposing improvements in the investment tax credit, making it refundable, to meet the 
investment needs o f firms with no current earnings. These two proposals, along with carefully- 
phased tax reductions for individuals, will improve both economic efficiency and tax equity. I 
urge the Congress to enact legislation along the lines and timetable I have proposed.
Not only were Carter’s proposals in line with Reagan’s in terms of what should be accomplished, 
he likewise stressed efficiency, equity, and simplicity, as did Reagan (Carter Library: 2014).
3.8 Reagan and the Democratic Opposition
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Reagan’s overwhelming popularity and landslide electoral win were nightmarish 
obstacles for hardline Democrats and huge advantages for Reagan and the supply-side 
Republicans. Democratic leaders, including House Speaker Tip O’Neill, seemed to believe this 
as well. They were convinced that public sentiment and media attention were irrevocably on the 
side of the President (O’Neill:1988). This, coupled with an anti-government political climate 
spawned by the struggles of the Carter administration, empowered Reagan’s coalition and led to 
trouble for Democratic leaders. In particular, even entrenched Democratic leaders, such as 
Speaker Tip O’Neill, were accused of being moot, disempowered, and without direction (New 
York Times, 1981b:1-2):
Tip O'Neill had tried to hold the Democratic majority o f the House together in the face o f an all­
out campaign by a skillful, determined president. The Speaker had lost the first two rounds, the 
battles over the budget, in May and June. Now, a month later, he was back on the ropes, facing a 
Congress filled with young men with blow-dry hairdos who were more at home with computer 
printouts and media advisers than with the Speaker's old-style, personal kind of politics. They had 
been children when he first stood at this rostrum almost three decades ago. The passionate, New 
Deal liberal had changed little since then, while many of his listeners, even within his own party, 
were, in his view, defectors.
The Democratic party and its leadership had been undermined by Reagan’s perceived electoral 
mandate. Ironically, this paved the way for greater compromise and less gridlock in that more 
moderate Democrats, such as Illinois Representative Dan Rostenkowski, became more important 
in the negotiations with the President.
Substantive discussion and debate of the Democratic and Republican plans began to gain 
momentum in the spring of 1981. Representative Dan Rostenkowski (Democrat, represented the 
state of Illinois) gave a speech in April of 1981 in which he outlined the Democratic opposition
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to Reagan’s tax plan. One of the key criticisms in the Democratic rebuttal was also one of 
Reagan’s sources of pride: individuals could spend the proposed incremental tax reductions in 
any way they wanted. Rostenkowski pointed out the weakness in this approach: “What we don’t 
know is where--and how much-people will save and invest. We don’t know whether a middle- 
income family will invest their tax cut in U.S. Steel--or a trip to Disneyland.” (Rostenkowski, 
1981: 1). Rostenkowski’s comments were in sharp contrast to Reagan’s belief that the individual 
knew best how to spend their own income. In addition, Democratic party leaders sought a plan 
that would oppose Reagan’s momentum, but that would also pass Congress (Smith: 1981). In 
creating space between Reagan’s plan and the Democratic alternative, the difficulty was that 
more differentiation reduced the likelihood of an acceptable compromise (Smith, 1981: 2):
''Danny's problem,'' (referring to Rostenkowski) said another senior House Democrat, ''has been - 
do you want to join a winning combination with the President or is the price the Administration is 
asking too high and you'd rather offer a Democratic alternative that you probably don't have the 
votes to pass.'' But Mr. Rostenkowski's aides said he was opposed to staging ''a Democratic 
Alamo'' and suffering another shattering defeat. He preferred to mold a consensus package to lure 
back some of the conservative Democrats being so ardently wooed by the White House.
Rostenkowski was honing his skills as a backroom negotiator, skills he would put to use in both 
the 1981 Act and later the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Rostenkowski was known to prefer to work 
one-one-one, out of the limelight, carefully avoiding too much public relations and 
speechmaking (Smith: 1981). He proved to be skilled at this kind of political maneuvering 
(Smith, 1981: 2):
''He wants a bill he can take from the committee and take to the floor and win,'' said one 
Rostenkowski aide. ''He's met the White House exactly halfway,'' commented Jim Wright of
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Texas, the House Majority leader. ''Not a one-year bill or a three-year bill, but a two-year bill. 
The 15 percent rate cut he's announced is half of what the President originally wanted,'' he said, 
''and it will save $60 or $70 billion in budget deficits by leaving off the third-year tax cut.''
Rostenkowski represented the middle ground: a Democrat, willing to compromise with the 
President. Rostenkowski and other moderates became more important as powerful, traditional 
leadership apparently faltered (New York Times, 1981b:2-3).
The President, in his six months in office, had engineered a revolutionary change in the direction 
of Government, reducing its size, powers and appetites. He had effectively taken control o f the 
Congress, raising questions about the ability o f the House and Senate to compete on anything like 
an equal footing with a popular President who knows how to use the power o f his office. 
Moreover, the Reagan victories had led many in Congress to entertain doubts about Tip O'Neill 
and his leader ship.
It is important to note that the political climate surrounding the debate of the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 was still that of a divided government. Despite a heavy electoral mandate in the 
executive branch, which may be inferred by Jimmy Carter’s landslide loss in the 1980 election, 
Reagan still faced a largely Democratic Congress and clearly needed to compromise in order to 
govern. As discussed throughout this research, there are some unexpected advantages to a 
balance of power between the parties which control the executive and legislative branches of 
government. Specifically, with shared power both sides appear to be more likely to compromise, 
and less likely to take up extreme political positions or resort to mechanical means to defeat 
legislation. Former House Representative Charlie Stenholm discussed this division and how it 
influenced legislative behaviour (Stenholm, 2015: 1):
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When Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980, Democrats lost 23 seats, but still controlled 
the House 244 to 191. In the Senate, Democrats lost 12 seats and gave up control to the 
Republicans by a margin o f 53 to 46, with one independent. We had a divided government. Tip 
ONeill, who was Speaker o f the House at that time, could have insisted that any bill coming out 
of his chamber have a majority o f Democrats supporting it, but he knew that he did not have that 
kind o f power and really did not want it. He told the new president that "We will cooperate in 
every way" — not that Democrats would necessarily vote for what the president wanted, but that 
we would allow the House to work its will. Tip also recognized that the people o f America had 
voted for change and the new president deserved a chance to pass his agenda. That required at 
least 26 Democrats (usually a few more) on every bill, because even then some Republicans and 
Democrats would not vote for anything.
Tip O’Neill and Ronald Reagan were well known as politically different men who managed to 
find enough personal common ground to work through differences and compromise (Bedard, 
2010:1). Bedard captures the thoughts of Tip O’Neill’s biographer, John Farrell, who made it 
clear that these two men shared a special, one-of-a-kind relationship unlikely to happen again in 
American politics (Bedard, 2010:1):
“Reagan and O'Neill had so much in common," says Farrell, a U.S. News contributing editor. 
"Don't get me wrong," says Farrell. "Folks in Berkeley detested 'Ray-gun,' and folks in Orange 
County thought Tip was a clueless lump of what the Irish call blarney. But you didn't have the 
domination o f the parties by their bases the way you do now." The model for today's regime, he 
says, is more like the dueling relationship between Bill Clinton and Newt Gingrich.
Likewise, Reagan understood that he needed the other side, the political left, to help him achieve 
anything in his first term. Despite the poor economy and struggles of the Carter administration,
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Reagan needed to work across the political aisle to secure enough votes for any measure 
(Bedard, 2010: 1).
John Heubusch, who heads the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation, says: "When Reagan 
came to Washington, it was a certainty that he could not get any o f his bold ideas into action until 
or unless he had a bipartisan solution. That was a given. So his initiatives, his lobbying approach, 
and his communications strategy, and the personal relationships he built were with all this in 
mind." And Reagan gambled with his fellow Irishman sometimes to a draw. "He'd ask for more 
than he expected to get and was willing to settle for less than the whole loaf," Heubusch adds.
This willingness to work together, regardless of party affiliation, appeared to be important in that 
it sent a signal to other legislators that compromise was possible, even expected.
In the meantime, Reagan remained a persistent and popular politician, and had 
successfully wooed many conservative Democratic Congressmen for their support (New York 
Times: 1981). These Democratic politicians were known as “boll weevils” for their willingness 
to break ranks and vote Republican (Malone: 1983). These Congressmen were mostly 
conservative and represented districts in the Southern United States. Accordingly, the term “boll 
weevil” referred to the pest insect that fed on cotton plants, which were native to the Southern 
United States. It was a political jab, implying that these southern Democrats could not be 
counted on as solid Democratic votes despite carrying the Democratic party label.
These “boll weevil” Democratic votes would prove to be critical to Reagan’s success in 
Congress. A number of the so-called “boll weevils” and other moderate Democrats had formed a 
coalition known as the Conservative Democratic Forum. The group was comprised of 45 
Democratic Congressmen, mostly from the South. This group effectively ensured the success of 
Reagan’s proposals, primarily by their willingness to break solidarity with the party voting line,
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which undermined the authority of party leaders (Roberts: 1981). In general, the group expressed 
openness to considering budget and tax issues from both sides, making them “free agents” in 
their deliberation of Reagan’s tax cuts (Roberts: 1981). As a rule, the group favoured budgetary 
restraint, primarily supporting Reagan’s proposed spending reductions, but cautiously opposing 
the severity of his proposed plan to reduce taxes and revenues (Roberts: 1981). Several key 
members of this group, including Representative Ken Holland of South Carolina, Representative 
Ed Jenkins of Georgia, and Representative Kent Hance of Texas were interviewed as part of a 
New York Times piece on this breakaway movement (Roberts, 1981: 1-2):
All prefer a smaller cut than the President proposes, to take effect at a later date, perhaps not until 
1982. They disagree on whether the cuts should be for one year or several years, and whether the 
cuts should be across-the-board or skewed toward lower-income groups. But they agree on 
proposals to reduce taxes on estates, unearned income and capital gains. All would like to see the 
cuts arranged to stimulate savings more directly. None o f the three conservatives underestimates 
Mr. Reagan's power to stir up support for his tax package, but they feel that the President used up 
considerable political capital in pushing through his budget. As Mr. Holland put it, ''The second 
Holy War has a little less passion than the first one, and the Administration knows that.''
The budget battle referred to by Representative Holland was one in which Reagan pushed 
through approximately 45 billion in spending cuts in March of 1981. These cuts would succeed 
but not without a considerable battle in Congress. The Federal budget was already thin, and 
Reagan had signaled that he was unwilling to touch defense spending, while many Democrats 
expressed concern over domestic spending: particularly social programs such as Social Security, 
early childhood education, veteran’s benefits, and welfare (New York Times: 1981c). Given the 
polarity and “sacred” nature of the potential cuts—defense spending for the conservatives, and
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social programs for the progressives-- a difficult road lay ahead for budget director David 
Stockman (New York Times, 1981c: 1):
Not only will arm-twisting be in order, more elbow grease than even Mr. Stockman plans to apply 
may be needed. Add last week's ingredients - President Reagan's assurance that social programs 
for the ''truly needy'' would be preserved - to his oft-stated intention to increase military spending, 
and the room to cut the budget narrows even further. And that means that the fighting over what 
to preserve will be at closer quarters still. In social programs, Mr. Reagan said he would leave 
intact $210 billion - or 25 percent o f the budget - for seven programs that affect 80 million 
people, many of them elderly. Principal on the list are Social Security's Old Age and Survivors 
Insurance, the Medicare health insurance program, Veterans Administration disability benefits 
and Supplemental Security Income for the blind, disabled and elderly poor.
Representative Holland’s “holy war” comments, as well as the comments about Stockman, 
chronicle the enormous amount of energy Reagan would expend in passing his budget in 1981. 
The Reagan administration’s economic plan, however, received a glimmer of hope from the 
Conservative Democratic Forum. In March of 1981, the group had signalled acquiescence to 
Reagan’s budget reduction demands by suggesting possible sources of budget cuts (New York 
Times, 1981c: 1). Proposed reductions included cuts in foreign aid and de-unionization of 
Federally-contracted construction workers. Reagan was happy with the group’s willingness to 
negotiate, saying “I like this... I might consider becoming a Democrat again.” (New York 
Times, 1981c: 1). This political humour was a reference to Reagan’s affiliation with the 
Democratic party earlier in his life (New York Times, 1981c:1). Though the budget would pass, 
Reagan expended significant energy to get it done, and now had to move ahead to the tax 
reduction plan he proposed as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
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3.9 The Largest Tax Cut in the Nation’s History
In a 238-195 vote, which included the votes of many Democrats, Reagan’s tax cuts would 
pass in July of 1981, at that time making them the largest tax cuts in American history (New 
York Times, 1981b:1). Politically, everything had changed (New York Times, 1981b:1). As 
already quoted on page 38, Reagan had capitalized on his public appeal:
The President, in his six months in office, had engineered a revolutionary change in the direction 
of Government, reducing its size, powers and appetites. He had effectively taken control o f the 
Congress, raising questions about the ability o f the House and Senate to compete on anything like 
an equal footing with a popular President who knows how to use the power of his office.
Several attempts to oppose the severity of the cuts were rejected, including plans to reduce the 
cuts to one year by Representative Morris Udall of Arizona, and Representative David Obey of 
Wisconsin (Cowan: 1981). Republican Representative Barber Conable of New York also offered 
a substitute plan, which would pass as the final version during the reconciliation process 
(Cowan: 1981). Conable stated, referring to the arduous political process involved in the tax cut 
debate, that the “mood of both sides is to get it behind us.” (Cowan, 1981:1).
Reduction in Marginal Individual Tax Rates
According to tax historian Joseph Thorndike, Ronald Reagan was a “taxcutter 
legislatively, emotionally, and ideologically. But for a variety of political reasons, it was hard for 
him to ignore the cost of his tax cuts.” (CNNMoney, 2010: 1) In pushing for lower marginal 
personal income tax rates, Reagan clearly hoped to lower unemployment, broaden the tax base, 
and decrease the ability of certain individual taxpayers to unfairly avoid taxation.
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A 1996 draft report prepared by the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the 
United States addressed Reagan’s plans and the issues his administration faced associated with 
marginal tax rates. The report concluded that high marginal tax rates “discouraged work effort, 
saving and investment, and promoted tax avoidance and tax evasion.” (Joint Economic 
Committee, 1996: 1). This indicated that, at least in theory, Reagan’s proposal to decrease 
marginal tax rates should have resulted in more individual work effort, increased personal 
savings, and less tax avoidance.
It is clear that high marginal rates, particularly in the top income brackets, incentivize 
taxpayers’ avoidance behaviour because of the perceived economic payoff associated with 
avoidance. However, it is also apparent that the taxpayers who are most likely to successfully 
avoid taxes at high marginal rates are by definition wealthy taxpayers: they earn enough income 
to actually face high marginal rates, and are likewise well-positioned to create avoidance 
strategies through financial vehicles, tax planning, and use of legal counsel. As a result, one can 
conclude that high marginal rates may be inefficient because they generate resistance from 
taxpayers. This resistance, when successful, erodes their economic and budgetary value on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis. Stated differently, one can conclude that tax increases may not be as 
beneficial to the tax revenue budget when it is likely they will be opposed, or will require 
substantial enforcement resources to enforce them.
The Joint Committee concluded that reducing marginal tax rates correlated with long­
term economic growth, and reduced the attractiveness of tax shelters and other avoidance 
schemes (JEC, 1996:1). Retrospectively, it appears that Reagan’s rate reductions were effective 
in addressing these issues (Joint Economic Committee: 1996). The rate adjustments appeared to 
help shift the tax burden towards the wealthiest taxpayers, as the percentage of income tax
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burden borne by the richest 10% of taxpayers increased during the period 1981-1988, from 48% 
to 57.2% (Joint Economic Committee, 1996:1). Further, it seems clear that tax avoidance 
strategies, primarily employed by wealthy taxpayers, become less effective when there is less 
incentive or ability to use them effectively.
With respect to tax fairness, one could conclude that high marginal tax rates also contribute to 
perceptions of unfairness in the tax code. This manifests in two distinct ways. First, the way the 
particular deductions and rates apply to taxpayers may be different based on the quality of their 
legal strategy. Second, instances of successful tax avoidance strategies, when made known to the 
public through news articles or other media, provide anecdotal evidence to the average taxpayer 
that the individual tax system unfairly benefits wealthy taxpayers. In a 2012 analysis, Hofman, 
Hoelzl, and Kirchler contend that “In a climate of mutual trust, citizens have positive 
representations of the tax systems and tax authorities and cooperate spontaneously. High 
subjective tax knowledge, favourable attitudes, personal and social norms of cooperation, as well 
as perceived fairness of the tax system are the basis of a motivational tendency to cooperate, of 
trust, and of voluntary compliance.” (Hofman, Hoelzl, & Kirchler: 2012, 1). Accordingly, 
Reagan’s proposals with respect to individual marginal tax rates set the tone for increased tax 
fairness, a tone which would continue throughout the 1980s in subsequent tax legislation.
Indexation of Tax Brackets
In addition to the reduction in marginal tax rates for individual taxpayers, the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act contained provisions that indexed tax brackets to offset the effects of “bracket 
creep.” (Pollack, 1996: 189). This phenomenon refers to the tendency for income to be subjected 
to tax at artificially high rates due to the numerical increases in income due to inflation,
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particularly when these increases did not result in real changes in purchasing power. Treasury 
Department Economist Eugene Steurle emphasized the powerful impact of this indexation on the 
United States’ tax scheme (Pollack, 1996: 189-190).
The major individual reform instituted in 1981 was not direct reduction in tax rates, but the 
establishment o f indexing o f tax brackets...this provision was not even part o f the original 
Reagan proposals, but has altered the patterns o f tax legislation ever since. No longer could 
Congress follow the pattern of tax reductions that merely offset tax increases due to inflation. By 
1990, the adjustment for inflation alone was estimated to have reduced receipts by over 57 billion 
relative to an unindexed tax code... eventually the indexing provision will dominate all other 
provisions of the 1981 Act.
Stuerle suggested that the indexation of inflation reduced politicians’ ability to rely on “pork 
barrel” politics, meaning that politicians pursued favoured legislation in the tax code that would 
benefit their own home districts (Pollack, 1996:190). It is clear that prior to the indexation 
amendment, bracket creep covertly provided a revenue source for politicians to rely on when 
introducing spending increases or tax preferences. Indexing reduced the amount of income that 
would be taxed at inflated rates, and quashed this as a convenient revenue source. An alternative 
way to view the possible effects of indexing is that such indexing may actually “impair the 
flexibility of Congress to resolve and determine the many issues encompassed in the Federal 
budget.” (Davies, 1986: 55). Though this idea of “revenue neutrality” would influence the tax 
paradigm for years to come, it did not entirely do away with the concept of budget deficits 
(Pollack, 1996: 191).
Accelerated Depreciation
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The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act initiated favourable accelerated depreciation 
provisions intended to spur economic growth, at the expense of Federal tax collections. With 
respect to the reduction in corporate tax rates, resulting from the increased depreciation 
deductions, a 1986 staff working paper prepared by Congressional Budget Office staff analysed 
the effects of the 1981 Act (Congressional Budget Office, 1986: 49-51).
ERTA reduced corporate income taxes by instituting the Accelerated Cost Recovery System 
(ACRS) o f depreciation deductions and the Investment Tax Credit (ITC). TEFRA (the Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act o f 1982) took back some o f these reductions, but the net effect of 
the two tax bills was to lower corporate taxes, leaving corporations with higher after-tax incomes. 
This income was either distributed as dividends, directly increasing individual incomes, or kept 
by the corporation as retained earnings. Higher retained earnings tend to increase the value of 
corporate stock. This increases individual incomes through higher realized capital gains when this 
stock is sold. Thus some change in the distribution o f individual incomes resulted directly from 
the corporate tax changes in ERTA and TEFRA.
This suggests that the corporate benefits of reduced tax rates would have flowed through to 
individual taxpayers, either through stock appreciation, or through higher capital gains. Clearly, 
it also begs the question: who benefited from the ownership of appreciated stock, or capital 
gains? It can be argued that wealthier taxpayers tend to hold more stock, and therefore would be 
positioned to benefit from these tax cuts. This formed the basis for the “supply side” economic 
argument, that encouraging wealthier taxpayers to invest and spend is a tide that causes “all 
boats” to rise.
The Congressional Budget Office’s staff reports suggest that this effect is at least 
functionally true (Congressional Budget Office: 1986, p. 49). With respect to the tax returns
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associated with top earners, the staff report outlined how a larger percentage of tax collections 
came from wealthier taxpayers (Congressional Budget Office: 1986, p. 49-51).
The data show that the largest percentage increase in taxes paid was by returns in the top 
percentile of the income distribution. This occurred because income grew more rapidly in the top 
group than for taxpayers as a whole, with growth in the realization o f capital gains contributing a 
large amount o f the increase in relative income in the top percentile.
The report also explained why this may have occurred from a behavioural perspective 
(Congressional Budget Office: 1986, p. 49-51). However, the report makes clear that higher 
earners were responsible for a greater share of tax payments under the Reagan administration’s 
reduction in marginal tax rates (Congressional Budget Office: 1986).
This difference between the actual change in the distribution of taxes paid and the distribution 
based on static analysis suggests the possibility that higher tax payments by the top percentile of 
returns may have resulted at least in part from behavioral responses to the ERTA reductions in 
marginal tax rates. These behavioral responses either could have caused personal income to grow 
faster than average for taxpayers in the upper part o f the income distribution, or taxable income to 
increase relative to personal income for these taxpayers. Behavioral changes that could have 
raised the tax base relative to personal income include:
• Increased realization of capital gains relative to personal income;
• An increase in the ratio o f taxable money wages to total compensation resulting from, for 
example, reduced demand by employees for nontaxable fringe benefits such as employer 
contributions for medical insurance;
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• A reduction in the ratio o f itemized deductions to personal income resulting from, for example, 
smaller growth in charitable contributions or in borrowing to finance purchases o f homes, 
automobiles, or other consumer durables; and
• An increase in the proportion o f income from investments attributable to taxable sources, such 
as interest and dividends, rather than nontaxable sources such as corporate retained earnings, tax- 
exempt bonds, or "tax shelter" investments that are allowed very favorable capital recovery 
deductions under current law.
Effectively, the Congressional Budget Office’s analysis shows that wealthier taxpayers paid a 
greater portion of the overall tax burden collected by the Internal Revenue Service in the years 
following the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (Congressional Budget Office: 1981). From 
this perspective, the cuts certainly made the tax code more progressive, though the economic 
effects remain up for debate.
Individual states in the United States typically do not retain any sovereignty over the laws 
the Federal government passes with respect to their ability to tax citizens. That is, individual 
states may enact new or additional taxes, but may not refute or oppose specific tax provisions in 
the Internal Revenue Code under U.S. Constitutional law, known as Supremacy doctrine. As a 
result, historically, most U.S. states typically adopt entirely, or in substantial portions, the 
Federal tax provisions, making minor adjustments or additions based on the needs of their 
particular state. Upon passage of the 1981 Act, many states feared the trickle-down effect of lost 
revenues at the Federal level, and reacted in defense of their own budgets (Davies: 1986). They 
responded by either not conforming to the Federal rules, or implementing new provisions that 
supplemented the loss of revenue at the Federal level (Davies, 1986: 242). More than half of U.S. 
states passed provisions that stunted the effect of the Federal changes, either with higher
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corporate rates, more addback provisions, or other means (Davies, 1986: 242). This resulted in 
greater compliance complexity, and likely lessened the intended effects of Reagan’s policies 
(Davies: 1986).
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3.10 Legacy
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 left a mixed legacy, rife for debate and 
analysis. The Act represented a bold change of direction with respect to managing the Federal 
budget and raising revenue through taxation. It ushered in low individual and corporate tax rates, 
broadened the tax base, and reduced the role of government, ideologically, if not practically. In 
Figure 3.1, the tax rate decreases, and subsequent deficit climbs, associated with Ronald 
Reagan’s policies become apparent. However, one of the most lasting and notable elements of 
Reagan’s program of tax reduction was that it came on with remarkable swiftness, and with little 
political opposition (Brownlee: 1996). It also began a period of significant increase in budget 
deficits, as well as a steady climb in expenditures, which exceeded the rate of tax collections for 
most of the 1980’s (Tax Policy Center: 2015c). This was dramatically true, until some of the 
1981 Act tax cuts were eased in 1982. However, expenditures continued to outpace collections 
steadily until the late 1980’s (Tax Policy Center: 2015c). By these measures, Reagan’s 1981 tax 
cuts would continue to expand the size of government, as measured by expenditures, but offered 
no accompanying change in tax collections to offset them.
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Figure 3.1: Tax Receipts, Outlays, and Cumulative Budget Deficit by Year in
4 , 000.0
Tax Receipts, Outlays, and Cumulative Budget Deficit by Year (in
Constant Dollars, 1980-2010
(Source: Tax Policy Center: 2015c)
Historian Elliot Brownlee observed that Reagan’s supply-side ideas encountered no 
effective intellectual resistance.” (Brownlee, 1996: 116). It is apparent that part of what made 
this transition so politically easy was the sordid state of the United States’ economy, coupled
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with the perceived weakness of the Carter administration’s management of the economy. 
However, another important factor was the fact that the United States had already begun to 
abandon the idea of a balanced budget over the last decade (Brownlee: 1996). In part, this 
abandonment was a result of lack of consensus among economists as to whether there was an 
appropriate theoretical size for the Federal budget deficit, or even whether there was one 
plausible theory of fiscal policy (Brownlee: 1996). However, without the budget deficit operating 
as a theoretical constraint, it is evident that Reagan’s plans became much easier to implement 
both in theory and practice.
In retrospect, two distinct schools of thought have emerged with respect to the 1981 Act. 
First, many believe the 1981 Act jumpstarted the American economy and, over the course of 
Reagan’s first term, began to pull the United States out of recession. The second school of 
thought is that Reagan’s policies did little to influence the economy, and were mere window 
dressing for much larger economic factors which truly created the positive change in economic 
conditions.
One way to assess both of these schools of thought is to take a cost-benefit approach to 
analysing Reagan’s programs. According to June O’Neill, of the Hoover Institution, the key 
question is to determine whether the 1981 Act’s effects were “worth” running deficits in the 
short term (O’Neill: 2001). Ultimately, some experts agree that they were cost-effective 
(O’Neill, 2001: 3):
As it turned out, tax revenues as a percentage o f GDP averaged around the same level as they 
were during the Carter years -  the annual average for 1981-88 was 18.1 percent (that is with some 
help from subsequent tax-raising legislation). But in the absence of ERTA, taxes would have been 
a much higher proportion of national output -  about 21 percent o f GDP in 1984 and still higher
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later on. That would have been enough to eliminate 80 percent of the 1984 deficit. But the price 
for that deficit reduction would have been sharply higher marginal tax rates that likely would 
have impeded economic growth in the long run. Moreover, by accommodating higher levels of 
spending with tax increases, pressure to restrain spending growth (and therefore help control 
future deficits) would have been diminished.
Effectively, O’Neill suggested that the lower marginal tax rates spurred growth enough to offset, 
and make economically viable, the impediments to deficit reduction they helped create (O’Neill: 
2001).
As part of a recounting of the 1981 Act’s legacy, the Cato Institute sponsored a summit in 
1991 with the theme “Reagan Supply-Side Tax Cuts After Ten Years: Economic Miracle or 
Voodoo Economics?” A panel of experts convened at this summit to discuss the historical 
implications, in their view, of the 1981 Act. In some sense, it was clear that supporters of 
Reagan’s policies could readily point to the economic expansion that occurred in the years 
following implementation of the provisions of 1981 Act. Opponents could likely point to the 
creation of deficits, which spawned a unique set of problems that needed to be addressed.
Analyst and vice-President of the Progressive Policy Institute, Bob Shapiro, supported 
the rate reduction scheme enacted in the 1981 Act (Cato Institute, 1991: 1:28:00-1:29:00):
I agree with Bob and with Art, that the tax burden had to be relieved in 1981, I think for average 
people it still has to be relieved. And for business I certainly wouldn’t have supported the 
business provisions apart from the corporate rate reduction. The main difference is that in 
addition we needed to dedicate Federal spending to the elements o f growth, to get people’s pretax 
incomes growing, which is to say education, and research and development, and infrastructure, all
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of the elements that get the economy growing and actually increase people’s incomes before tax, 
so that we worry less about manipulating their incomes after tax.
Rudolph Penner, Senior Analyst at the Urban Institute, differed in opinion. He felt that the 
marginal tax rate changes made little difference in the scheme of things, when compared with 
other economic periods (Cato Institute, 1991: 1:24:20-1:25:00).
In looking at the big picture, it’s important to note that the 1980s on average don’t look all that 
different say from the 1950s once you smooth at the business cycle, which of course, the 1950s 
was a time of 90 percent tax rates. I think what all this indicates is that the marginal tax rate 
changes don’t make as much difference as even I thought they would in the early 1980s when the 
thing was passed.
Penner went on to stress that, in his opinion, monetary policy was a much more important factor 
in turning around the economy than the tax changes in the 1981 Act (Cato Institute: 1991).
In contrast, Bob McIntyre, the director for the Citizens for Tax Justice, felt that the move 
toward deficits in any form was irresponsible (Cato Institute, 1991: 1:26:00-1:27:00).
It was very clear that year that there had to be a tax bill. Number one. Taxes were already being 
pushed up by inflation, and there had to be some adjustment for that. If they had in fact done that, 
and adjusted people’s taxes for inflation, so that there was a true across-the-board tax change... 
we wouldn’t have had the great deficits o f the 1980s and our children wouldn’t be burdened with 
this enormous debt we have now, and we would all be better off.
Arthur Laffer, well-known political consultant, indicated that he was generally in favour of the 
25% individual tax rate reductions which applied across the board (Cato Institute: 1991). Laffer 
also indicated that he believed that all other tax preference items in the bill, aside from the rate
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cuts, were not helpful and he would have opposed them (Cato Institute: 1991). Laffer also, only 
half-jokingly, proposed a bonus system whereby Federal agencies would be rewarded by 
meeting program objectives and reducing their own budget (Cato Institute: 1991).
Old bad arguments never die. In fact, they don’t even fade away. Especially when they’re based 
upon hopes. If you look at the times. Number one, the tax cuts, as you mentioned, while they 
were passed in 1981, did not take effect the day they passed. In fact the tax cuts were phased in. 
So when you really want to try to judge the effect tax cuts had, you have to look at when they 
started, not when they were passed. It’s amazing how tax cuts don’t work until they take effect.
Laffer pointed out that Reagan’s individual tax rate reductions did not take effect as quickly as 
many assume (Cato Institute: 1991). Specifically, he cited that the first rate cut was only 5%, 
taking effect in October 1981. This was, effectively, just a 1.25% cut for the entire year. Then, 
the second rate cut, of 10%, took effect on January 1st, 1982. The largest and most significant cut 
occurred on January 1st, 1983. This is when, in Laffer’s opinion, the cuts truly began to make a 
difference (Cato Institute: 1991).
Starting on January 1st, 1983. That’s when the tax cuts started. So if  you look at the economic 
impact of the Reagan tax cuts, you’ve got to start on January 1st, 1983, when they actually took 
effect. When you look at that point on you get very different answers than if  you compare 
administrations.
This argument of “timing and responsibility” for economic outcomes has frequently been a 
flashpoint for pundits to assign blame, or credit, for economic results. While it is clear that 
consensus has rarely been achieved on this point, it is important to take into account the precise 
timing of the passage and implementation of tax measures. For example, Carter was still in the
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Oval Office in early 1981, meaning that he would have proposed the 1982 Federal Budget, 
despite Reagan’s election in November of 1980.
Others contend that Reagan’s policies were timely and effective under the specific 
circumstances Reagan faced, but at the same time they created new challenges (Bloomberg, 
2004:1).
Inevitably, the measure o f Reagan's legacy o f the '80s must be taken against what followed: the 
Clinton years o f the '90s. Reagan became President when America was economically sclerotic. 
His tax changes, combined with a tight monetary policy, helped to make the country competitive 
again. The price paid, however, was a soaring budget deficit. Reagan and his supply-side advisers 
believed that big tax cuts would pay for themselves by generating higher tax revenues through 
greater economic growth. It never happened.
As discussed previously, the consensus on the particular tax effects of the 1981 Act remains 
cloudy. According to the Tax Policy Center, there was a substantial dip in Federal tax revenue, 
both in real dollars and as a percentage of GDP in 1982 and 1983 (Tax Policy Center: 2015c). 
However, these same measures stabilized between 1985 and 1990, showing revenue increases, 
and continued to remain stable into the 1990s and the transition to the Clinton administration 
(Tax Policy Center: 2015c).
Finally, it appears that the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was to a large extent a 
response designed to alleviate dire economic conditions that had developed in the United States 
under the Carter administration, as opposed to an attempt to alter the tax scheme or benefit 
specific taxpayer groups (Prasad: 2012). Accordingly, comparatively less of the available 
historical record is focused on specific tax provisions and their legal effect, when compared to 
the large volume of sources that are focused on the impact of the 1981 Act on the United States’
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economy and the Federal budget. In particular, much of Reagan’s tax platform was built around 
an approach to handling “stagflation,” a unique combination of ongoing high unemployment, 
low growth, and inflation that had become acute late in the Carter administration (Prasad: 2012). 
Reagan’s approach tax reform in 1981 was much more economic and ideological than it was 
legalistic. As discussed earlier, Reagan viewed tax cuts as a desirable goal because it returned 
economic freedom to the American taxpayer. In addition, Reagan believed it could theoretically 
solve the nation’s economic problems at the same time (Reagan, 1990: 232).
I have always thought o f government as a kind of organism with an insatiable appetite for money, 
whose natural state is to grow forever unless you do something to starve it. By cutting taxes, I 
wanted not only to stimulate the economy but to curb the growth of government and reduce its 
intrusion into the economic life o f the country.
Effectively, it seems Reagan was choosing to engage tax policy, not for “tax” reasons, but rather 
for economic ones. It is also arguable that Reagan and the Republicans who supported tax cuts 
were, in fact, supporting contradictory outcomes and hoping that things would turn around 
(Prasad: 2012; Reagan, 1990). In a 2016 interview, campaign managers Elliot Curson and Jeff 
Bell discussed an ad they created and ran for Ronald Reagan on his tax cuts (Maher, 2016: 1).
Then we did an ad on tax cuts. Reagan said, “I didn’t always agree with President Kennedy, but 
when he came out with a 30% tax cut, everybody benefited, even the government gained, since 
they generated $54 billion in unexpected revenue. If I become president, we’re going to do that 
again.”
Reagan was calling for tax reforms that he, at varying points, suggested that he hoped would 
increase revenue, decrease the size of government, return money to the taxpayer, and decrease 
Federal intervention in the lives of the average American. These were incongruent goals (Prasad:
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2012). However, the common thread is that Reagan, and members of Reagan’s administration, 
often spoke about the 1981 Act in terms of economic change rather than tax policy.
3.11 Conclusion
While their legacy remains a source of debate, it is evident that the Reagan tax cuts in the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 generated large deficits, and did not pay for themselves 
(Bloomberg: 2004). Nonetheless, it is entirely possible that these policies may have provided 
other social, political, or economic benefits that made them worthwhile. Such analysis is beyond 
the scope of this research. However, regardless of one’s viewpoint of Reagan’s tax policies in 
1981, one certainty emerged: the position of the income tax as a convenient tool for increasing 
tax revenues was substantially reduced as a result of the 1981 Economic Tax Recovery Act 
(Brownlee: 1996). Between 1980 and 1990, the Federal income tax, as a percentage of all taxes 
paid in the United States, had dropped from 63 percent to just 57 percent (Brownlee, 1996:118). 
Also, by 1985, the Federal tax system had become significantly less progressive, as a result of 
the reduction in “bracket creep” as well as the 1981 tax cuts.
In addition, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 set the stage for new ways of 
viewing income taxes and budget deficits. Reagan viewed deficits as political tools, not “hard” 
financial numbers whose variances needed to be managed carefully. This was an unexpected 
development, yet one that would pervade budget politics for many years to come (Peterson, 
1985: 601).
But the Reserve's very success has had an ironic consequence no economist o f the Keynesian era 
could have anticipated: it has provided presidents and acquiescent Congresses with a virtually 
unprecedented license to incur deficits. Although political leaders will denounce deficits, none
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want to give up their favourite policy objectives - defence, social security, domestic welfare, or 
tax cuts - to address a problem whose unfortunate consequences are now said to be long term.
This new “deficit doctrine” would dominate the tax policies in the 1980s, and will be discussed 
later in this research as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In addition to domestic changes, the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was an important catalyst for an international movement 
toward tax reduction for economic growth (Brownlee: 1996). Similar programs were instituted in 
the United Kingdom, Japan, and a number of European states (Brownlee: 1996). The “Reagan 
Revolution” had profound and immediate effects on the way tax policy was administered in the 
United States, and beyond. Nonetheless, the question as to whether Reagan’s domestic tax cuts 
were a “good idea” remains an open one.
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CHAPTER 4
The Tax Reform Act of 1986
4.1 Introduction
This chapter will discuss the Tax Reform Act of 1986, arguably the most influential piece 
of tax legislation in American history. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 exemplified compromise, 
active engagement across the political spectrum, and pursuit of progress, not perfection in tax 
legislation. This chapter will focus on the emergence of the United States from a damaging 
recession, and the role the Act played in deficit reduction. Further, it discusses the colourful, 
sometimes flawed personalities who shaped the change. This research seeks to chronicle the 
evolution of this landmark legislation into law, ushered in by a fascinating cast of characters. 
First, a gruff Illinois representative, whose political career would end in scandal; an enormously 
popular president, principled but willing to compromise; a maverick Senator, blunt to a flaw; 
and, finally, an ex-professional football player who laid much of the philosophical groundwork.
Many Americans in the 1980s were skeptical of their government and its ability to be fair 
and efficient. In addition, the United States tax code had begun to sag under its own 
administrative weight: countless exemptions, special rules, loopholes, and tax shelters had 
become so attached to the code over the years that the tax rules had lost much of their meaning. 
In some areas of the law, taxes had emerged as the primary driver of individual and business 
behaviour. Further, tax rates had become artificially inflated in order to offset the costs of a 
myriad of special provisions, pushing the highest marginal individual tax rates up to 50% in 1985 
(Holid & Labate: 1985).
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From the perspective of the average American in the 1980s, it may have appeared that 
Washington politicians had lost their credibility, the result of years of pork-barrel politics and 
lobbying activities. The United States had suffered through a deep recession, the onset of 
“stagflation”, and slow economic growth since the close of the Carter administration in 1979 and 
1980. In an effort to spur economic growth, the Reagan administration had implemented a series 
of tax cuts beginning in 1981 and 1982 (McCaleb: 1984). However, by 1984 the U.S. Treasury 
had begun to run huge deficits, spurring politicians to examine tax rules more closely, 
particularly tax-advantaged shelters and loopholes (McCaleb: 1984). In addition, it was clear that 
the pressure generated by budget deficits had encouraged politicians from both sides of the aisle 
to consider new approaches to tax policy and alternative systems of taxation.
In this environment of uncertainty the Tax Reform Act of 1986 began to develop. This 
move to reform was spurred on by a small group of strong-willed but unlikely champions. One 
analyst stated “nobody thought that a retired B-list actor, a corrupt Chicago pol, and a man who 
held weekly strategy breakfasts with rich campaign donors would produce the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986.” (Burman, 2006: 359). Of course, this refers to three principal architects of the Act: the 
B-list actor was President Ronald Reagan; the corrupt politician was Illinois Representative Dan 
Rostenkowski; and, the “breakfast strategist” was Oregon Senator Bob Packwood. While there 
were many other individuals who played key roles in the move toward the 1986 Internal 
Revenue Code, such as Jack Kemp and Dick Gephardt, these three individuals played critical 
roles in ensuring the success of this landmark legislation in Congress.
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4.2 Background
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, or H.R. 3838, was passed by the House of Representatives 
on December 17, 1985. The Senate Finance Committee reported favourably on the proposal, 
including proposed amendments, on May 6, 1986, and nearly 40 days of public debate began 
(US Senate Committee on Finance: 1986). The legislation, which passed later that year, was 
considered the most sweeping reform to the Internal Revenue Code since 1954. Accordingly, due 
to its widespread impact, H.R. 3838 was named and came to be widely known as the “Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986.” (Joint Committee on Taxation: 1986). It remains the core of the current 
Federal tax code to the present day, though some of its provisions have been amended in 
subsequent legislative efforts. Though imperfect, it is generally accepted as a strong example of 
broad-based tax reform, having been achieved with broad bipartisan support and a spirit of 
compromise from all interested parties.
In its final Committee report endorsing H.R. 3838, the Senate Finance Committee of the 
United States Congress stressed three major values of the legislation: a simpler, fairer, more 
efficient tax system (Joint Committee on Taxation: 1986). The report outlined simplicity in terms 
of reducing the costs of compliance; weakening the thriving tax shelter industry; and ensuring 
that economic investment is undertaken with real economic motives in mind, not goals 
artificially induced by the complexities of the tax system (Joint Committee on Taxation: 1986). 
The Committee’s notions of fairness were also made clear in the report (Joint Committee on 
Taxation, 1986: 23):
A primary goal o f the committee is to provide a system that ensures that individuals with similar 
incomes pay similar amounts of tax. The ability o f some individuals to reduce their tax liability
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excessively leads to a direct erosion of the tax base, requiring higher tax rates. Other individuals 
unable to take advantage of tax shelters may lose confidence in the tax system and may respond 
by seeking to evade their tax liability.
This philosophy was also exemplified in the Tax Reform Act’s focus on reducing overall tax 
rates by limiting specific carve-outs and tax preference items for individual taxpayers. The 
legislation was clearly designed to force tax liabilities to more closely align with true economic 
activity. As a result, many of the provisions of the bill were designed to broaden the individual 
tax base, and suppress special accounting circumstances that created divergence from true 
economic income. Ultimately, however, individuals also bear the burden of corporate taxation as 
well, as the economic pass-through of the economic burden pricing of goods and services in the 
marketplace.
Accordingly, in addition to individual tax fairness, H.R. 3838 sought to achieve greater 
balance between corporate taxpayers. The bill specifically cites income manipulation 
mechanisms as serious problems, including timing and nature of foreign income, dividend 
payments, and earnings management. Further, the bill sought to increase the corporate share of 
tax receipts as a portion of total tax revenues. Stated differently, the Senate Finance Committee 
desired to relieve the individual taxpayer at the expense of the corporation, and to create greater 
equity among subcategories of both individual and corporate taxpayers (Joint Committee on 
Taxation: 1986).
The final key goal of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was efficiency. The Act represented a 
critical move away from tax incentives, which the bill’s supporters believed had unintended and 
occasionally illogical consequences for taxpayer behaviour and economic activity ((Joint
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Committee on Taxation: 1986). Further, the bill’s authors also believed that reduction in special 
tax incentives improved motivation for individual efforts at generating income and savings.
Specifically, the committee attacked the system of tax shelters in place (Joint Committee on 
Taxation, 1986: 25):
The present Federal tax system contains a number of preferences, which have not satisfactorily 
served the purposes for which they were designed. In the past few years, tax incentives have led 
to the excessive construction of office buildings and record vacancy rates; overinvestment in 
agricultural tax shelters by high-income investors with little knowledge o f farming; and, 
distortions at all levels o f business - from financing choices to production decisions.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was drafted to promote fairness, efficiency, and simplicity, and 
those responsible for writing the provisions in the bill clearly felt that their proposal would 
accomplish these goals. These were lofty goals for any piece of tax legislation, and the 
provisions were clearly written to accomplish much more than making routine changes to the tax 
code. As the political process unfolded, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 began to take shape as a 
historically-important piece of legislative work.
4.3 Major Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made a number of significant changes to the existing 
Internal Revenue Code. With fairness, simplicity, and neutrality as its guiding principles, as well 
as a goal of closing the Federal budget deficit, the Act attacked areas where disparity was most 
apparent. Major alterations were implemented, particularly in the area of individual taxation: a 
simplified rate structure, home mortgage interest deductions, passive activities and tax shelters,
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capital gains taxes, and alternative minimum taxes. Specifically, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
accomplished the following significant provisions related to individual income taxes (Wilkie, 
Young, & Nutter: 1986; Tax Policy Center: 2011):
• reduced the top marginal rate from 50 percent to 28 percent, below the top corporate 
tax rate;
• eliminated the long-term capital gains deduction;
• first introduced passive loss limitations, phasing in disallowances of taxpayers' 
deductions from business losses originating in "passive activities”;
• limited IRA eligibility and pension contributions; and
• increased the earned income tax credit for low-income taxpayers; created a new low- 
income housing tax credit.
In the area of corporate taxes, the following provisions were enacted (Wilkie, Young, & 
Nutter: 1986; Tax Policy Center: 2011):
• reduced the top marginal rate from 46 percent to 34 percent;
• broadened the definition of “business” income and restricted recognition and timing 
of expenses such as bad debt charge-off, added uniform capitalization for inventories, 
lengthened depreciable lives for business assets, and repealed the investment tax 
credit (as explained later in this research);
• expanded corporate alternative minimum tax by subjecting to immediate taxation a 
portion of economic income that was not otherwise included in the regular taxable 
income;
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• repealed the General Utilities doctrine, which had allowed, in certain circumstances, 
tax-free corporate liquidations;
• extended research and experimentation credit; and
• repealed the investment tax credit.
4.4 Timeline
The timeline of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and its movement through the legislative process, is 
outlined below (Votesmart.org: 2015):
• December 3 , 1985 introduced
• December 17th, 1985 House version passed
• June 24th, 1986 Senate version passed
• September 25th, 1986 House Conference report adopted
• September 27th, 1986 Senate Conference report adopted
• October 22nd, 1986 signed by the president into law.
4.5 Historical Groundwork for the Tax Reform Act of 1986
As early as 1982, a number of factors had begun to clear the way for passage of the 1986 
Tax Reform Act. Though President Ronald Reagan played a significant role in opening the door 
for tax reform during his second term in office, it is also notable that a number of previous 
efforts, both successful and unsuccessful, had helped frame the debate and create coalitions of 
support around key issues. For example, supply-side conservatives, such as Jack Kemp, pushed
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for broad rate reductions. Mainstream, politically popular Democrats, such as Senator Bill 
Bradley (Democrat, represented the state of New Jersey) and Dick Gephardt (Democrat, 
represented the state of Missouri), pushed for a broad tax base, reduced loopholes, and fairness 
and relief for the lower-middle class and to ensure the reduction of the number of poor on the tax 
rolls. Powerful politicians such as Dan Rostenkowski and Bob Packwood, entrenched in the 
informal mechanisms and political pageantry of Washington politics, pushed for reform for their 
own reasons, both personal and political.
In 2010, Representative Richard Gephardt (Democrat, represented the state of Missouri) 
testified in a series of hearings on Capitol Hill in which major participants in the passage of H.R. 
3838 were asked to reflect on the bill and its legacy. Gephardt reflected on the broad purposes of 
comprehensive tax legislation, and its role in society and in the life of the average citizen 
(Gephardt, 2010: 3):
It is time for us to look again at whether we can dramatically simplify the tax code so that it is 
broadly understood and -  while perhaps not loved, at least respected. We need to look over every 
provision in the code and ask: does this really serve the greater good, is this the best way to help 
grow the economy, can we really afford the myriad o f provisions that only benefit the privileged? 
And finally, we have to make certain that the tax code itself is not the driver o f everyday 
investment decisions, leaving those to the free market and the great common sense of the 
American people.
Gephardt make several astute observations about what good tax legislation should be, and what it 
should avoid. In particular, his opinion that good tax legislation should be “respected, not loved” 
captures the spirit of equity that is indicative of good government (Gephardt, 2010: 3). 
Gephardt’s comments also capture timeless characteristics associated with good tax policy, and
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make an excellent yardstick for evaluating the overall effectiveness and fairness, not just of H.R. 
3838, but any tax bill. Gephardt’s reflection was one shared by many participants in the political 
process surrounding the Tax Reform Act of 1986: that Act was an unexpected, effective, and 
bold political stroke. As this research will illuminate, it is even more surprising in that this 
landmark piece of tax legislation was ushered in during difficult political circumstances and 
championed by unlikely supporters. A detailed review of the historical record demonstrates that 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 passes Gephardt’s test of good tax legislation: while not everyone 
loved the bill, it was respected by almost everyone involved in the political process.
4.6 Key Figures in the Tax Reform Act of 1986
Four key figures were instrumental in the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 -  Ronald 
Reagan, Dan Rostenkowski, Bob Packwood and Jack Kemp. Each of these individuals played a 
unique role in the success of the 1986 Act, and helped shape its final form. From fascinatingly 
different walks of life and political spheres, they managed to collaborate to create a landmark 
piece of tax legislation.
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan served two terms as president of the United States, and is known as one of the 
most influential presidents of the 20th century. A champion of individual liberty, economic 
growth, and limited government, Reagan became known as a proponent of “Reaganomics”, a 
conservative version of supply-side economics. A former actor and governor of the state of 
California, Reagan was a renowned speechmaker and left his second term as one of the most 
broadly popular presidents in history (White House: 2014). Reagan played an important and very
73
public role in positioning tax reform for success, particularly in signalling to both political 
parties that tax reform was both possible and necessary. However, Reagan’s approach to budget 
deficits, tax policy, and deficit spending remain controversial to this day even among experts 
(White House: 2014).
Dan Rostenkowski
Dan Rostenkowsi was a Democratic Congressman from Chicago, and was known as an 
unmatched Capitol Hill “dealmaker.” He epitomized the slightly greasy feel of a traditional 
Washington insider, plain-speaking, a bit rough around the edges, but willing to do whatever it 
took to move his agenda forward. He was elected to Congress at the age of 30, and remained the 
youngest member for a number of years (New York Times: 2010). Rostenkowski was 
unpretentious and blue-collar, a product of Mayor Richard Daley’s Chicago political regime. 
Rostenkowski had a checkered record as a speechmaker and lacked public relations agility. 
Reportedly, a speechwriter had once given Rostenkowski a speech with the word “hyperbole” in 
it. Rostenkowski proceeded to pronounce the word “hyper-bowl” when he delivered the address 
(Birnbaum & Murray: 1992). He was also master of mixed metaphors, claiming once that 
guiding the Tax Reform Act through Congress was like walking through an “egg field” instead 
of “mine field.” (Birnbaum & Murray: 1992). A “machine politician”, he eventually became 
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and gained a reputation as powerful broker 
of compromise, with friends on both sides of the political aisle. He played an instrumental but 
unexpected role in moving the Tax Reform Act of 1986 forward. True to his roots, he lived in his 
childhood home until his death at 82 in 2010 (New York Times: 2010). A significant stain on
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Rostenkowski’s career was his indictment and conviction on fraud charges, which effectively led 
to his unseating in Congress and the end of his political career.
Bob Packwood
Bob Packwood was a maverick Republican Senator from Oregon and Chair of the Senate 
Finance Committee in 1986. He attended law school at New York University, though he was a 
third-generation Oregonian. Packwood was a blunt, yet politically savvy politician who could be 
highly independent and unpredictable. He was a staunch supporter of special interest groups and 
“sweetheart” deals on Capitol Hill, particularly when they benefited the Oregon timber industry. 
This is particularly ironic given his later role in tax reform. His forthright speech was legendary: 
he reportedly once told President Richard Nixon, to his face, “Your weakness is credibility. This 
has always been your short suit with the news media and the general public.” (Birnbaum & 
Murray: 1992). While Packwood passed easily among the Washington elite, he remained a bit of 
an enigma. He was a pro-abortion Republican who ultimately became one of the most influential 
tax policymakers of his generation. However, he was known to be earthy and unassuming; 
Packwood was said to dress very shabbily away from the office, and according to his spouse, 
needed a complete wardrobe overhaul and “cleanup” effort prior to assuming the Chair post on 
the Senate Finance Committee (Birnbaum & Murray: 1992). Ironically, Packwood was forced 
out of office in 1995 due to very public rumours and evidence of sexual misconduct while in 
office.
Jack Kemp
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Jack Kemp was former National Football League quarterback, member of Congress, Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development, and Republican vice-presidential candidate. Kemp was the 
author of Kemp-Roth tax legislation in 1981, the first of the “Reagan” tax reforms (Jack Kemp 
Foundation: 2014). Kemp continued to be a bipartisan voice for economic growth, urban 
development, and tax reform and simplification throughout his political career. Many of his 
proposals, even the unsuccessful ones, were included as part of other successful legislative 
efforts, such as his Kemp-Kasten proposed legislation (Jack Kemp Foundation: 2014).
4.7 Ronald Reagan on Tax Reform
President Ronald Reagan played an important symbolic role in moving the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 along toward its passage late that year. At that point in time, Reagan was one of the 
most popular presidents in the history of the United States, and was coming away from an 
election in which he had won 49 of 50 states in an unprecedented landslide (Birnbaum & 
Murray: 1992). His tremendous popularity therefore lent weight and importance to any issue he 
chose to back. Reagan also desired to be seen as a president who reduced tax rates, some of 
which exceeded 70 percent at the top margins, and in this regard the tax reform movement 
dovetailed with Reagan’s own tax philosophy (Birnbaum & Murray: 1992).
Precursors o f Tax Reform
Before direct tax reform efforts began in earnest, the Reagan administration had begun to 
shift the tone in Washington away from “big government” efforts and toward the private sector. 
Reagan sought to move away from Jimmy Carter’s policies, which in his estimation had caused
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the economy to stall. Reagan began to push for the private sector to help repair the economy and 
close the budget deficits the tax cuts of 1981 and 1982 had opened. In his State of the Union 
address before a joint session of Congress on January 26, 1982, President Ronald Reagan first 
hinted at his interest in empowering private commissions of citizens to tackle the problems of the 
Federal government, particularly the expanding Federal budget deficit. Reagan frequently 
employed the imagery of the “individual citizen” taking on a large, inefficient Federal 
bureaucracy, with Reagan typically positioning himself rhetorically as on the side of the 
individual. Reagan’s stance on “big government” foreshadowed the empowerment of private 
commissions, particularly the Grace Commission, which would ultimately make 
recommendations as to ways to improve the state of the Federal budget. This was one of the first 
steps that had begun to blaze the trail toward successful, comprehensive tax reform. Reagan 
spoke in 1982 on this topic (Reagan: 1982, 6):
Our faith in the American people is reflected in another major endeavor. Our private sector 
initiatives task force is seeking out successful community models o f school, church, business, 
union, foundation, and civic programs that help community needs. Such groups are almost 
invariably far more efficient than government in running social programs.
As suggested by the President in his rhetoric, he sought to empower private citizens and reduce 
the influence of the Federal establishment. Ultimately, he would convene the Grace Commission, 
also known by its formal name, the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control. The 
commission’s goal was to rein in and reduce the influence of what Reagan believed was a large, 
inefficient, overly-centralized Federal government.
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The Grace Commission was made up of hundreds of executives and community leaders, 
and included a roll of several thousand volunteer participants (PPSSC: 1984). The Commission 
prepared a massive report for the President on the performance of the Federal government, 
involving thousands of hours and hundreds of volumes of specific recommendations. The 
President initially requested that the commission members pursue the stated mission of 
identifying waste and budgetary problem areas “like tireless bloodhounds” and the commission 
responded accordingly (PPSSC, 1984:10).
In 1984, the Grace Commission presented its final conclusions to President Reagan as to 
where and how costs might be controlled in the Federal government (PPSSC: 1984). The Grace 
Commission’s report helped validate and bolster Reagan’s belief that reduced government 
spending was the primary means to control the deficit, though Reagan would later use increased 
tax revenues as a tool as well. In the commission’s press release, the members set the tone for 
deficit reduction (PPSSC, 1984: 10-11):
In the course of the search by our 36 Task Forces, chaired by 161 top executives from around the 
country and staffed by over 2,000 volunteers that they provided, we came up with 2,478 separate, 
distinct, and specific recommendations which are the basis for the carefully projected savings. 
For practical purposes, these savings, if  fully implemented, could virtually eliminate the reported 
deficit by the 1990s versus an alternative deficit o f $10.2 trillion in the decade o f the 1990s if  no 
action is taken.
The commission’s findings reflected Reagan’s interest in the private sector as a means for 
measuring, improving and criticizing the performance of government services. The report went 
on to explicitly endorse the correctness of Reagan’s policy of not raising taxes to close the
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budget deficit, saying that Reagan was “so correct in resisting attempts to balance the budget by 
raising taxes.” (PPSSC, 1984: 11). Further, the report also cited Congressional interference as a 
major hurdle in the way of truly closing the budget gap (PPSSC: 1984).
This idea of “Congressional interference” was emblematic of the problems Congress 
would later face as it wrestled with tax reform on the House and Senate Floors. Every budget­
saving effort came at a political cost for the representative or Senator who had secured it for a 
corporation or individual constituent. This inherent pressure between generating large-scale 
budget savings and accomplishing micro-level political goals would remain at odds throughout 
the debate over H.R. 3838. However, as the discussion around the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
unfolded, it became clear that tax reform would be a necessary step in the process of closing 
budget deficits generated early in Reagan’s first term.
This should not have come as a surprise, given that members of Congress answer directly 
to their home districts electorally. Given the choice between retaining spending priorities at 
home and participating in large-scale Federal budget-trimming efforts, most elected officials 
would choose the desires of their district without fail. The Congressional climate is not 
conducive to fostering large-scale cooperation; rather, it rewards political particularity, such as 
the funding of state-level projects and special interests. These kinds of projects are things that 
can be “bought and sold” during the political horse-trading process. They are the lubricants for 
the political machinery in Washington D.C. Congressional officials are therefore rightfully 
concerned with their popularity and perception “back home.” This is particularly true in the 
House of Representatives, where individual representatives are elected every two years. This 
creates great pressure for representatives to bring results home to their political district. On the
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other hand, with elections every six years, Senators had more room to negotiate, and more time 
to recover from difficult political circumstances should hard choices be required.
As the threat of rising budget deficits continued to plague Reagan, the impetus to move 
ahead the march toward comprehensive tax reform began to galvanize. In fact, members of 
Reagan’s inner circle were surprised at how significantly a series of tax cuts, championed by 
Reagan in the first few years of his term, had damaged the budget (Birnbaum & Murray: 1992). 
Reagan had pushed for tax cuts as a growth mechanism, but after seeing the massive budget 
deficits these cuts created, he understood that he needed to address deficits quickly and 
decisively. However, it was not politically expedient for a sitting Republican President to 
acknowledge that tax cuts had contributed to deficits. Accordingly, Reagan would maintain his 
public position that Federal spending was the problem, not revenue reductions (Reagan: 1985).
It is also noteworthy that previous legislative efforts in 1982 and 1984 gave Reagan a key 
strategic angle in attacking budget deficits: rate reductions, coordinated with a broadened tax 
base. These two tools, when instituted at the same time, would prove to be economically and 
politically effective (Weinberg: 1987). This broad-base, low-rate approach to tax policy 
permitted substantial increases in revenue with minimal political fallout, as the average citizen 
primarily makes a strong connection between tax rates and the tax they pay to the government 
(Weiss: 2010). However, in the same scenario, the average taxpayer is much less adept at 
determining the tax impact of a broadened tax base with a lower tax rate. Accordingly, it is 
usually politically expedient to avoid rate changes and cuts in specific tax benefits, because 
citizens will take note and voice their frustration at the ballot box. The key lesson for the Reagan 
administration was that broad-based tax reform could work to reduce the deficit under these
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conditions, and that any politically “dire consequences” would be extremely unlikely (Weiss: 
2010).
In a 2006 panel discussion entitled Tax Reform 20 Years Later: Time for Another Round? 
Panelist Joseph Minarik considered Reagan’s role in pushing ahead tax reform (Tax Analysts: 
2006, 33):
President Reagan's flexibility on revenue increases immeasurably facilitated the achievement of 
tax reform by allowing him to raise corporate taxes by approximately $25 billion per year, $120 
billion over a five year estimating horizon, to finance individual income tax cuts in the 1986 Act. 
This was extraordinarily helpful because for the most part what happens to individual income 
taxes drives the political verdict. And President Reagan's transfer of tax obligations from 
individuals to corporations was in the end the grease that allowed the tax reform machine to run. 
In addition to the corporate tax revenue kitty that helped to close the 1986 deal, there were ready 
tools at hand for legislators to implement that, namely the repeal of the biggest corporate tax 
preference, the investment tax credit.
As Minarik suggests, the individual voter makes the greatest difference in whether tax reforms 
succeed or fail, given that they typically vote on simple economic terms (Tax Analysts, 2006: 2). 
This would suggest that if lobbyists and well-heeled political insiders could be defeated, or at 
least held at bay, the individual voter would likely support tax reform. This is particularly true if 
the tax burden were to be shifted to corporate taxpayers, as it ultimately would be in H.R. 3838.
Reagan addressed the nation regarding the Federal Budget and Deficit Reduction on 
April 24, 1985. His position on the growing deficit remained steadfast: out-of-control 
government spending was the cause of the growing budget deficit, and the expanding deficit
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must be closed without raising taxes. Clearly, the work of the Grace Commission, and the US 
Treasury Department’s first report on potential tax reform offered Reagan some political cover to 
expand revenue without appearing to burden taxpayers. In Reagan’s words (Reagan, 1985: 1):
The simple truth is: No matter how hard you work, no matter how strong this economy grows, no 
matter how much more tax money comes to Washington, it won't amount to a hill o f beans if  
government won't curb its endless appetite to spend. Overspending is the subject we must now 
address -- how budgets got so far out o f balance and, yes, what together we can and must do to 
correct this.
Deficits are politically troublesome, as they would prove to be to Reagan as well. Closing them 
requires top-line tax revenue increases, or the elimination of tax preferences that benefit 
particular groups, or both. Even more troubling is the fact that taxpayers are notoriously sensitive 
to changes in tax rates and the presence of special deductions or carve-outs that 
disproportionately benefit them, or harm them relative to other groups of taxpayers. Despite all 
of the complexities in the tax code, the average taxpayer has always been adept at identifying 
and criticizing disparities between themselves and other taxpayers. Accordingly, President 
Reagan faced a dilemma: he wanted to promote economic growth, attack “stagflation”, and 
remain taxpayer-friendly, all while remaining true to Republican principles of conservative 
taxation and responsible spending policies.
Part of what made the Tax Reform Act of 1986 come to life was the fact that Reagan’s 
political goals aligned broadly with both the needs of the economy and the desires of Congress. 
In particular, H.R. 3838’s fairness provisions, described in detail later in this chapter, allowed 
Reagan to continue his public discourse against taxation and spending under the guise of
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simplification and right-sizing of the tax code. In his April 24th speech he seized the opportunity 
to frame this argument in terms of morality (Reagan, 1985:1).
Well, there is no magic money machine. Every dollar the government spends comes out o f your 
pockets. Every dollar the government gives to someone has to first be taken away from someone 
else. So, it's our moral duty to make sure that we can justify every one of your tax dollars, that we 
spend them wisely and carefully and, just as important, fairly.
Unfortunately, hardly anyone could honestly call Federal budgets wise, careful, or fair. Is it fair to 
ask one small business to help subsidize its competitors? Is it fair to ask workers in the private 
economy to pay for civil service pensions that are much more generous than the retirement 
benefits they receive? Is it fair to ask low-income families to help pay for the college education of 
children from families with incomes as high as $100,000 a year? Is it fair to ask taxpayers to help 
pay billions for export subsidies to a handful o f America's biggest corporations?
Well, it isn't fair, and you know it. But that's the law of the land right now, just part of the legacy 
of 50 years o f trying to do good things for all by treating your earnings like government property.
The time has come to decide what benefits we can properly expect from the Federal Government 
for ourselves, our neighbors, and those in need; and what government can take from us in taxes 
without making everyone worse off, including those who need our help. The one thing we cannot 
do is stay on the immoral, dead-end course o f deficit spending.
Reagan used this speech to begin to place himself on the “side of the taxpayer” despite having 
full knowledge that the effect of the bill would be to decrease the deficit using both revenue and 
spending adjustments. It is also important to note his strong populist tone in separating himself 
from Congress. Reagan characterized himself as being on the side of fairness, justice, and
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frugality, while at the same time he must have certainly been aware of, and perhaps complicit 
with, Congressional Democrats’ position on revenue increases. This was brilliant political 
gamesmanship, and is an excellent example of how Reagan earned the title of “The Teflon 
President” from former Congresswoman Pat Schroeder (Schroeder: 2004). Her reference to 
President Reagan borrows from the notion that bad news simply did not affect Reagan, much like 
burned breakfast would not stick to Teflon coated cookware (Schroeder, 2004:1):
Remember how we were promised a big tax refund, a huge increase in military spending and a 
balanced budget? Selling that was like selling a hot-fudge-sundae diet. When the national debt 
grew during his administration, you couldn't blame Reagan. He came across with that Irish 
twinkle. Americans are optimistic by nature, and they loved that Reagan believed to his core in 
the American Dream. If someone accused him of hurting college students by cutting loans, 
President Reagan could be seen on the nightly news writing a personal check to a struggling 
student.
In his State of the Union Address in February of 1986, President Reagan went as far as to frame 
tax reform as a return to traditional American values. He also pushed for simplification of the 
Internal Revenue Code, a balanced budget, and reduced tax revenues. Reagan’s speech 
characterized tax reform as a gateway to fairness in government (Reagan, 1986a: 2):
Before we leave this city, let's you and I work together to fix it, and then we can finally give the 
American people a balanced budget. How often we read of a husband and wife both working, 
struggling from paycheck to paycheck to raise a family, meet a mortgage, pay their taxes and 
bills. And yet some in Congress say taxes must be raised. Well, I'm sorry; they're asking the 
wrong people to tighten their belts. It's time we reduced the Federal budget and left the family
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budget alone. We do not face large deficits because American families are undertaxed; we face 
those deficits because the Federal Government overspends.
Now history calls us to press on, to complete efforts for an historic tax reform providing new 
opportunity for all and ensuring that all pay their fair share, but no more. We've come this far. 
Will you join me now, and we'll walk this last mile together? You know my views on this. We 
cannot and we will not accept tax reform that is a tax increase in disguise. True reform must be an 
engine o f productivity and growth, and that means a top personal rate no higher than 35 percent. 
True reform must be truly fair, and that means raising personal exemptions to $2,000. True 
reform means a tax system that at long last is pro-family, pro-jobs, pro-future, and pro-America.
Reagan readily acknowledged the size of existing budget deficits, but blamed excessive Federal 
spending as the primary cause (University of California-Santa Barbara: 2014). The 1986 Federal 
budget deficit was approximately 221 billion dollars, an all-time high to date, and accordingly, it 
was politically necessary for Reagan to address it as he discussed with Congress in February 
1986 (Reagan: 1986b). A significant disclosure in this speech was in fact a proposed broadening 
of the personal exemption, which would have benefited all taxpayers, regardless of income. As 
with any tax proposal, fairness is a function of one’s position on the issue. Just several days 
before the State of the Union Address, Reagan transmitted his annual report to Congress on the 
economy, a portion of which addressed tax reform (Reagan: 1986b):
Over the years, successive modifications of the Federal tax code have resulted in a complex tax 
system that contains many loopholes and artificially encourages some types o f activities at the 
expense o f others. Furthermore, the inflation o f the 1970s distorted the overall pattern of capital 
taxation and pushed personal incomes into ever-higher tax brackets, discouraging saving and 
investment. Our actions to reduce tax rates have corrected many of these distortions and
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inequities. Individual income tax rates have been reduced and indexed to the inflation rate; 
effective tax rates on new investment have been lowered substantially. Still, more must be done. 
In May 1985, I submitted to the Congress a comprehensive reform of the tax code to make it 
simpler, fairer, and more conducive to economic growth. I proposed reducing marginal tax rates 
for individuals and businesses, broadening the tax base by eliminating the majority o f existing 
loopholes, taxing different activities consistently so that resources are allocated on the basis of 
economic merit and not tax considerations, and compensating for or eliminating much of the 
remaining influence o f inflation on effective tax rates on capital.
Reagan was on message, and his rhetoric had begun to align with public opinion, the needs of the 
Federal budget, and the desires of Congress. The President had helped put the United States on 
the road to tax reform by making it a priority in his public discourse. Now it would be up to 
Congress to take up this challenge and act.
4.8 Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: the 1984 Treasury 
Report
In November of 1984 the Treasury Department issued a historically-important report to 
the President: Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth. This report was a 
bold plan for tax reform, and despite the loss of some of its provisions in the final version of 
H.R. 3838, it remained a significant proposal to fundamentally change the United States’ tax 
scheme (US Treasury: 1984). The major guiding principles of the proposal were highlighted in 
Chapter 4 of the report:
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It is worth repeating here the watchwords (described further in chapter 2) that guided 
development of these reforms: simplicity; fairness; lower rates; economic neutrality; economic 
growth; and fair and orderly transition. (US Treasury, 1984: 37)
There is great similarity between these principles and those that ultimately became core tenets of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Specifically, the Treasury report recommended a number of actions 
to accomplish these core goals with respect to individual and corporate taxpayers.
With respect to simplicity, the Treasury recommended “fairness for families” in the 
context of the individual income tax. The report promoted an expansion of personal exemption 
amounts so as to have the effect of reducing to zero the potential income tax liability of any 
families with incomes below the poverty level (US Treasury: 1984). In addition, the report called 
for rate reduction and simplification, proposing just 3 rates to apply across all types of individual 
tax returns: 15%, 25%, and 35%. Each of these rates would apply similarly to single, joint, head 
of household, and married filing separately returns, but with different income exemption 
amounts.
Reagan’s 1986 speech to Congress on the economy bore many similarities to the 
recommendations in the 1984 Treasury Report, as it should have, given that it was crafted by 
Reagan’s own Treasury Secretary Donald Regan. However, one of the primary points of 
agreement across both sides of the political aisle was that the tax code had actually begun to 
illogically drive economic decisions. The problems identified in this speech, as well as the 
Treasury Report, were both fundamental and industry-specific. The study (US Treasury, 1984: 
iv) cited broad objectives:
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The objectives o f our study included: lower marginal tax rates; reduced interference with private 
economic decisions; simplicity; revenues equal to those o f the existing tax system; fairness for 
families; equal treatment o f all sources and uses o f income; an unchanged distribution o f tax 
burdens across income classes; and encouragement to economic growth. We believe that our 
proposals for a modified flat tax best reconcile these competing objectives. They include some 
features that are similar to those in flat tax proposals that have been offered by members of 
Congress, but our proposals are much more comprehensive.
The Treasury report also provided great insight into lessons learned by recently unsuccessful tax 
reform efforts, as will be discussed in more detail later in this research. Stated differently, the 
Treasury Report appeared to acknowledge that for comprehensive tax reform to succeed, it 
needed to remain cohesive, and it needed to remain impervious to favouring or harming any 
particular group more than another (US Treasury, 1984: iv).
Most importantly, any change in the package inevitably means that the proposed rate structure 
must be redesigned in order to keep tax burdens constant -- in total and across income classes. 
Each credit, deduction or deferral o f tax that is retained in current law means that tax rates higher 
than those proposed in the Report will be necessary to attain the same level o f revenues, 
Moreover, if  any special tax benefits are left intact, it will be more difficult to resist appeals by 
others for special treatment. These proposals are bold, and they will be controversial.
The 1984 Treasury Report was comprehensive, tackling both high-level principles and details: 
Specifically, the report singled out a number of areas where accounting changes were needed or 
where new principles should be applied. Several of these included (US Treasury, 1984: 166):
1. Match expenses and receipts from multi-period production.
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2. Restrict use of cash accounting method.
3. Limit bad debt deductions to actual loan losses.
4. Disallow installment sales treatment when receivables are pledged.
5. Repeal corporate minimum tax (only if basic reforms are fully implemented).
Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth focused first on the divergence of 
real economic income and taxable income. Specific industry concerns, though discussed, were 
secondary to the ideas pointed out in items (1) and (2) above: use of the cash method to 
accelerate deductions and defer income and improper matching of expenses and revenues. It is 
notable that these were basic accounting issues, not specific tax preference items. Analysis of the 
1984 report revealed the Treasury Department’s belief that the Alternative Minimum Tax was a 
“necessary evil” to offset the variety of tax preferences buried in the Internal Revenue Code. As 
highlighted in item (5) above, the Alternative Minimum Tax helped maintain some sense of 
equity in the code, and as a result could not be repealed unless other mechanisms were enacted to 
maintain fairness (US Treasury: 1984).
Beyond fundamental issues, such as matching of expenses and revenue, Tax Reform for 
Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth also tackled specific industries which received 
preferences in the existing tax code, particularly Energy, Banking, and Insurance. Some of the 
subsidies targeted in the 1984 report were as follows (US Treasury, 1984: 166):
1. Energy and Natural Resource Subsidies
a. Repeal windfall profits tax.
b. Repeal percentage depletion; use cost depletion, adjusted for inflation.
89
c. Repeal expensing of intangible drilling costs.
d. Repeal special rules for mining reclamation reserves.
2. Special Rules of Financial Institutions
a. Repeal special bad debt deductions for banks and thrift institutions.
b. Disallow 100% of interest incurred to carry tax- exempt bonds.
c. Repeal tax exemption of credit unions.
3. Life Insurance Companies
a. Limit insurance reserve deductions to the increase in cash surrender value.
b. Repeal special deduction of percentage of taxable income of life insurance companies.
Each of these proposed changes would further the goal of reducing carve-outs and broadening 
the tax base, to make corporate taxes apply more evenly across industries. Specific subsidies 
were targeted, with the tradeoff being fewer tax brackets and lower rates for everyone: a more 
predictable tax system.
It is important to note that, in general, a more complex tax code can accomplish more 
specific political goals than a broad-based tax code, by way of special deductions and 
exemptions. However, in a hearing during 2010 on the current state of the United States Tax 
Code, Senator Max Baucus offered his reflections as to the effect of such complexities, and why 
the reforms proposed in the 1984 Treasury Report were important. Senator Baucus played a 
major role in shaping the Tax Reform Act of 1986. He and other key participants were asked to 
reflect on the evolution of the Internal Revenue Code since 1986 (US Congress, 2010: 1):
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The 1986 tax reform leveled the playing field. No longer could a wealthy individual escape taxes 
by buying into a shelter. No longer could a clever investment strategy get investors out of paying 
their fair share. No longer could businesses participate in notorious tax shelters. Similar taxpayers 
paid similar taxes. But since 1986, Congress has made more than 15,000 changes to the code. 
Congress made these changes with the best intentions; some to collect revenue, some to stabilize 
the economy, others to further certain social objectives, all made for legitimate reasons. But each 
change created additional complexity, and each change created the potential for exploitation. 
Once again, just as in the 1980s, many can largely avoid paying taxes if they know how to 
manipulate the code. A long list of deductions, credits, and exclusions is available to help avoid 
taxation. Those who do not have a savvy accountant and refuse to participate in tax games often 
end up paying more. Many honest taxpayers end up feeling like chumps.
Baucus’ point was clear. Changes to the tax code, specifically loopholes and special exceptions, 
drive complexity, which in turn drives administrative inefficiency. Taxpayers who can afford to 
spend significantly more time and resources on compliance efforts certainly will do what can be 
done to reduce their tax burden, and accordingly they may be rewarded with favourable, 
potentially inequitable, outcomes. The result is that the financially successful taxpayer is 
rewarded with a reduced tax burden, thanks to successful legal and administrative maneuvering, 
while the less astute taxpayer is punished with a higher tax liability.
Baucus also provided a favourite quote of Senator Bob Packwood, another architect of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, stating: “Senator Packwood was fond of saying, “Many taxpayers 
accept complexity that favors them.” (US Congress, 2010:7). In some sense, Baucus is right. Tax 
complexity oils the proverbial gears and pistons of the United States’ political machinery. 
Politicians who can deliver specific tax preferences to their constituents or favoured political
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groups solidify their incumbency and remain popular in the home district. Alternatively, removal 
or reduction in specific tax preferences may reduce the utility of the individual politician to the 
individual voter. Stated differently, it is easier to complicate the tax code than simplify it, 
primarily because of the way politicians are rewarded for their efforts by voters. Tax preferences 
can be marketed to voters, and are ready-made evidence of the value delivered by the politician 
to his or her constituents. In the absence of strong intervention, the tax code would likely move 
toward greater volume, deeper complexity, and disparity between taxpayers.
Alternatively, tax simplification efforts require significant political will and a coordinated 
effort between individual Congressional representatives and the executive branch. For example, 
a representative must first be willing to give up home district or home state-centered tax 
preferences in favour of the common good. Next, reform requires similar efforts on the part of 
other representatives, who are equally willing to enter into an implied agreement not to create tax 
advantages for their own political allies or home districts. Finally, the executive branch of 
government must be willing to sign simplification legislation that could create a significant 
number of economic “losers” who have lost their government-sponsored tax preferences, either 
as individuals or stakeholders in corporations. Taxpayers feel more clearly what is lost through 
simplification, in the form of individual economic impact, than what is gained by improvement 
in administrative efficiency, reduced overall tax rates, and collective fairness. Further, as every 
political figure knows, what the individual taxpayer feels, even in superficial terms, is critically 
important to electoral outcomes.
4.9 Previous Legislative Efforts
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The groundwork for the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was laid by a number of unsuccessful 
legislative efforts. Though these efforts did not succeed legislatively, many of their tenets were 
incorporated into the 1986 Act. In particular, the work of Bill Bradley and Dick Gephardt was 
most influential in producing comprehensive tax reform. Bradley and Gephardt were clearly 
centrist politicans, and would prove willing to work for compromise.
The Fair Tax Act o f 1982
The Fair Tax Act, also known as “Bradley-Gephardt” was an unsuccessful reform effort 
instituted with cooperation between Missouri Congressman Dick Gephardt and New Jersey 
Senator Bill Bradley. In a speech outlining his purposes and thinking in pushing for this reform 
bill, Gephardt explained his move toward a low-rate, broad tax base reform effort. Gephardt was 
reportedly unaware of Bill Bradley’s own independent efforts at drafting reform, and decided to 
join forces with him (Gephardt Collection: 2014). Initially, Gephardt was interested in pursuing a 
consumption tax, rather than overhauling the existing income-based tax system. However, after 
several failed efforts, and recognizing the complications in completely changing the tax 
paradigm in the United States, he settled instead on fundamental reform of the existing system 
(Gephardt Collection: 2014). Many of Gephardt’s and Bradley’s provisions formed the core 
tenets of subsequent reform efforts, including the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Specifically, The Fair Tax Act pushed for a variation of a flat tax (Gephardt Collection: 
2014). The Act recommended just three lower corporate tax rates, removal of as many corporate 
and individual loopholes as possible without compromising the bill’s ability to pass, and 
expansion of those individuals at the lower end of the income schedule who would not be subject 
to any income tax. Under the Fair Tax Act, a family of four would pay no tax up to $11,200 in
93
household income (Gephardt Collection: 2014). The three corporate rates would have been 14%, 
26%, and 30%, with Gephardt contending that over 70% of Americans would be subject to tax at 
the lowest rate (Gephardt Collection: 2014). In his speech, Gephardt urged that the public remain 
aware of the practical difficulties of truly comprehensive reform. He also expressed concern that 
other tax objectives, such as budget outcomes, would become confused and commingled with 
fundamental tax reform efforts. Ultimately, this bill was introduced by Bill Bradley but did not 
progress past Committee discussion (Govtrack: 2015).
Jack Kemp’s Reform Efforts
Tax Policy Center analyst Howard Gleckman (Gleckman, 2009: 1) discussed Jack 
Kemp’s importance to the tax reform efforts of the mid-1980s:
Kemp was a key member of the most improbable band of reformers: Bradley; Rostenkowski; 
Senate Finance Committee Chair Bob Packwood (Republican, represented the state of Oregon), 
who had built his career larding the revenue code with the sorts of tax subsidies that reform was 
intended to eliminate; and Reagan, who never could muster quite the same enthusiasm for the ‘86 
reform as he could for his ’81 tax cuts. But like the others, Kemp was willing to work across the 
aisle to make reform happen. It is, sadly, hard to imagine a politician today doing what Kemp did 
back in 1983-86.
Kemp had offered a wide range of tax reform efforts over the years, including a number of 
creative, forward-thinking proposals: flat taxes, modified value-added taxes, lower rates, and 
broadening of the tax base. Though Kemp was a loyal “supply-sider” and conservative he also 
worked well across the aisle and was open to new directions and proposals.
The Pool Party -  August o f 1983
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In 1983, Kemp hosted a renowned “party” around his swimming pool which evolved into 
an important, though highly informal strategy session for future tax reform. In a discussion 
forum hosted by the Miller Policy Center at the University of Virginia, a number of participants 
in Kemp’s reform efforts recalled this strategy session. This meeting between Jack Kemp and 
many of his colleagues helped chart the course of Conservative reform efforts for the next 
several years, leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. John Mueller, Kemp’s speechwriter 
and staff economist opened the panel by highlighting the political significance of this otherwise 
casual meeting (Miller Center: 2011, mm 4:00-5:00):
I think I should start by saying that tax reform (in the 1980’s) stressed all the fault lines in both 
parties, but also stressed the fault lines in the supply-side movement, precisely because of the 
difference in emphasis as to whether it’s things like the investment tax credit or rate reduction, 
which have the most oomph, so he would not have the unified party behind him as he did in the 
beginning.
Mueller also noted that the conventional wisdom in recent reform efforts, such as those 
sponsored by Bill Bradley, followed two major tenets. First, tax reform should not change the 
distribution of the tax code -  it should be distributionally neutral so that no group bears a 
disproportionate burden. Second, it should be revenue neutral (Miller Center: 2011).
Much of the discussion around Kemp’s pool was around the proper direction 
Conservative tax reform should take. There had been recent reform efforts sponsored by 
Democrats, including the Bradley-Gephardt bill, but it emerged during the discussion that it 
would be healthy if Conservative Republicans had their own version of reform to offer as an 
alternative to the Democratic proposals. Mueller again recalled the discussion around the pool as
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to how Conservatives should best respond to Democratic reform efforts (Miller Center, 2011, 
7:00-8:00).
Most of them (those at Kemp’s pool) actually did not have a firm view on the issue. It was my job 
as Jack’s liaison to the supply siders to poll everybody, which I did in the next month. I polled 
them about their analyses of the specific bill, whether it would fly or not, and we came to the 
conclusion after about a month’s discussion that we could do a lot better. Bradley-Gephardt did 
get the rates down... but it also repealed indexing, which is a big deal when there’s still inflation. 
It got much of its revenue by disallowing most of the deductions over the 14% rate. There really 
wasn’t a firm reason for doing that, we felt we had differential treatment of different taxpayers. 
But we thought we could build a better mousetrap because the so-called flat tax was very salient 
at the time.
Indexing for inflation was a major piece of the tax reform debate, and has remained an important 
principle in tax reform since the 1986 Act. Essentially, inflation was a great concern in the 
United States during the 1980s. Unchecked, it could have the effect of pushing individual 
incomes into higher tax brackets merely due to the artificial increase in wages. In testimony 
before the Maryland Ways and Means Committee in 2014, Tax Foundation expert Lyman Stone 
clarified the problem of indexation in taxation (Tax Foundation, 2014: 1).
Taxpayers suffer from what is known as “bracket creep.” This phenomenon causes wage inflation 
to push nominal wages, or a worker’s wages “on paper,” up even as taxpayers’ purchasing power 
remains the same. With higher nominal wages, they are pushed into higher tax brackets and owe 
more taxes. Paying higher taxes on income that is worth the same amount is especially damaging 
for low-income taxpayers.
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Accordingly, any discussion about tax reform required consideration of indexation before real 
economic comparisons could be made. Indexation would later be considered a major “lesson 
learned” after the Bradley-Gephardt proposed legislation in 1982. Modern tax systems needed it 
to make tax changes meaningful, as clarity, consistency, and predictability were major pillars of 
any good tax system, and uncertainty around inflation jeopardized this (Stone: 2014). Still, 
Republicans desired a legislative plan of their own, which could borrow some common tenets 
from Democratic proposals, but could also show a degree of originality.
Bill Bradley himself expressed concerns that cutting tax rates would almost certainly 
result in lost revenue. However, when referring to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1986, he indicated 
that he thought lowering tax rates was a great idea, but that politicians needed to realize that they 
also had to pay for them (Miller Center: 2011). Bradley, in retrospective discussion about tax 
reform, also indicated that he felt the historical record clearly showed that supply-side economics 
did not work as intended. He believed it had a negative effect on the budget and growth over the 
long term.
The Fair and Simple Tax Act o f 1984
H.R.5533, or the Fair and Simple Tax Act of 1984, was introduced on the House floor by Jack 
Kemp on April 26th, 1984. Ultimately, it would die in committee but represented another step in 
the evolution toward the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This legislative effort, also known as “Kemp- 
Kasten” was a further modification and enhancement of prior reform, particularly Bradley- 
Gephardt. Robert Kasten, a chief aide of Jack Kemp, discussed this integration of Democratic 
proposals into a “new” bill (Miller Center, 2014: mm 12:00-13:00):
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Most Republicans hoped to lower rates at that point. That was the hope. And I think the 
background, including the flat tax debate, is an important part of the foundation of what we did. 
And people were concerned because of the politics of it, not just the real estate lobby. People 
were not concerned just about the economics, but the politics. And the politics started to work its 
way through when we started to realize that Bradley-Gephardt would stay with us and we had the 
support of the President and we had the support of the Treasury secretary.
This comment is important because it speaks to a key element in the 1986 tax reform efforts: 
appropriate signalling. During this time frame, there were a number of signals in place that 
demonstrated that compromise across the political spectrum was possible and would not carry 
grave political consequences, or be exploited by the opposition. Reagan signalled in his 
discourse that he wanted simplification and low tax rates; Democrats, such as Gephardt and 
Bradley, signalled they would not abandon Republican efforts; and, Republicans such as Jack 
Kemp were also willing to work across the aisle for the good of the entire tax code. As will be 
discussed later in this research, such political signalling engenders trust, particularly when it is 
public, and proves to be a necessary element for any true bipartisan tax reform. Heavily partisan 
bills have been passed since the 1986 legislation, but they lacked this broad support, and of 
course, also lacked appropriate signalling.
Bob Mueller, drafter of the Kemp alternative, continued to discuss Republican strategy 
(Miller Center, 2014: 13:00-14:00):
Jack was already talking as early as early ’83 about the next step in Reaganomics. There was an 
effort in each year after Kemp-Roth (a 1981 tax bill) to have a tax increase of some sort, there 
was an ’83 bill, and an ’84, and the idea I think on the supply-siders part was to have a 
countermove to get the rates down with a base-broadening approach and to head off tax increases
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which would otherwise be inevitable. And so the idea was that Jack should wildcat with dissident 
democrats like Bill Bradley, and as Bradley mentioned, it seemed like a live option that he would 
be able to sell the democrats on the idea for the 1984 campaign, and so the Republicans should 
have their own version of it.
The version mentioned above, which the Republicans ultimately produced, was the Fair and 
Simple Tax Act of 1984. This was the result of several prior legislative efforts, as well as 
strategy sessions and informal discussions between members of both parties. Many of the major 
tenets of the Fair and Simple Tax Act or “FAST” would later be incorporated into the Tax 
Reform Act, either wholly, or partially. Some of the most important features proposed in FAST 
included (Miller Center, 2011: 5):
• cutting the top marginal tax rate in half, dropping it down from 50% to 25%, expanding 
personal allowances, and fixing a flat rate of tax at 25%;
• doubling the personal exemption for each taxpayer, and expanding “zero-rate” brackets 
for low-income taxpayers so Americans near or below the poverty level would no longer 
pay income tax;
• broadening the tax base by eliminating most tax preferences, but retaining major 
deductions for mortgage interest, charitable contributions, real property taxes and 
catastrophic medical expenses;
• retaining tax treatment of IRA's, Keoghs, Social Security and veterans' benefits;
• indexing for inflation, including capital gains for the first time;
• cutting the corporate marginal tax rate from 46% to 30%, with a reduced 15% rate for 
small businesses, and reducing corporate capital gains tax from 28% to 20%;
• maintaining revenue neutrality, retaining average tax rates, but reducing marginal rates; 
and
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• reducing disparity between types of investment in property for tax purposes, such as 
depreciation.
Jack Kemp also had much to say himself about tax reform, despite his own sponsorship and 
reform efforts falling short of a major breakthrough. In a 1985 statement in support of bipartisan 
tax reform, Kemp announced the introduction of a Republican version of tax reform, and urged 
immediate passage of a comprehensive tax bill that reformed, equalized, and simplified the code 
(Kemp, 1985: 3):
The American people know that the current system is in disarray. The President strongly supports 
tax reform and Congressmen of both Parties understand the popular yearning for change. To 
symbolize the spirit of bi-partisan support for tax simplification, Senator Bradley and 
Congressman Gephardt are also introducing their tax reform plan in Congress on this same day. 
As Senator Kasten and I have said on many occasions, we welcome the contribution that Senator 
Bradley and Congressman Gephardt have made to lower marginal tax rates, increase investment 
incentives, and simplify the tax code. This kind of support from our Democratic colleagues 
signals Congress and the Administration that the movement for comprehensive tax reform is 
building undeniable momentum and strength.
The bipartisan support in Congress simply reflects the public's overwhelming support for tax 
simplification, lower tax rates, and fairness. According to a New York Times poll, almost 95% of 
the American public feel that the present tax system is unfair to the ordinary working man or 
woman. By almost 2 to 1, the public favors proposals to simplify the tax system by reducing the 
tax rate and the number of special tax preferences. According to a Washington Post/ABC News 
poll, over 60% of the public believe that tax rates are just too high.
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Though this reform effort would ultimately fail, as did Bradley-Gephardt, the groundwork was in 
place for tax reform. Kemp stressed that the public wanted reform, and that Congress needed to 
act to deliver the fundamental change the American people needed. However, despite the 
synergies in place that would ease the process of changing the tax code, the current system of 
political tit-for-tat was hard-wired into life on Capitol Hill. Individual politicians had made 
promises to their home districts and to significant campaign donors. Committee Chairs, such as 
Bob Packwood, Senate Finance Chair during the legislative process associated with the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, could demand compliance from their committee members using political 
favour as leverage. It would become increasingly clear that changing individual provisions in the 
tax code was simple. However, arranging support from a wide range of special interests for tax 
reform and the sacrifice of sovereignty it required would be far more difficult.
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act o f 1985
Another important step which paved the way for the Tax Reform Act of 1986’s 
successful passage was the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985. This bill was designed to cut the deficit to zero by 1990 by way of a 
sequestration process. If the results of the annual budget exceeded agreed-upon thresholds, 
across-the-board sequestration percentages were applied evenly across the entire budget (Library 
of Congress: 2014). The specific provision that enacts sequestration is described in the bill as 
follows (US House of Representatives, 1985: 30):
Each automatic spending increase shall be reduced
1) to zero (a uniform percentage reduction of 100 percent), or
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2) by a uniform percentage reduction of less than 100 percent calculated in a manner to reduce 
total outlays for the fiscal year by one-half of the deficit excess, in such case fiscal year 1986, 
if the elimination of all such increases would reduce the total outlays for the fiscal year by 
more than one-half of the deficit excess (or the adjusted deficit excess, in the case of fiscal 
year 1986) for the fiscal year.
Gramm-Hollings was significant in that it was a serious attempt to tackle budget deficits that had 
grown significantly since 1981. It was supported almost unanimously by House and Senate 
Republicans, while receiving mixed support among Democrats (UC Berkeley: 2014). President 
Reagan’s administration was also only tacitly supportive, primarily due to the fact that the 
sequestration provisions in the bill would directly and materially impact defense spending, a 
Republican priority (University of California-Berkeley: 2014). Ultimately, the Supreme Court 
would find Gramm-Hollings unconstitutional; Congress would pass a second version, with 
modifications to the sequestration provisions, just two years later (University of California- 
Berkeley: 2014).
Gramm-Hollings was also important because it was part of the “perfect storm” that 
helped lead the nation toward truly landmark tax legislation in 1986. The Tax Reform Act of 
1986 succeeded partly out of the need for the political establishment on both sides of the aisle to 
take on the rising budget deficit in a manner that was palatable. President Reagan’s 
administration had begun to run large deficits by 1982, and these deficits had reached all-time 
highs by 1986 (Bloch: 2014). By contrast, President Jimmy Carter’s administration had 
maintained a small budget surplus all the way into the final year of his presidency (Bloch: 2014). 
The Reagan-era deficits between 1981 and 1986 were rooted in a number of significant causes,
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including Reagan’s tax cuts, dramatic and unexpected drops in inflation, and general economic 
malaise in the United States (American Enterprise Institute: 2012).
4.10 The House of Representatives’ Debate of H.R. 3838
The principal architect of the House’s version of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was 
Representative Dan Rostenkowski (Democrat, represented the state of Illinois). As Chairman of 
the House of Representatives’ Ways and Means Committee, Rostenkowski had great power to 
author and shape bills involving budgetary expenditures. This is a hallmark of the American 
legislative system: bills involving monetary outlay must originate in the House of 
Representatives. Though the House is considered to be the “weaker” and more transient of the 
two legislative bodies, the framers of the United States Constitution felt that empowering the 
House of Representatives with initial control over spending kept this key power close to the 
electorate. Rostenkowski was generally accepted to be one of the most powerful Congressmen 
ever to wield the position of House Ways and Means Committee chair.
On May, 28, 1986, President Ronald Reagan delivered a speech in support of tax reform, 
to which Rostenkowski was selected by House Speaker Tip O’Neill as the appropriate 
Democratic respondent (Mitchell: 2013). Rostenkowski’s speech was a call for support for tax 
reform, and he suggested that the root goals of the legislation transcended party politics. 
Interestingly, while flavoured by party affiliation, it was an expression of support for Reagan’s 
core ideals as well (Mitchell, 2013: 1):
Trying to tax people fairly: That’s been the historic Democratic commitment. Our roots lie with 
working families all over the country, like the Polish neighborhood I grew up in on the northwest 
side of Chicago. Most of the people in my neighborhood worked hard in breweries, steel mills,
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packing houses; proud families who lived on their salaries. My parents and grandparents didn’t 
like to pay taxes. Who does? But like most Americans they were willing to pay their fair share as 
the price for a free country where everyone could make their own breaks.
Every year politicians promise to make the tax code fair and simple, but every year we seem to 
slip further behind. Now most of us pay taxes with bitterness and frustration. Working families 
file their tax forms with the nagging feeling that they’re the biggest suckers and chumps in the 
world. Their taxes are withheld at work, while the elite have enormous freedom to move their 
income from one tax shelter to another. That bitterness is about to boil over. And it’s time it did.
But this time there’s a difference in the push for tax reform. This time, it’s a Republican president 
who’s bucking his party’s tradition as protectors of big business and the wealthy. His words and 
feelings go back to Roosevelt and Truman and Kennedy. But the commitment comes from 
Ronald Reagan and that’s so important and so welcome.
Because, if the President’s plan is everything he says it is, he’ll have a great deal of Democratic 
support. That’s the real difference this time. A Republican president has joined the Democrats in 
Congress to try to redeem this long-standing commitment to a tax system that’s simple and fair. If 
we work together with good faith and determination, this time the people may win. This time I 
really think we can get tax reform.
This speech was a strong signal that it was acceptable for Reagan to proceed with tax reform, 
with symbolic support from the Democratic side of the aisle (Mitchell: 2013). Even more 
fascinating, Rostenkowski closed the speech with a request for letters of support from the public 
(Mitchell, 2013: 2):
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Even if you can’t spell Rostenkowski, put down what they used to call my father and 
grandfather—Rosty. Just address it to R-0-S-T-Y, Washington, D.C. The post office will get it to 
me. Better yet, write your representative and your senator. And stand up for fairness and lower 
taxes.
Thousands of letters poured in in response. The public reception of Rostenkowski’s response was 
energetic and positive, a surprise given Rostenkowski’s reputation as an awkward speechmaker 
(Mitchell: 2013). This conciliatory and populist tone set the stage for legislators to make real 
change. Some of the ideological impediments to reform had been removed, and this freed up the 
political players, including President Reagan, Rostenkowski, and Senator Bob Packwood, to 
pursue the bill with few reservations. Further, it is important to note that the most important 
personalities in the legislative process were known to be “dealers”, more than willing to bargain 
and “make political sausage” without dishonesty. This “honourable wheeler-dealer” mentality 
was a unique aspect of 1980s politics. The politics of compromise was widely accepted as the 
way policy was done, and no one excelled at this more than Rostenkowski (Citizens for Tax 
Justice: 2000). Ironically, a number of political figures associated with the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 were later damaged by criminal and ethics probes, most notably Dan Rostenkowski 
himself.
4.11 Senate Debate
The Senate Finance Committee debated H.R. 3838 beginning on September 27, 1986. 
The session, televised on the network C-SPAN, contained nearly 16 hours of debate and 
discussion. The key themes of this debate centered on several areas: the expression of solid
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support for the overall legislation, despite known flaws; recognition that the effort was not just a 
tax bill, but true reform; and criticism and concern over transition rules.
Senator Slade Gorton (Republican, represented the state of Washington) opened the discussion, 
expressing strongly the context which gave rise to the bill (CSPAN: 1986, mm 49:00-50:00):
Congress has increasingly come to view the tax code not simply as a revenue raising system, but 
as a tool for achieving all sorts of social goals, not always successfully. In recent years the tax 
code has become so complex and confusing, that even the smartest and most sophisticated 
taxpayers are frustrated by the task of filling out a tax return. Perhaps the most dramatic symptom 
of this is the industry of tax avoidance that has grown up around the tax code.
He also expressed a number of common concerns around the proposed legislation, including the 
proposed repeal of the investment tax credit and favourable capital gains tax rates, as well as lack 
of consideration for indexation of inflation.
Positives associated with the bill were its dramatic simplification and lowering of the tax 
rates, as well as removal of over 6 million poor and very low-income residents from the tax rolls. 
The increases in personal exemptions and standard deductions also levelled the tax scheme, to 
place a greater burden on top earners, and reduce the burden on low-income taxpayers. Gordon 
spoke further in support of the bill, stating “After reviewing the testimony, I am convinced that 
the long-run impact on our economy will be positive. The deterioration of our current tax system 
cannot continue. We have the chance to stop it now.” (CSPAN, 1986: mm 55:40-56:30).
Senator Alan Dixon also (Democrat, represented the state of Illinois) spoke, in support of the bill 
(CSPAN, 1986: mm 1:34:30-1:35:20).
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I think that almost every member in either house would agree that this is truly a historic moment 
in the Congress, but I think anyone who has been here for a while appreciates the fact that this is 
landmark legislation. Mr. President, this is truly is a fundamental reform of the entire Internal 
Revenue Code of this country.
Dixon went on to address concerns about the economic impact of the bill, a concern with any 
large-scale tax reform effort (CSPAN, 1986: mm1:36:00-1:37:00):
Some have expressed concern about what this might do to the economy. But I would argue that 
any bill that takes fourteen brackets, with a high of 50%, and reduces it to 15 and 28%, reduces 
the corporate tax rate from 46 to 34%, and takes 6 million working poor off the tax rolls, 
ultimately has to be in my view a benefit to the economy. Now there are some things about this 
bill I don’t like. I was one of those who led the fight in the Senate to retain deductibility of the 
sales tax if you itemize on the return. My state of Illinois, and many other states in this union that 
rely on sales tax for major sources of revenue, take some exception to the fact that you can’t 
deduct the sales tax if you itemize.
Dixon also complained about the loss of IRA deductibility in the Senate conference report and 
the harshness of the transition rules with respect to real estate investments. However, he was 
positive with respect to the bill “taking 120 billion dollars in tax liability off the back of 
individual American citizens.” (CSPAN, 1986: mm 1:38:00-1:38:45).
Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen, a democrat, and known friend of “big oil” also referred to 
the legislation as imperfect but worthwhile, stating “As I’ve looked at this bill and worked on 
this bill, I’ve certainly come to the conclusion that we’ve got a mixed bag on our hands. But 
don’t we always have that when we’re talking about a major reform piece of legislation?”
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(CSPAN: 1986, mm 1:44:40-1:45:00). The “mixed bag” metaphor was a common theme during 
the Senate Debate. Whether this was an expression of political cover from the Senate floor, or an 
expression of political reality, was unclear. However, this theme emerged strongly from the 
debate: the bill was not perfect, but as legislation goes, it was widely considered to be a very 
good bill.
Bentsen continued to discuss the bill’s reduction in loopholes, and shed significant light 
on precisely why they needed to be cut from the law. Interestingly, Bentsen was known to be a 
supporter of tax breaks for the oil industry, being a Senator from Texas, which he readily 
acknowledges in his speech as reproduced below. He was considered one of the most reluctant 
reformers on the committee as well, though he would later take on the Chairmanship due to the 
election results in November of 1986 (Birnbaum & Murray: 1986). However, his comments 
represented well the broader view of why the sheer volume of special tax breaks needed to be 
reduced (CSPAN, 1986, mm1:46:20-1:47:00).
I just happen to think the private sector is more efficient in that regard, and that’s what we ought 
to pursue. And this gets rid of a lot of those incentives. Well then, why would I vote for that bill? 
The reason I would is because each of those incentives was put in at a time and place in history 
when it serves what we deem to be a worthwhile purpose for our country. Some economic 
objective we think ought to be achieved. But time passes, economic conditions change, and we 
never go back and revisit the problem. Because we’re going to take something away from some 
special interest group. And one piles on top of another. And finally you’ve got the darndest 
mishmash in the way of a tax system you can imagine. And finally you don’t just make an 
economic decision, you make a tax decision. And then you end up with a very unfair tax system.
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Bentsen’s speech revealed a key element that provided impetus for change in H.R. 3838. There 
was a broad and growing sense that the tax code, including both individual and corporate 
provisions, had reached a tipping point. These historical “piles” of nuances, exceptions, and 
carve-outs Bentsen referred to had become too large for the average taxpayer to handle, and for 
even Congress to begin to broach. These particularities in the code often lacked logical or 
economic consistency, and usually benefited those most who could best navigate them with legal 
counsel, lobbying efforts, or campaign contributions (Birnbaum & Murray: 1986).
4.12 Transition Rules: The Cost of Compromise
Any attempt to simplify a major piece of tax legislation must allow for an orderly 
transition period for the new rules to take effect, ostensibly helping alleviate a catastrophic or 
disparate impact to taxpayers affected by the changes mid-stream. Transition rules were a major 
point of contention with respect to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, with over 80% of Senators and 
50% of Congressmen receiving at least one instance of transition benefits (Klott: 1986). 
However, in this particular piece of legislation, over 1,000 requests for transition relief were 
denied, and even a number of staunch opponents of the bill received transition relief (Klott: 
1986). However, those in charge of administering the transition aid, such as Senator Bob 
Packwood, viewed transition dollars as a cost of doing business and a key tool to get legislation 
passed. According to columnist David Rosenbaum, “One of the most powerful clubs available to 
the chairman of a tax-writing committee is his capacity to do small favors, called ’transition 
rules’, for the lawmakers who support him and to withhold favors from those who do not.” 
(Rosenbaum, 1986: 1). This was true of Bob Packwood, who used the privilege as chairman of 
the Senate Finance Committee to gain compliance from wavering committee members. These
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transition amounts were handed out in a bi-partisan fashion, intended to smooth bumps on both 
sides of the political aisle.
The relief rules associated with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were implemented as part of 
a discretionary lump-sum under the control of Senator Bob Packwood (Republican, represented 
the state of Oregon). This process raised questions among the Congress. These transition rules 
were, by their nature, intended to benefit particular individuals. In US v. Kjellstrom, the order 
referred to the original intent of the 1986 Act, stating “Transition rules were intended to provide 
limited exemptions for certain taxpayers who would be affected adversely by a new law because 
they had relied on the old law to their detriment.” (US v. Kjellstrom, 1996: No. 95-C-0091-C). 
Further, the court opinion in Apache Bend Apartments, describes transition rules as “specified 
exemptions from designated provisions of the new tax laws to a very, very few specified favored 
taxpayers.” (Apache Bend Apartments v. United States, 1993: 987 F.2d 1174). However, despite 
clear understanding that there would be winners and losers in any transition effort, a number of 
members of the Senate expressed reservations.
The transition rules constituted a list of hundreds of projects that would receive specific 
legislative protection amidst the storm of legal changes in the Act (Redburn: 1986). These items 
were not contained in the Act itself, but were referenced and cited in the associated Conference 
report, often covertly. H.R. 3838’s summary, as passed by the Senate, contains the following 
reference: “Transition rules. It is the sense of the Senate that the conference report on this bill 
contains the names of all persons receiving transitional relief as well as the costs and reasons for 
such relief.”
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Several major industries received significant relief, along with numerous “pet” projects 
associated with particular Senators and House members. General Motors, Chrysler, Phillips 
Petroleum, and numerous civic projects such as stadiums and infrastructure were included (Klott: 
1986). While the transition rules associated with major industries were difficult to conceal, the 
smaller rules associated with particular taxpayers or projects were often written so as to shield 
the beneficiary, and their Congressional sponsor, from the public eye. These became commonly 
known as “rifle-shot” transition rules (Evans: 1988). These rifle-shot rules were employed 
despite the statement in the bill’s summary which promised to specify the beneficiaries and 
reasons for the transition relief.
One instance of a transition rule that covertly protects the beneficiary is highlighted in 
Sec. 2656 of the 1986 Tax Reform Act:
For purposes of section 2656(b)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, an individual who 
receives an interest in a charitable remainder unitrust shall be deemed to be the only 
noncharitable beneficiary of such trust if the interest in the trust passed to the individual under the 
will of a decedent who resided in Tarrant County, Texas, and died on October 28, 1983, at the age 
of 75, with a gross estate not exceeding $12.5 million, and the individual is the decedent's 
surviving spouse.
It is clear in reading the legislation that this instance of relief targets one particular individual. 
There are numerous examples throughout the transition rules of this sort of arrangement. Not 
surprisingly, such deals and carve-outs angered a number of Senate and House members. 
However, Senator Packwood made it clear that anyone who did not vote for the bill in
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conference would receive no transition aid. Of course, every member of the committee 
ultimately voted in favour, and every member accepted transition aid (Rosenbaum: 1986).
In Senate Committee hearings televised on C-SPAN, Senators aired their complaints 
about the transition rules built into the Tax Reform Act. The major criticism was the extensive 
discretionary power to hand out transition benefits granted to Senator Bob Packwood. In 
addition, a number of Senators expressed discontent at the politically tainted process of phasing 
out transition aid. Many of the beneficiaries of transition aid were also major sources of lobby: 
insurance companies, banks, and high-profile individual taxpayers. Accordingly, the lobby and 
hallway outside the Congressional committee room became known as “Gucci Gulch” for the nice 
shoes of the well-heeled lobbyist who lurked there (Birnbaum & Murray: 1992).
Senator Howard Metzenbaum (Democrat, represented the state of Ohio) was an outspoken critic 
in his speech on the Committee Report. Metzenbaum had previously contended that he would 
have accepted any transition rule as long as the rule was made public and the beneficiary was 
clear (CSPAN, 1986: mm 1:12:00-1:13:00).
I don’t think any two men or women in this Congress have the right to parcel out 3.3 B dollars 
over and above that which the Congress has seen fit to include in the legislation, and at the same 
time you withdrew 250 M dollars from the farmers of this country of benefits they have by reason 
of income averaging...I guess what I am trying to say is that the managers of the bill have truly 
made a strong enough case for their having parceled out this 3.3 B dollars. (but) some of those 
positions were purely political.
Metzenbaum went on to point out that for 3.3 B dollars “foster care could be provided for every 
child in America for the next ten years” in response to Sen. Bob Packwood’s defense that in the
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scheme of things, the transition rule discretionary funding allocated by Packwood was a small 
amount of money. “How can we determine whether we are for them or against them if we don’t 
know what they are? They are one-liners. They don’t tell you the whole story.” (CSPAN, 1986: 
mm 1:24:00-1:25:30). Metzenbaum went on to say “What concerns me is that when you shroud 
the legislative process in secrecy, you contribute to the views of the average American that tax 
bills hurt the average American, and that only those with clout get taken care of.” (CSPAN, 
1986: 1:24:30-1:25:00). Further, Metzenbaum contended “If they knew it fully, they’d say ‘I 
appreciate the thrust of the tax bill and that it moves in the right direction, and I think it is going 
to help me as a middle-class American. But why did they give away so much money?’” 
(CSPAN, 1986: 1:25:15-1:25:40).
Senator Metzenbaum stressed repeatedly that the transition rules were too opaque and 
gave too much discretionary authority to Senator Bob Packwood. Packwood’s defense was 
simple: when the legislation was coming down to a deadline, he did whatever he needed to do to 
get the legislation passed (Redburn: 1986). Further, when pressed by reporters whether he could 
explain to them precisely how he leveraged transition rules to get the legislation passed, he stated 
that though he could, he didn’t plan to (Rosenbaum, 1986). In the legislative process, the 
finished product is often more palatable than the sometimes distasteful steps that created it. 
Ironically, some political favouritism and special provisions were ultimately required to pass 
large-scale tax reform legislation that was designed to limit special deals. Though 
Metzenbaum pushed for a more perfect version of the bill and its transition rules, Packwood 
clearly did not want to allow perfection to slow down a bill he believed to be good enough.
4.13 Success Despite Opposition
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While the Tax Reform Act of 1986 garnered broad support, it was also opposed by 
political action groups, individual politicians, and a portion of the voting public. The Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 was perceived as threatening to those who benefited from the existing political 
process, particularly those who were able to deliver “pork” or specific projects earmarked to 
their home districts. Other staunch opponents were lobbyists who were paid well to lean on 
Washington politicians on behalf of their corporate and wealthy individual clients. However, 
despite representing an existential threat to powerful Washington lobbyists, one of the most 
important surprises associated with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is that these disparate opposing 
forces were never able to galvanize into a single bloc capable of taking down the bill (Birnbaum 
& Murray: 1992). Numerous theories have been conjectured as to why this was the case: the 
individual lobby groups’ focus on narrow exemptions; unwillingness to stand in the way of tax 
reform; lack of communication between “common enemies” of tax reform; and, broad public 
support (Birnbaum & Murray: 1992).
In part, the bill’s lackluster opposition was a product of the neutral political nature of the 
bill itself. The bill was supported and moved along by members of both major political parties, 
and offered few favours to any particular group. Well-known Republican supporters included 
President Ronald Reagan, Senator Bob Packwood, Jack Kemp, and future presidential candidate 
Bob Dole. Democratic supporters included Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, Dick 
Gephardt, and Bill Bradley, also a future presidential candidate. These individuals were from a 
broad range of the political spectrum, and this diversified base of support helped the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 weather criticism and opposition at varying points in the process (Birnbaum & 
Murray: 1992). Along similar lines, Randall Weiss, Managing Director of Economic Research at 
The Conference Board in New York City provided testimony in 2010 as to why he believed this
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Act was successful where others had failed. He listed four key provisions in the Act that made it 
“stick” despite political difficulty: a substantial reduction in tax rates; moving the tax base closer 
to actual income; revenue neutrality; and, de-emphasis on distribution by income class (Weiss: 
2010). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 contained these universal, unifying elements that helped 
consolidate its support and diffuse its opposition. It is nearly impossible to argue against these 
principles without appearing to be an out-of-touch Washington insider, or a lobbyist with a 
personal stake in the outcome.
In 2010, Representative Dick Gephardt (Democrat, represented the state of Missouri) was 
called to testify before a Congressional commission called “Tax Reform: Lessons from the Tax 
Reform Act o f 1986’ (Senate Finance Committee: 2010). Gephardt recalled the circumstances 
that contributed to the Act’s success, particularly the Fair Tax Act. He also observed some of the 
key circumstances which allowed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to progress (Senate Finance 
Committee, 2010: 1-2):
In 1982, Senator Bill Bradley (Democrat, represented the state of New Jersey) and I introduced 
the Fair Tax Act which reflected our view that the tax code needed to be dramatically simplified 
to restore public faith, and trust that the code’s intentions were to promote sound economic 
growth for all, and not just narrow, short-sighted, and often counter-productive benefits for a few.
Super Dairy Cows were a prime example of that. There were substantial benefits to taxpayers to 
invest in dairy cows that could produce higher quantities of milk. Yet, due to dairy programs in 
the Farm Bill, there was already a glut of milk on the market. There was so much milk in fact, 
that cheese was literally spoiling in federal warehouses, with no appropriate consumer for the 
product. Schools, nutrition programs and other users already had their fill. Yet, millions and
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millions of dollars were invested in these tax shelters -  with the federal taxpayer underwriting the 
benefits -  because of some talented lawyers who helped arrange the tax dodge.
Gephardt reflected that by 1986, the Internal Revenue Code had become a playground for special 
interest groups, attorneys, and lobbyists. Special deductions, subsidies, and carve-outs were 
rampant, and these exceptions altered the behaviour of the participants in the political process. 
Politicians delivered “pork” to their constituencies, including both individuals and corporations, 
and lobbyists helped make sure that everyone who wanted a seat at the table had one. While this 
process of political favour-trading has not changed substantially in United States politics, the 
1980s was a particularly dark period in this regard.
Gephardt’s “Super Dairy Cows” example drove home the point that particularities in the 
tax code could drive irrational consumer behaviour in unexpected and undesirable ways. Further, 
special interest lobbying and complexity in tax law are closely correlated: a specific deduction or 
subsidy requires the creation of a particular code section to allow it under the law. Gephardt’s 
point was that specific tax subsidies, while helping in a particular policy objective, can run 
counter to overall goals of sound tax and economic policy. Also, the passive activity rules, which 
were enacted as part of the 1986 Act, also helped combat the distortion of economic activity by 
tax policy. Many of the passive investments the new law targeted had little economic substance: 
their real economic value was the paper losses they generated on the personal income tax returns 
of their owners (Wilkie, Young, & Nutter: 1986).
Gephardt also pointed out that a deep analysis of the issues, without prejudice or scope 
limitation, was critical to the success of the 1986 Act. Specifically, Congress was given time to 
explore deeply the alternatives, strengths, and weaknesses of various tax paradigms. This
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resulted in the conclusion to continue with the current approach to the income tax, rather than 
gutting it for other alternatives such as a national sales tax (Senate Finance Committee, 2010: 2)
But, it wasn’t until President Reagan embraced the idea of tax reform that real action started. The 
President had commissioned a number of extensive studies by the Treasury Department to look at 
various options -  such as sales taxes and the VAT. After full analysis, President Reagan came to 
the same conclusion that I did -  that the best approach was to reform the current income tax 
system rather than abandon it.
House Ways & Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski began comprehensive hearings that helped 
establish a thorough and fair understanding of the provisions in the tax code at that time, how the 
code might be altered and what the implications of each change would be. It was critical for 
members of Congress to come to a complete understanding of the interaction of the thousands of 
individual tax provisions. Without this level of understanding of the complex issues involved we 
could never have reached the bipartisan consensus that in the end passed the bill.
Gephardt’s point was about how long it takes to truly understand the impact of tax legislation of 
the magnitude of H.R. 3838. In this sense, it was not a surprise that the 1986 effort had begun as 
early as 1982 with Gephardt-Bradley. The political players needed time to understand what their 
reforms really meant, beyond the impact of a single provision that might apply to their home 
jurisdiction. Large-scale reform meant that each participant had to become a bigger stakeholder 
in the process, meaning many politicians would be “learning while legislating.” The 
understanding required for members of Congress to make such important policy shifts could not 
have occurred in a short time frame.
In his 2010 testimony which reflected on H.R. 3838, Representative Dick Gephardt went 
on to describe what he believed were precipitating factors that made the 1986 Act the right
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legislation at the right time. What begins to emerge from his account is a “recipe” or list of 
conditions that make it conducive for passage of major tax reform such as the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act. First, the presence of a national crisis was critical. In the 1980s the United States was 
emerging from a deep recession and unprecedented energy shortages. This was exacerbated by 
high unemployment and competition in trade from other countries (Gephardt: 2010). The 
presence of a “crisis” was important because it galvanized individuals to make their voices heard 
and pressed politicians to make sacrifices and compromises necessary to generate tangible 
results. Second, limited trust in government by the American citizenry and a desire for change 
contributed key pressure to the cause of reform. Gephardt explained “Taxes remain the principal 
point of contact between the average citizen and the Federal Government, and during tight 
budget times, the American people want to make certain that their tax dollars are not only fairly 
spent, but also fairly collected.” (Senate Finance Committee, 2010: 2). Finally, parity in 
leadership, including charismatic leaders who were also willing to compromise, helped usher in 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Gephardt (2010: 3) described this phenomenon:
In 1986 we had the benefit of a strong desire for change in Washington, and across America. We 
had leaders in both parties, like President Reagan, who were willing to negotiate in good faith, 
and debate when needed, and not just block anything and everything from getting done. These 
were leaders who were true champions of their respective philosophies as conservatives and 
progressives, but who were not hamstrung by partisan extremists who question every opponent’s 
patriotism, vilify compromise, and who have more in common with the Know-Nothings than with 
our Founding Fathers.
Gephardt’s testimony suggested that in order to produce broad-based tax reform, certain political 
and social conditions needed to be present. While changes to the tax law have occurred
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continuously throughout the history of the United States, on just a few occasions could the 
changes be referred to as “landmark.” The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a landmark piece of 
legislation, and accordingly it fit the profile suggested by Dick Gephardt. However, perhaps the 
most important aspect by which one can measure any significant piece of tax legislation is its 
historical legacy.
4.14 Conclusion
With the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, real compromise and material tax 
reforms appeared to have been achieved. In many ways, the Act represented the best of 
American politics. This chapter highlighted the strengths of the 1986 Act, the personalities who 
shaped it, and the behind-the-scenes efforts which laid its foundations. Perhaps most importantly, 
in examining this Act, four important lessons emerged as to how to best foster substantive tax 
reform. As later chapters will discuss, many of these lessons in fact predicate any real effort at 
tax reform.
First, partisanship creates dire consequences for reform efforts. When party leaders and 
voting constituencies make narrow, specific demands on politicians, it erodes their individual 
ability to compromise and make government function properly. This impedes progress of any 
kind, and prevents efforts at change that could be considered “across-the-board.” The result is a 
self-fulfilling prophecy: the only change that is possible is narrow in scope, not substantive, or 
responds piecemeal to special interest groups or particular jurisdictions.
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Second, certain political elements in the environment are critical. The history of the 1986 
Act shows that tax reform is most likely when no single party has effective control of the 
legislative and executive branch. This balance of power appears to create ideal conditions for 
compromise. If this balance is not present, the minority party may be inclined to take more 
extreme positions or seek leverage by mechanical or administrative means.
Third, highly visible, vocal support from top political leaders makes reform more likely 
to succeed. President Reagan’s openness to compromise set a tone within his own party, a tone 
that was reciprocated by the opposition. With political consequences out of the way, politicians 
could go to work making a deal that could pass Congress.
Last, pursuit of a good bill, as opposed to a perfect one, is the best attitude for creating 
tax reform. By focusing on making some progress, as opposed to accomplishing every political 
goal, legislators can appease a large enough voting bloc to pass key pieces of legislation. In 
seeking tax reform, this is a key consideration: creating a piece of legislation that is substantively 
better than the alternative.
The 1986 Tax Reform Act succeeded for several reasons: Reagan’s very public 
leadership; Packwood and Rostenkowski’s willingness to set a tone of compromise; the efforts of 
Jack Kemp and Bill Bradley to lay the groundwork for reform; and, the political landscape which 
allowed for a proper balance of power. The story of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is colourful and 
complex. It is still regarded as one of the most important and comprehensive attempts to change 
American taxation in the nation’s history. Though imperfect, it was largely recognized as a leap 
forward in the United States’ tax system. However, perhaps its most memorable contribution to 
our understanding of history and taxation is that it provided a blueprint for cultivating
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substantive tax reform. But questions remain: Did the Act accomplish what it appeared to? 
Would it last? A 1992 study examined retrospectively public opinion around the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act. Surprisingly, public opinion became increasingly negative of the Act itself over 
time, while public opinion of the tax system improved (Scholtz, McGraw & Steenbergen: 1992). 
Perhaps the lesson is a universal one in the political process by which tax laws are forged: the 
average voter dislikes the political process, even when the results of that process are healthy and 
beneficial. However, it is clear that the Internal Revenue Code and the American system of 
taxation itself improved in the eyes of the public with the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986. This in itself should be considered a major victory for any piece of tax legislation.
Metaphorically speaking, the 1986 Act helped make many more taxpayers accountable, 
and helped encourage many more taxpayers to buy in to the tax reporting process. It also left 
little room, other than conflict over transition rules, for any particular group to claim either 
aggrieved or superior status. It ironed out many differences between classes of taxpayers, types 
of transactions, and levels of income. To the average taxpayer, it made more sense than any tax 
code before, and had a great deal of face validity. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the 
citizen’s need to wonder whether their neighbors, co-workers, or business competitors were 
getting a better tax deal than they were. While some of the accomplishments in the Act would be 
undone by later legislation, the Act was important and memorable. While a future Congress 
might roll back its provisions, it would not be able to alter its legacy: the Act accomplished a 
difficult task during complicated circumstances, to the surprise of its critics; and, in taxation, as 
in life, sometimes we surprise ourselves most of all.
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CHAPTER 5
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
5.1 Introduction
As the decade of the 1980s came to a close, optimism, economic growth, and financial 
prosperity in the United States were on the decline. The United States endured significant 
reductions in business growth and investment, and steep declines in real estate values, beginning 
in the late 1980s and proceeding into the first term of President George Bush (Kamery: 2004). 
Ironically, it has been posited that many of the law changes in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 may 
have contributed to these economic woes (Entin: 1991). For example, passive loss limitations 
passed in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 possibly contributed to the slide in real estate values, and 
the repeal of the investment tax credit arguably discouraged business expansion and spending 
(Entin: 1991). Coupled with the resoundingly negative outlook on the economy expressed by 
most Americans, the nation teetered on the brink of a deep recession (Kamery: 2004).
Further, despite extensive tax reform efforts in 1986, the incidence of tax expenditures 
continued to rise (General Accounting Office: 1993). In its report entitled “Tax Expenditures 
Deserve More Scrutiny”, the General Accounting Office stated that in 1993 special preferences 
“applied to 124 separate exemptions and exclusions of income, deductions, credits, deferrals, and 
preferential tax rates.” (General Accounting Office: 1993). This was an all-time high, the result 
of a steady climb up from just 74 instances in 1974 (General Accounting Office: 1993). These 
tax preference items continued to be an area of concern because they circumvent traditional
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budgeting processes, and result in artificially high tax rates in order to equalize budget outlay 
(General Accounting Office: 1993).
Many of these widespread economic challenges served to boost the presidential 
candidacy of Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, challenger to Republican incumbent George Bush 
for the Presidency in 1992. Clinton ran aggressively against Bush on a platform of economic 
change (American Presidency Project: 2015a). Clinton laid out his economic and tax philosophy 
in a series of presidential debates in late 1992, including the final debate before the November 
election, on October 19th. Clinton sought to incentivize economic investment to spur growth, as 
well as increase the share of the tax burden borne by the wealthy (American Presidency Project, 
2015a: 1):
I propose an American version of what works in other countries. I think we can do it better: invest 
and grow. I believe we can increase investment and reduce the deficit at the same time if we not 
only ask the wealthiest Americans and foreign corporations to pay their fair share, we also 
provide over $100 billion in tax relief in terms of incentives for new plants, new small businesses, 
new technologies, new housing, and for middle class families, and we have $140 billion of 
spending cuts. Invest and grow: raise some more money; spend the money on tax incentives to 
have growth in the private sector; take the money from the defense cuts and reinvest it in new 
transportation and communications and environmental cleanup systems. This will work.
rdClinton would go on to win the Presidency in a rout, despite the unusually strong presence of 3 
party candidate Ross Perot, who garnered nearly 20% of the vote (FEC: 1993). However, after 
his election in 1992, President Clinton needed to deliver on his promises to relieve the United 
States’ economic malaise and boost the morale of a dispirited public.
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Clinton’s budget challenges were substantial. In its report filed in January of 1993, the 
Congressional Budget office projected a $310 billion budget deficit, marking the fourth year in a 
row the United States would tally a record-setting deficit (Congressional Budget Office: 1993). 
The long-term budget outlook was also poor, with reports projecting a deficit of $357 billion by 
1998 (Congressional Budget Office: 1993). These bleak projections made a strong case for 
immediate deficit reduction steps, and President Bill Clinton made it his legislative priority 
to attack both the deficit and the lagging economy.
Tax policy would ultimately play a critical role in these efforts, with the passage of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. The 1993 Act would become a defining piece of 
legislation for the Clinton administration. The measure was part of a very active first-term 
legislative agenda in the Clinton White House. Though Clinton would be nagged by scandal in 
his second term, by 1994, the budget deficit had fallen to just under $300 billion, and by 1999, 
the deficit would turn into a $124 billion surplus (Miller Center: 2015). In 1998, President 
Clinton generated the first balanced Federal budget in the United States since 1969, with a key 
element of the reduction funded by tax increases on the wealthiest Americans (Miller Center: 
2015). Clinton’s aggressive deficit-reduction policies, spearheaded by the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, made the difference (Miller Center: 2015).
5.2 Background
In his State of the Union address on February 17th, 1993, President Bill Clinton explained 
his plan to close the budget deficit, a plan which would again significantly alter the tax landscape 
(Washington Post, 1993: 9).
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For the wealthiest -  those earning more than 180,000 dollars per year, I ask you to raise the top 
rate for federal income taxes from 31 percent to 36 percent. Our plan recommends a ten percent 
surtax on incomes over 250,000 dollars a year. And we will close the loopholes that let some get 
away without paying any tax at all. For businesses with taxable incomes over ten million dollars, 
we will raise the corporate tax rate to 36 percent. And we will cut the deduction for business 
entertainment. Our plan attacks tax subsidies that reward companies that ship jobs overseas. And 
we will ensure that, through effective tax enforcement, foreign corporations who make money in 
America pay the taxes they owe to America.
It is clear that budget reform should ideally be accomplished through compromise 
between factions. However, compromise does not always occur in a timely or efficient manner. 
As a result, prior budget reform efforts in the United States have relied on process mechanisms, 
such as sequestration, to enforce specific budget limitations. Sequestration is process by which 
an “automatic” and targeted budget cut is instituted when legislative compromise cannot be 
reached. It is primarily intended to be a severe and unpalatable option for all parties to the 
debate, in order to encourage them to compromise (White House: 2015). In its 1993 report, the 
Congressional Budget Office instead proposed a different approach to deficit reduction 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1993:119):
The past indicates that efforts to reduce the deficit are most likely to be successful if the President 
and the Congress first agree on policy actions and then set up processes to enforce them: deficit 
reduction does not work as well if the process changes precede the policy actions.
The Congressional Budget Office’s report suggested that such mechanisms are a poor substitute 
for compromise in situations where the political will to find common ground is limited. Rather
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than working first toward policy solutions for budget deficits, politicians have tended to resort to 
enforcement as an artificial means to gain agreement. The Congressional Budget Office 
specifically advised against this approach (Congressional Budget Office, 1993:119):
If agreement exists on policy actions, many of the major process changes (such as the balanced 
budget amendment, the line-item veto, and mandatory caps) that have been advocated are 
superfluous. The Congress and the President should avoid any temptation to substitute process for 
policy, but should recognize the importance of process in ensuring that policy changes are 
realized.
Successful tax reform bills, such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986, were achieved through 
extensive personal effort and substantial compromise, including very public support by key 
leadership figures in both Congress and the White House. As discussed earlier in this research, 
Dan Rostenkowski and Bob Packwood made great examples of this approach to establishing 
policy. They spent long hours in backrooms and endured great personal sacrifice to ensure the 
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. They also benefited from the very public support of 
President Ronald Reagan and his commitment to similar policy outcomes. In the end, the 
legislative deal was made around how to make policy, not whether particular policies should be 
made.
However, the legislative history of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was 
entirely different. The bill would ultimately be passed without a single Republican vote in either 
chamber of Congress (Rosenbaum: 1993). In fact, the bill struggled through both committee and 
the final vote in the Senate, with vice-President Al Gore forced to add a tie-breaking vote to pass 
the measure in both cases (Rosenbaum: 1993). This is surprising, given that many of the key
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architects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were also directly involved in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993. Bob Packwood, Dan Rostenkowski, Max Baucus, and Bob Dole 
were all members of the Joint Committee on Taxation which took up the work of creating and 
passing the 1993 Act (Joint Committee on Taxation, 1993: iii).
5.3 Major Provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was originally sponsored by 
Congressman Martin Sabo (Democrat, represented the state of Minnesota) and was first 
introduced on May 25th, 1993 (GovTrack: 2015b). The tax changes in the bill were designed to 
accomplish several major economic policy goals: budget deficit reduction; an increase in the 
share of tax burden borne by corporations and wealthy individuals; increased aid to working 
families with low incomes; and, rollback in “posh” business deductions such as lobbying and 
meals and entertainment expenses (Tax Policy Center: 2015a). The most critical provisions of 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act were as follows (Tax Policy Center: 2015a; Hall: 1993):
• increased individual income tax rates on top earners, creating higher tax brackets of 36 
percent and 39.6 percent;
• permanently extended the itemized deduction limitation and the personal exemptions 
associated with individual income taxes;
• increased by 4.3 cents per gallon the gasoline tax, and dedicated those funds specifically 
to deficit reduction;
• increased the corporate tax rate to 35% on income above $10 million;
• reduced deductions for business meals, entertainment, club dues, and lobbying expenses;
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• increased both tax rates and exemption amounts under the Alternative Minimum Tax 
System;
• expanded the taxable portion of Social Security benefits from 50 percent to 85 
percent for taxpayers with joint income of $44,000, or $34,000 for single filers; and
• expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit program for low income taxpayers.
5.4 Timeline
The timeline of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and its movement through the 
legislative process, is outlined below (Votesmart.org: 2015).
• May 25, 1993 introduced
• May 27, 1993 House version passed
• June 25, 1993 Senate version passed
• August 5 th, 1993 House Conference report adopted
• August 6th, 1993 Senate Conference report adopted
• August 10, 1993 signed by the President into law.
5.5 Key Figures in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
Several individuals played critical roles in the evolution of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993. Bill Clinton, inheriting an ailing U.S. economy and significant budget deficits, 
determined that significant tax action was required to close the budget gaps and restore the 
economy. With the help of Martin Sabo, and over the objections of Republicans Newt Gingrich 
and John Kasich, the 1993 Act passed with almost no Republican support.
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Bill Clinton
Bill Clinton was a Yale-educated attorney, Rhodes Scholar, and two-term president of the United 
States. Clinton was born in 1946 in Hope, Arkansas, and ultimately served as Governor of the 
state for 12 years before being elected president in 1992. He was also the first Democrat elected 
to consecutive terms in office since Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1936. Clinton was well-known 
as a centrist Democrat who supported international trade, economic change and deficit reduction, 
and public education (Clinton Presidential Library: 2015). He pushed for economic change as the 
primary plank of his 1992 campaign platform against incumbent George Bush, and would 
become the primary force behind the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. The Act 
would form the centerpiece of Clinton’s domestic agenda. Though his second term would be 
marred by allegations of misconduct in office, Clinton’s legacy would be one of popularity and 
strength on economic issues (Clinton Presidential Library: 2015).
Martin Sabo
Martin Sabo was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1979-2007, having been 
elected fourteen times prior to his announced retirement in 2006 (Biographical Directory of the 
US Congress: 2015). Sabo represented Minneapolis, Minnesota, a heavily democratic district. 
Sabo chaired the House Budget Committee, and was also a member of the House Appropriations 
Committee (Biographical Directory of the US Congress: 2015). Despite being known as a quiet, 
reserved man he was well known for managing the Democratic baseball team in the annual 
Congressional game against the Republicans (Biographical Directory of the US Congress: 2015). 
Sabo was the primary architect and champion for the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993.
129
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Moynihan was a Senator from the state of New York, Fulbright fellow, and graduate of Tufts 
University. Moynihan was a lawyer and sociologist, with a background in urban studies. He was 
a professor at Syracuse University and during the 1990s, was a member of the Senate Committee 
on Finance (Biographical Directory of the US Congress: 2015c). Moynihan had a peculiar, witty, 
manner of speaking for which he was well known. He was a proponent of political compromise 
and “subsidiarity” or the idea that small, community organizations play an important role in 
filling the void between big government and the individual citizen (Katz: 2015).
Newt Gingrich
Gingrich is a conservative Republican from the state of Georgia, and graduate of Emory 
University in Atlanta. Gingrich was known for being plainspoken and direct. He became the first 
Republican Speaker of the House in 40 years with his election in 1994, having served in the 
House since 1979 (Biographical Director of the US Congress: 2015b). Gingrich ran for president 
in 2012, unsuccessfully. He was known to be a philosophical “foil” for President Clinton. 
Gingrich authored the famous “Contract with America” and ushered in what is known as the 
Republican Revolution, a mid-1990s movement which overturned Democratic control of both 
Congressional bodies.
John Kasich
John Kasich is currently the Governor of Ohio, and a former member of the United States House 
of Representatives, as well as the Congressional Budget Committee. Kasich is a fiscal 
conservative, with a long record of supporting defense initiatives and low taxes. He is also a
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former investment banker with the blue-chip firm Lehman Brothers. Kasich ultimately voted 
against Clinton’s 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, but was an outspoken and 
charismatic representative of the conservative side. Still active in politics, Kasich is currently a 
2016 presidential candidate (Kasich: 2013). Kasich authored the Kasich Substitute, a proposed 
alternative to Clinton’s budget plan which was defeated by a 2 to 1 margin in a House vote 
(CSPAN: 1993j).
5.6 Bill Clinton on Taxes and the Budget Deficit
Bill Clinton faced several significant challenges in his first term as president, most of them 
economic. For these reasons, tax policy and tax legislation would be extremely important to his 
presidential agenda. Since 1981, the amount of the Federal debt held by the public had 
quadrupled, and as a percentage of the total economy, had increased from 26 percent to 48 
percent of Gross Domestic Product (Jeffrey: 2015). In his State of the Union Address on 
February 17th, 1993, Clinton laid out his vision for tax reform, with deficit reduction in mind. 
Clinton opened by highlighting the major moves his administration planned (Washington Post, 
1993: 2).
Our plan has four fundamental components: First, it reverses our economic decline, by jump­
starting the economy in the short term and investing in our people, their jobs and their incomes in 
the long term. Second, it changes the rhetoric of the past into the actions of the present, by 
honoring work and families in every part of our lives. Third, it substantially reduces the federal 
deficit, honestly and credibly. Finally, it earns the trust of the American people by paying for 
these plans first with cuts in government waste and inefficiency -- cuts, not gimmicks, in 
government spending -  and by fairness, for a change, in the way the burden is borne.
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Clinton introduced the theme of “fairness in the way the burden is borne” in laying out his 
economic plans with respect to taxes. This particular paradigm of fairness would become a 
recurring theme in the life of the 1993 Act. Clinton, as well as several Democratic party leaders, 
would begin to frame the “fairness” narrative around the idea that fairness is achieved by urging 
that the wealthy pay proportionally higher taxes, while those with middle and low incomes pay 
proportionally less. It is clear that Clinton’s view of “tax fairness” was at least, in part, a political 
view, not a purely philosophical view (Miller Center, 2015: 5).
Our economic plan is ambitious, but it is necessary for the continued greatness of our country. 
And it will be paid for fairly -- by cutting government, by asking the most of those who benefited 
most in the past -  by asking more Americans to contribute today so that all Americans can do 
better tomorrow. For the wealthiest -  those earning more than 180,000 dollars per year, I ask you 
to raise the top rate for federal income taxes from 31 percent to 36 percent. Our plan recommends 
a ten percent surtax on incomes over 250,000 dollars a year. And we will close the loopholes that 
let some get away without paying any tax at all. For businesses with taxable incomes over ten 
million dollars, we will raise the corporate tax rate to 36 percent. And we will cut the deduction 
for business entertainment. Our plan attacks tax subsidies that reward companies that ship jobs 
overseas. And we will ensure that, through effective tax enforcement, foreign corporations who 
make money in America pay the taxes they owe to America. Middle-class Americans should 
know: You're not going alone anymore; you're not going first; and you're no longer going to pay 
more and get less. Ninety-eight point eight percent of America's families will have no increase in 
their income tax rates. Only the wealthiest one point two percent will see their rates rise.
Clinton’s remarks, while no doubt easy for many to agree with, represented a step back toward 
partisanship and use of the tax code for political ends. This is not to suggest that this was 
immoral conduct; few would disagree with the proposition that those in need could benefit from
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economic assistance from those who could most afford to assist them. However, the distinction 
lies in the manner in which the tax code was used to achieve nontax goals. Recall Max Baucus’ 
testimony on the evolution of the post-1986 Internal Revenue Code (US Congress, 2010:1):
The 1986 tax reform leveled the playing field. No longer could a wealthy individual escape taxes 
by buying into a shelter. No longer could a clever investment strategy get investors out of paying 
their fair share. No longer could businesses participate in notorious tax shelters. Similar taxpayers 
paid similar taxes. But since 1986, Congress has made more than 15,000 changes to the code. 
Congress made these changes with the best intentions; some to collect revenue, some to stabilize 
the economy, others to further certain social objectives, all made for legitimate reasons. But each 
change created additional complexity, and each change created the potential for exploitation.
One can observe that the bipartisan nature of the 1986 Act, by comparison, was much more than 
merely an agreement between political parties and a practical compromise. Rather, it was a grand 
agreement to begin to limit the number of political inequities and preferences in the code, 
irrespective of political affiliation.
The Clinton budget proposals, on the other hand, appeared to move the tax code back to a 
pre-1986 paradigm, and toward increasing complexity and more prevalent use of tax preferences. 
For example, the creation of two new high-rate individual tax brackets at 30% and 36% suggests 
that the effective tax rate, across all tax brackets, might not have been high enough to sustain 
new spending levels for low-income individuals. Stated differently, new tax benefits at lower 
income levels must be paid for by new revenue at higher income levels, if all other variables are 
held constant. Accordingly, it is important to clarify that actions generally accepted to be good or 
“correct,” such as a tax bill that helps the poor, may also be unfair. While it may have been
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morally correct to redistribute wealth in this manner, it was a departure from the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act’s efforts at simplification and consistency.
Despite the trend toward “unfairness” through greater use of the tax code as a political 
tool, the 1993 Act did improve fairness by taking on the lobbying industry associated with the 
tax code, in particular deductions associated with lobbying efforts. Bill Clinton called for an “end 
to the tax deduction for special interest lobbying” and implored the government to “use the 
money to help clean up the political system... and we should quickly enact legislation to force 
lobbyists to disclose their activities.” (Washington Post: 1993). The push toward transparency in 
the political process was a major goal of President Clinton’s, and he was able to achieve it. The 
specific changes enacted in the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 as highlighted 
in the Conference committee report, were as follows (DeLuca: 1993):
• limited deductions for costs incurred in any attempt to influence legislation through 
communication with a member or employee of a legislative body or with any other 
government official or employee (regardless of rank) who may participate in the 
formulation of legislation; and
• costs incurred in connection with "direct communication with covered executive branch 
employees'' in an "attempt to influence official actions or positions of such official" are 
non-deductible.
The Conference report also requested guidance in several key areas, including how third parties 
might distinguish attempts to influence legislation from simple monitoring of legislation. It is 
easy to see how these two activities could overlap. For example, if a firm was in the process of 
“monitoring” a legislative development, and the legislation ultimately took a negative turn,
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monitoring efforts could seamlessly transform into lobbying activities without a clear indication
that a boundary had been crossed (DeLuca: 1993).
5.7 House and Senate Committee Discussion
Committee discussion of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 began on July 
15th of that year. On the afternoon of the 15th, prior to the closed door conference session which 
would consider the Act, Representative Martin Sabo (Democrat, represented the state of 
Minnesota) spoke in a public meeting in favour of the proposal. Sabo was the author of the 
original proposal for the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. In his remarks he 
defended the budget reconciliation efforts as a move that would increase “tax fairness” (CSPAN: 
1993a, 3:00-7:00):
As we approach conference, the House and Senate versions are 80-95% alike. Each achieves 
$500 billion in deficit reduction. Each features tax fairness as a cornerstone. Under either plan at 
least 75% of the new revenues raised will be paid by the wealthiest 6% of all Americans. Tax 
fairness is applied to the other end of the income equation as well, for expansion of the earned 
income tax credit taxes of full-time working Americans will be effectively reduced and such 
workers will no longer be forced to live in poverty. Both versions also include significant 
spending reductions. Over five years, for example, the House version includes $250 billion in 
spending reductions, and will cap discretionary spending at 1993 levels for each of the next five 
years.
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It is notable that Sabo couched the Act as a step toward greater tax fairness. As with all tax 
reform proposals, it is important to consider what political figures mean when they use the term 
tax “fairness.” According to Heritage Foundation researcher William Beach, tax fairness is a 
concept that is easily misunderstood and subject to interpretation (Beach: 2005). Beach testified 
“As I observed, nearly every major tax bill is challenged to prove that it is fair. Fairness, 
however, can (and probably does) mean something different to each person who thinks about it. I 
imagine there are differences on this subject even on this committee.” (Beach, 2005: 2). Beach 
instead referred the Committee to more transparent tests of tax fairness, such as vertical and 
horizontal equity (Beach: 2005). Vertical equity means that taxpayers bear a similar proportion 
of taxes as one moves up or down the income continuum (Cordes: 1999). Horizontal equity 
means that taxpayers with the same income pay the same amount of tax, regardless of their 
differing circumstances (Cordes: 1999). Accordingly, using these definitions, one can reasonably 
interpret tax fairness to mean a tax applied without politically-motivated tax preferences. Beach 
suggests this is a persistent problem in evaluating the fairness of any piece of tax legislation 
(Beach: 2005):
However, our current tax policy is, if anything, one of targets, not of equal treatment. That is, 
Congress has decided to use the tax system to achieve specific social and economic goals, which 
has resulted in a significant decay in vertical equity. To illustrate this point, I have provided in my 
full testimony a wonderful graph prepared by Kevin Hassett of the American Enterprise Institute, 
a tax economist well known to this committee. Dr. Hassett compares the current tax code to tax 
law in 1986 and 1988 and how tax policy has affected the marginal income tax rates faced by a 
family of four. While this graphic shows many things, its single most important message is how 
targeting tax relief has produced significant equity distortions in the code.
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Sabo argued that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 19935 would increase fairness by 
increasing the share of tax burden borne by top earners, while subsidizing and expanding 
benefits to low-income taxpayers. Sabo’s interpretation of fairness is based on targeted political 
goals: he believed it would increase fairness because the legislation addressed his goals of 
reducing the tax burden of low-income taxpayers. This approach was a departure from the broad- 
base, low rate approach championed in prior proposals by Bill Bradley and Dick Gephardt 
(Gephardt Collection: 2014).
It is also noteworthy that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, while in line 
politically with Democratic, progressive economic goals, was out of line with the principles of 
fair taxation. Stated differently, Representative Dick Gephardt and Representative Martin Sabo 
would have likely agreed on the political principle that lower-income individuals should receive 
some tax relief, given that both Gephardt and Sabo were progressive Democrats. However, 
Gephardt may have considered Sabo’s bill to be on shaky ground in the way it specifically 
targeted its tax relief to achieve political goals, and likewise focused the tax burden of those 
goals on high-income taxpayers. Gephardt was a strong proponent of tax fairness and was 
opposed to targeted tax legislation (Gephardt Collection: 2014).
Senator Jim Sasser (Democrat, represented the state of Tennessee) spoke following 
Representative Sabo’s remarks. Sasser lauded the bill for its dramatic effect on the deficit, as 
well as its fairness (CSPAN: 1993a, 8:00-12:00). Like Representative Sabo, Sasser characterized 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act as “fair and balanced.” (CSPAN: 1993a, 8:00-12:00).
Both the House Bill and the Senate Bill in my judgment are tough in regard to deficit reduction,
but they are fair, and they are balanced. Both bills, coupled with the discretionary spending cuts
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which will be enforced in each version, will provide for a record 5-year deficit reduction. As 
Chairman Sabo said, our calculation is $498 billion in deficit reduction in the Senate bill, and 
$503 billion in deficit reduction in the House bill, and I say to my colleagues: that is 
unprecedented in American history, or perhaps unprecedented in any country in the world, to 
have a deficit reduction package of that substance. Now, both of these bills will produce 
entitlement spending cuts, and will offer a serious down payment for healthcare reform, for which 
the American people are demanding, and which is coming down the pike in the not-too-distant 
future.
Senator Sasser also stressed the fact that there had been significant partisan rhetoric around the 
bill, and that Republicans were trying to raise fears about the legislation. Sasser reiterated the 
fact that the “average American” did not need to be concerned about its effects (CSPAN: 1993 a, 
8:00-12:00).
Of course, there’s been a lot of talk, a lot of discussion across the country about taxes. There’s 
been an effort to frighten many Americans when they really have nothing whatsoever to fear from 
this bill. As Chairman Sabo said, fully 79% of the tax increases in the revenue portion of this plan 
will fall on people who have incomes in excess of $200,000 per year. Now what about the other 
Americans, will their taxes be raised? Well, middle class Americans, and by that I mean people 
making between $30,000 and $100,000 will not see their taxes raised at all.
As was the case with Representative Sabo, Sasser portrayed the bill as “fair” in the sense that it 
relieved the tax burden of middle-income and low-income Americans, with wealthier taxpayers 
bearing the balance. As discussed later in this research, Democratic proponents purported the bill 
to be fair, while criticizing opponents’ objections as fear-mongering and disinformation.
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The Joint Tax Conference for the proposed Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
began in earnest on the evening of July 15th, 1993. The Conference included both the House of 
Representatives Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committees. Chairman 
Dan Rostenkowski (Democrat, represented the state of Illinois) opened with a statement that 
outlined clearly the difficulties that lay ahead in getting the legislation passed. In particular, 
Rostenkowski stressed the political frailty of the bill. He also made clear the primary purpose of 
the legislation was to reduce the deficit in an aggressive fashion (CSPAN: 1993a, mm 3:30­
6:00).
Back in May, at the urging of our President, we set an ambitious task for ourselves: cut the deficit 
by $500 billion dollars over the next five years. This afternoon, we are in the home stretch, on the 
verge of achieving that goal, and in the final stages of the first real test for the 103rd Congress. I 
hope that we can measure up. I welcome the opportunity to be here this afternoon. I have no 
illusions about the difficulty of the job ahead of us. We face an enormous task. But we, members 
of Congress, on both sides of the aisle, cannot afford to fail. This country and this Congress faces 
(sic) no bigger problem than the crushing debt that we are amassing, as the inheritance of our 
children and grandchildren. In large measure, the credibility of this Congress rests on our ability 
to accomplish this task. That will not be easy. I know how fragile support for this Conference 
Report could be, and how fragile the House and Senate support was achieving it. Representatives, 
and those of us that are obligated, have a tremendous burden. I know that for each of us, the bills 
before this conference are far from perfect. There is much we would prefer not to do. Tough 
choices that we would prefer not to make. Changes we would like to suggest. Ultimately, the 
secret to a successful conference is a combination of patience and flexibility. I believe that both 
will be tested in the weeks ahead.
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The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 carried with it divided support nearly from start 
to finish, narrowly passing through even the conference stage of the legislative process (Tumulty 
& Eaton: 1993). That same day, in the public meeting prior to the closed door session, Rep. John 
Kasich expressed his concerns over the heavy partisanship associated with the bill (CSPAN: 
1993a, 14:00-18:00).
I think it is a terrible mistake, the business of this Congress trying to pass the largest tax increase 
in history, behind closed doors, without Republican involvement at all in either the Senate or the 
House. And there is one thing we heard a lot about in this campaign, and that is the issue of 
gridlock. I want to tell you that the Republicans feel particularly gridlocked especially in the 
House of Representatives, because at every turn of the bend we tried to fix the package, we tried 
to improve the package, we spent ten and a half hours in the budget committee when we 
originally wrote this broad outline, we spent ten and half hours offering 40 amendments offering 
to replace tax increases with specific spending reductions. We were defeated on every single 
effort along a party line vote.
Kasich stressed that the bill was forced through without any Republican input, and would 
negatively impact jobs, while slowing the economy (CSPAN: 1993a). He also warned about the 
nature of spending cuts in Washington (CSPAN: 1993 a, 14:00-15:00).
In addition, there’s been an argument made that somehow that this package, this is a budget that 
is very tight fisted. Over the next five years domestic spending will increase by 15%. We should 
also realize, especially the American people, that we live in a fantasy land here in Washington, 
D.C. when we talk about the concept of cuts. We don’t cut anything in Washington. We cut 
below a baseline. A baseline is the increase in spending that should occur the next year in Federal 
programs, established by some bureaucrat. See, where I come from in Ohio, a cut is a cut, a
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freeze is a freeze, an increase is an increase. We don’t have any real cuts except in the area of 
national security in this proposal.
Kasich’s comments reflected well the overall Republican position on the Clinton budget 
proposals: the increase in taxes would slow the economy, and would only result in greater 
propensity to continue an upward trajectory in spending. In addition, the increase in domestic 
spending came at the expense of Defense Department spending, a sharp turn away from the 
spending policies of the Reagan Administration. With the military being a traditionally 
conservative voting bloc, this was of particular concern to conservatives in Congress.
With Republicans pushing hard for spending reductions to offset new spending, and 
Democrats pushing for revenue increases to fund additional domestic spending, there was 
seemingly little room for compromise. Speaking from “Gucci Gulch,” the same hallway in the 
Russell Senate Office Building where numerous deals had been cut in drafting the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Democrat, represented the state of New York.) 
spoke with candor about the chances of reform: “There are three numbers here: the total deficit 
reduction, the ratio of spending cuts to revenue increases, and the gasoline tax. You can fix any 
two of those numbers, and the other falls out from them. In your high school math classes, they 
would call that a dependent variable.” (CSPAN: 1993b, mm 2:00-3:00). Of those three variables 
cited by Senator Moynihan, the gasoline tax provision would prove to be most controversial.
5.8 Gasoline Tax Provision
The additional 4.3 cents per gallon gasoline tax provision in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 was arguably unfair, regressive, and punitive to low-income 
taxpayers: (Federal Highway Tax Administration: 2013). The increase in the gasoline tax in both
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1990 and 1993 was unprecedented, primarily because the United States’ gasoline tax had been 
traditionally administered as a type of “user fee.” Theoretically, those who purchased gasoline 
and availed themselves of the United States’ highway system would ultimately pay higher 
gasoline taxes. In principle, Federal gasoline tax proceeds would fund a single trust account, 
which was to be used to improve and maintain transportation infrastructure. However, in 1993, 
the 4.3 cent tax increase, representing a 30% increase in the overall rate of tax, was used entirely 
to decrease the budget deficit (Thorndike: 2013). This was seen by many as a “raiding” of a 
public trust fund, and it has been proposed that this has resulted in public distrust of special 
levies such as fuel taxes (Thorndike: 2013). Rep. John Kyl, in an interview with CSPAN on July 
30th, 1993, reacted to the 4.3 cent proposed gas increase: (CSPAN: 1993 c, mm 4:00-6:00)
It’s pernicious in three specific ways. First of all, it costs people who have to drive their cars. 
Secondly, the costs are added to the cost of goods and services, particularly the products that are 
brought across country that are delivered throughout the United States, primarily through trucks. 
And third, the effect on state gas tax revenues is a negative effect, because as people buy less 
gasoline because of a higher cost due to the Federal increase in taxes, the state gasoline tax 
doesn’t bring in as much revenue, so then the state legislatures usually raise the state tax, and you 
have kind of a vicious cycle created where the consumer always ends up paying more and 
revenues to the treasury are never quite as much as predicted in the first instance.
Kyl’s sentiments on the gasoline tax were echoed by Sen. Dennis DeConcini (Democrat, 
represented the state of Arizona). DeConcini was unique because he was a Democrat who, at that 
point in time, had chosen to oppose the bill. In a speech given on July 30th, 1993, he gave two 
primary reasons for his opposition: the gasoline tax increase, and the bill’s lack of impact on the 
Federal budget deficit. As with Kyl, DeConcini’s home state of Arizona was one in which
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gasoline tax would have a direct impact. Similar to most Western states in the United States, the 
population is spread between a few large urban areas and many sparsely populated areas. This 
requires significant commuting and transportation times, and accordingly, a higher incidence of 
gasoline tax on the individual resident. DeConcini was also concerned about the impact of low 
ceilings on the Social Security tax on individual taxpayers (CSPAN: 1993d). This was likely a 
key concern for DeConcini because of the relatively high rate of retired individuals in Arizona.
In taking up the progressive viewpoint, media member Clarence Page of the Chicago 
Tribune discussed how the makeup of the United States Senate could play a role in swaying the 
negotiation toward opposition to the gasoline tax (CSPAN: 1993e). Page seemed to refer to the 
fact that each state’s two allocated Senators represent their home state without regard to 
population. As a result, under the United States Constitution, individual Senators have great 
power to lobby for their own state’s interests (CSPAN: 1993e, 9:00-10:00)
The real issue here is the politics as well as the nature of American culture. We are a car country, 
a big car nation as has been said. Britain has a much better public transportation system than the 
US because that’s the way we have shifted this country. But what the real politics of it - are such 
that - what is revealed here is a great imbalance on the part of the clout of Senators from 
Oklahoma and Nevada, and other states where you’ve got to drive a long way to work or to get to 
where you are going. And, uh, being someone from the industrial Northeast I find this to be a 
great imbalance.
The gasoline tax was ultimately passed as part of Clinton’s budget, and brought the nationwide 
total tax per gallon to 18.4 cents. All of it was allocated to deficit reduction, despite calls to 
redirect it to the Highway Trust Fund. Nonetheless, the tax remained an important part of the 
President’s budget package, representing approximately $30 billion of the $500 billion dollar
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deficit-reduction package. In 1997, the gasoline tax was in fact redirected to the Highway Trust 
Fund as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Federal Highway Tax Administration: 2015).
5.9 Senate Debate
Given the bill’s divided support, many members of Congress painted the 1993 Act in 
stark, apocalyptic terms, reflecting the depth of the divide over the legislation. Democrats voted 
unanimously for the bill, though some centrist Democrats had reservations. Senator Bob Kerrey 
(Democrat, represented the state of Nebraska) voiced these concerns, but was unwilling to vote 
against the bill because he did not want to damage President Clinton’s credibility, stating “I 
could not, and should not, cast a vote that brings down your presidency. I do not trust 44 
Republicans enough to say no to this bill." (Tumulty & Eaton, 1993:2). Kerrey was the last 
holdout on the Democratic side of the aisle, with all other participants casting votes strictly along 
party lines (Tumulty & Eaton: 1993).
Republicans staunchly opposed the bill. Sen. Charles E. Grassley, (Republican, 
represented the state of Iowa) stated that the bill was a “blivet--five pounds of manure pounded 
into a four-pound sack. The point is, if you vote for this package, you're voting for deep doo- 
doo." (Tumulty & Eaton, 1993: 3). Bill Archer, a conservative Republican from the state of 
Texas, also made sarcastic comments that symbolized these stark differences in the Conference 
debate (CSPAN: 1993a 12:00-13:00)
It was stated over and over again this was an historic occasion. I will admit it is an occasion for 
the record books, because we are gathered here to consider the largest tax increase in history. It 
was also said that it was historic because this is the largest deficit reduction activity in the history 
of the United States. And that was said over and over again. And I say to the American people,
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we don’t know if that’s true. We have every reason to believe it is not true. The deficit reduction 
package of the 1990 budget agreement was officially scored by the CBO as one that would reduce 
the deficit by $497 billion dollars. And that is a matter of record.
In his remarks, Archer expressed lingering doubts about the accuracy of the proposed deficit 
reduction efforts in the 1993 bill, based on his claim that the 1990 budget estimates were also 
inaccurate. This appeared to be mostly political posturing; if the 1990 budget estimates were 
wrong, then Archer wanted his colleagues to believe the 1993 estimates were wrong as well. 
However, estimating the budget impact of any bill, including the 1990 Congressional Budget 
Office forecast, is tricky business. While Archer’s claim that the budget reduction efforts in 1990 
were not as effective as expected is technically correct, it glossed over the point that almost all of 
the measures in the bill reduced the deficit (General Accounting Office: 1993). Further, a poor 
economy, which underperformed substantially below forecasts, was the primary reason the 
deficit reduction efforts in the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act were less effective 
(General Accounting Office: 1993). These doubts were emblematic of Republican criticism of 
the 1993 Act.
Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole (Republican, represented the state of Kansas) also 
spoke about the bill, expressing concerns about its expanding revenue provisions, as well as the 
fact that it guaranteed no spending cuts. His sentiments echoed those of Bill Archer’s. Dole also 
expressed his willingness to work with the Democrats to forge a compromise, but he tempered 
his enthusiasm when it came to spending. Dole made it clear that the Republicans’ willingness to 
participate in a “deal” to pass the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 would increase if 
Democrats offered up spending cuts at the same time (CSPAN, 1993a: 19:00-22:00).
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Maybe it’s not necessary to raise taxes as much, and maybe other things could be accommodated 
that I know would be very difficult items for the conferees to deal with. And I would just 
underscore what’s been said, we do have a different view. Republicans have a different view. Our 
view is not adopted. Some liked our view, position, our package, others did not, and I think 
everything is based on what will happen in the future. Except the American people understand 
that taxes are going to happen. They also understand that spending (cuts) may not happen, and 
they’ve seen this happen time after time after time. I guess that’s why there is some is some 
cynicism in America about Congress and taxes. We always seem to stick with the taxes but we 
never, or not always, come up with the spending cuts whether it’s Republican or Democratic 
administration.
Throughout the legislative process, one of the most common themes among Democratic party 
members was that Republicans were circulating false information and raising fears about the bill 
among the general public. Democratic political consultant Bob Shrum indicated that the strong 
opposition by conservatives was unprecedented (CSPAN: 1993f, 1:00-2:00).
By a 3-2 margin the people understand that the lockstep Republican opposition, unprecedented by 
the way, and I’ve checked and there isn’t a single major piece of economic legislation since 
Franklin Roosevelt that passed without any vote from the other party. I think that kind of lockstep 
opposition has come through to the people and they know how partisan this Republican 
opposition was.
Shrum’s comments are no surprise. The debate and discussion around the bill began and ended 
along stark party lines, a huge shift from the politics of compromise that were the hallmark of tax 
legislation in the 1980s. In this one-hour segment, Shrum and conservative consultant Glen 
Bolger also discussed, rather sharply, the manner in which both parties contributed to “gridlock”
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in Washington (CSPAN: 1993f). Shrum cast the Republicans as threatening moderates in their 
own party if they supported Clinton’s efforts at passing the budget, while Bolger indicated that 
Democrats had cast aside their own home states and constituencies to get into lockstep with 
President Clinton (CSPAN: 1993f). Bolger also suggested that this was the same way Democrats 
had tried to attack the Presidency of George Bush in the early 1990s (CSPAN: 1993f).
In both cases, the common thread was that the parties had moved away from any 
semblance of real compromise. Democrats and Republicans alike alienated members of the 
opposition party. This created high-risk public relations stakes when the other side waffled in 
their positions, or showed weakness. Further, each party had clearly begun policing its own 
membership internally, an allegation made by Shrum against the Republicans. However, it is 
clear that both parties participated in this given the nearly unanimous, partisan nature of the votes 
for and against the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.
Conservative political consultant Glen Bolger responded to Shrum’s allegations 
(CSPAN: 1993f, 20:00-21:30).
I think when people see a plan that is a bad idea, I think they are going to vote against it. I don’t 
see anything wrong with the party being unified. Democrats were certainly unified in successfully 
bringing down the Bush presidency by not allowing him to put forth any policies and programs 
that had any chance in passing.
Both parties, as reflected in the words of each of these political consultants, had begun to 
polarize away from the opposition. This bitterness highlights a dramatic difference between the 
compromises that forged the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the political climate in 1993. What 
had previously been considered good political work and a moderate approach to solving
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problems had become signs of political weakness and infidelity to the party. This change raised 
the stakes for individual politicians who might consider political compromise. Those who did 
risked alienation from their own party, as well as the opposition. The result was the beginning of 
political gridlock and the beginning of death throes for moderation in political work in 
Washington.
5.10 House Debate
House Republicans were predictably and staunchly opposed to the President’s budget 
plan. In response, earlier in the summer, Rep. John Kasich had floated an alternative plan that 
would theoretically reduce the deficit without relying on tax increases. This plan called for $495 
billion in deficit reduction, slightly less than the Congressional committee’s request (U.S. 
Congress: 2015). In Kasich’s amendment, also known as House Amendment 20 to House 
Continuing Resolution 64, domestic spending cuts amounted to $290 billion; $145 billion were 
achieved by government savings; and, $60 billion were achieved by defense cuts (U.S. Congress: 
2015).
In budget debate on May 28th, 1993, Representative John Kyl of Arizona opened 
discussion of Representative John Kasich’s (Republican, represented the state of Ohio) budget 
proposal (CSPAN: 1993j, mm1:00-6:00).
Unlike the President’s budget, the Kasich substitute is based on the premise that spending cuts 
should come first, which is exactly what the American people have been demanding. First year 
savings alone, again according to CBO, amount to 86 billion dollars under Kasich, all from 
spending cuts. CBO scores the President’s plan at zero net spending cuts for the first two years.
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Kasich strikes the President’s retroactive income tax increases, his energy tax, his increased tax 
on Social Security, and his increased Medicare payroll tax.
Democrat Charles Schumer, of New York, vehemently opposed the Kasich amendment. In 
response to Kasich’s plan, he spoke on May 28th, 1993 (CSPAN: 1993j, mm 8:00-10:00).
On the Kasich budget, you know, I respect the gentleman from Ohio. He has tried to put together 
an honest plan. The problem is, that the kind of cuts that are in this plan are unpalatable to the 
American people. And I ask my colleagues on this side of the aisle, you want to freeze the 
COALUS for military retirees between 55 and 62, vote for Kasich. You want to vote to eliminate 
college assistance? Vote for Kasich. You want to vote to eliminate programs you care about? 
Vote for Kasich. But you don’t have enough votes even on your side to pass this recessionary 
budget.
Representative Dick Gephardt (Democrat, represented the state of Missouri) also spoke. 
Gephardt played a key role in shaping the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (CSPAN: 1993j, mm 53:00­
54:00).
Tonight, we must act. Many of the members have said to me, this bill has got difficulties in it, 
pain in it, things that are not politically attractive. When you’re trying to honestly reduce a deficit 
that has built now to 4 trillion dollars, take our deficit from 5% of GDP to 2.5, there is no way 
that that piece of legislation can be politically attractive.
Gephardt’s comments called attention to Congress’ duty to take action to solve a practical 
problem, knowing the problem would be painful. This is a dramatically different tone than those 
members of the House who spoke only in terms of what their constituents specifically needed, or 
who spoke in opposition to Clinton’s plan without considering middle ground (CSPAN: 1993j, 
mm 54:30-55:00).
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In my view the Kasich plan is deficient, it doesn’t cut the deficit enough, it is not fair in my view, 
because it does not ask the people at the top to pay their fair share, and it doesn’t give the people 
stuck at the bottom the incentive that the earned income credit gives the people to get out of 
welfare and get into a job, something that all of us desperately want to do. The Clinton plan is 
better. It is fair and comprehensive.
Gephardt couched the need for deficit reduction in terms of the future of America’s children. He 
referred to ignoring the debt as irresponsible and potentially fatal to the American economy 
(CSPAN: 1993j).
Republican and Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (Republican, represented the state of 
Georgia) closed the House debate for the Republican side. Gingrich’s comments represented 
well the Republican position: conservatives cast their opposition to Clinton’s budget in terms of 
principles, rather than of pragmatism (CSPAN: 1993j, mm 1:13:00-1:13:50).
What we face is a genuine, historic, legitimate, difference of principle. These next votes are about 
our vision of the future, our understanding of America, and our belief in the lessons of history. 
The Clinton plan, which I respect, props up the past. It raises $325 billion in new taxes to pay for 
a bigger welfare state. It starts $40 billion dollars in new entitlements, as it should, because it 
believes in the welfare state. But the simple fact is, the welfare state has failed.
Tom Foley (Democrat, represented the state of Washington) as Speaker of the House, closed the 
debate on the Kasich amendment as is custom. Foley (CSPAN: 1993j, mm 1:19:00-1:22:00):
We seldom do important, valuable and lasting things by taking easy votes, comfortable votes, 
politically popular votes. I can remember when President Reagan came and asked for his 
economic program to be adopted. It was a program that called for giving back to people, taxes. 
Encouraging them to vote for tax reductions. And, it came with a promise that if only those deep
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reductions could be accomplished, a balanced budget would be achieved. A distinguished 
member of the other body, Senator Baker, called it at the time a riverboat gamble. It was a 
gamble that many members made, and it was a gamble that the country lost. A recession, sharp 
increases in defense spending, a falloff in revenues, year by year, not reducing deficits but rising 
deficits, multiplying anything that had been seen in previous years, and a burgeoning national 
debt that is now an all-too-sad factor of our national life.
The House ultimately voted on Kasich’s amendment, and resoundingly rejected it at a nearly 2 to 
1 margin. Clinton’s budget plan, supported almost exclusively by tax increases, would go on to 
succeed, but without any measurable support from the Republican side.
5.11 Deficit Reduction
While deficit reduction was the primary driving force behind the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, economists debated the effectiveness of the “tax increase” approach 
in the context of the effects on the overall economy. During a forum before the House 
Republican Conference on August 11th, 1993, the day after President Clinton signed the Act into 
law, Harvard economist William Niskanen spoke about the potential effects of the revenue 
provisions in the Act (CSPAN: 1993i, mm 46:00-50:00).
I want to make a point that deficit reductions are not all equal. A deficit reduction that is achieved 
primarily by tax increases has very different effects than one that is achieved by spending 
reductions. Now, I am a deficit hawk, I think that it is very important to reduce the deficit, but I 
have come to conclude that it is also especially important, maybe even more important how it is 
done... a deficit reduction that is achieved primarily by tax increases, as is the case in the Clinton 
budget, would not have a significant effect on private investment, and that should be the primary 
objective of a deficit reduction exercise.
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Further, Niskanen went on to discuss the tax effects of attempting to close the deficit with 
revenue increases (CSPAN: 1993i, mm 46:00-50:00).
It is not clear to me that higher taxes would reduce the deficit. Because, in the absence of some 
independent control on Federal spending, higher taxes, that Congress may not change, higher 
taxes are very likely to increase spending in future years. Most governments appear to act like a 
person who spends all of his earnings, plus the remaining limit on his credit card. If you look at 
the fiscal records of about 19 OECD countries for example you find a very strong relationship 
between the level of taxes and level of spending. But, you find no relation between the level of 
taxes and the amount of government borrowing. So, the marginal effect of additional revenues on 
spending for this sample of OECD countries is one.
Despite some criticism of the approach taken by the Clinton Administration, the economic 
effects, including the effect on the budget deficit, would prove to be positive (White House: 
2015b). By 2000, Federal debt had reached its lowest levels of the decade in terms of percentage 
of GDP, to a low of 31.4 percent in 2001 (White House: 2015b). Further, by 2000 the economy 
had transitioned slowly into a budget surplus, reaching 2.3% of GDP and $296 million in 
constant dollars. In 1993, these figures were a 3.8% deficit and $255 million deficit (White 
House: 2015b:32-33). In pure economic terms, the Clinton administration’s tax policy had been 
effective in closing the budget deficit, despite reservations and political obstacles to its 
implementation.
5.12 Constitutional Objections to Retroactive Taxation
One element of the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act considered to be extremely 
controversial was the retroactive nature of some of the elements of the plan. The budget
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proposed by Clinton sought to levy taxes on income earned prior to the first introduction of the 
bill in April of 1993 (CSPAN: 1993h, mm 3:00-6:00). Senator Slade Gorton (Republican, 
represented the state of Washington) spoke in a press conference about the unfairness of the 
retroactive nature of portions of the tax bill.
The outrage of the American people at the retroactive nature of this tax literally knows no 
bounds. In my office, and in many others, callers are almost speechless over the fact that this tax 
looks all the way back to January 1st. The constitutional point of order, which Senator McCain 
will raise, which I will argue however, is more narrowly limited, because we want to operate 
within the parameters of the Constitution as it has been interpreted. And it will claim 
unconstitutionality of this law only for that portion of the taxes which will be levied on income 
prior to April 8th of this year. April 8th is the date on which the President submitted a budget with 
the specific recommendation that this tax be retroactive. The Supreme Court of the United States 
has said, in this case in 1938, that ‘harsh and oppressive’ retroactive taxation violates the Due 
Process clause of the 5th amendment. Nothing can be more harsh and oppressive than the 
retroactive nature of this tax on both the living and on the dead.
In citing a Supreme Court case related to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Gorton went on to 
highlight what he considered to be the two tests to determine whether Due Process 
considerations were intact with respect to the taxpayers of the United States (CSPAN 1993h, mm 
3:00-6:00).
Retroactive taxation has got to meet two tests. First, that the taxpayer has actual or constructive 
notice that the statute will be retroactively amended. And, second that the taxpayer relied to his 
detriment on the pre-amendment tax statute, and was such reliance reasonable. In this case, of 
course, the taxpayers had no such notice before April 8, 1993, and we are being generous in that
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respect. In June of this year, Senator Mitchell asked a question whether these taxes would be 
retroactive, said no, unconditionally, no.
Gorton’s argument hinged upon the fact that taxpayers did not receive actual or constructive 
notice of the change. However, constructive notice is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as either 
“knowledge that can be acquired by normal means or news about court actions that is sufficient 
for all parties involved.” (Black’s Law Dictionary: 2015). This appears to be a rather loose 
definition, in that if a reasonably informed taxpayer followed the legislation, they would be 
aware of the possibility of a pending change. Further, the definition suggests that constructive 
notice might be achieved if an individual citizen has at least a chance to influence or lobby for a 
desired outcome within the bounds of the democratic process.
A Bloomberg article penned by Craig Roberts on August 29, 1993 lamented the 
retroactive provisions as well. The piece, written from a Conservative perspective, focused on 
the possible precedent set by use of retroactive legislation (Roberts: 1993, 1).
Clinton’s tax increase, for which only Democrats voted, may be challenged and overturned in the 
courts. If not, a dangerous new precedent will have been established. Clinton’s next deficit- 
reduction plan can be made retroactive two years, and after that a government desperate for 
revenues can use retroactive tax laws to confiscate wealth. Clinton’s tax increase won’t reduce 
any deficit, but it may signal the end of our Constitutional protection against ex post facto laws.
Despite these appeals, the bill passed in August of 1993, with the retroactive provisions intact. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court would receive a petition to address these complaints in US v. 
Carlton (1994). The taxing provisions allowing for retroactive tax were originally overturned by 
the US Court of Appeals, prior to the appeal to the Supreme Court. However, the appellate court
154
ruling would be reversed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the tax was not 
“wholly new” and that the tax itself had a very limited retroactive effect, making the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act provisions materially consistent with the Due Process Clause (US v. 
Carlton: 1994). In its reasoning, the Court cited that the lack of advance notice was not 
compelling, primarily because the taxing scheme was not new or surprising.
5.13 Clinton’s Reflections
President Clinton’s remarks upon signing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1993 
expressed clearly his dismay at the partisan nature of the deal that had been forged. While happy 
with the tangible results, Clinton recognized that the political victory had taken a more divisive 
path than he desired (American Presidency Project, 2015b: 1):
Today we come here for more than a bill signing. We come here to begin a new direction for our 
Nation. We are taking steps necessary and long overdue to revive our economy, to renew our 
American dream, to restore confidence in our own ability to take charge of our own affairs. This 
was clearly not an easy fight. When I presented this program to Congress, I had hoped for 
something quite different: I had hoped that it would spark a genuine, open, honest, bipartisan 
national debate about the serious choices before us, about the world economy we face as we 
move toward the 21st century, about the problems we have here at home and all the people whose 
lives and potential we lose and what economic consequence that has for all the rest of Americans. 
I had hoped that we could discuss whether and to what extent the revival of the competitive skills 
of our work force could raise incomes and generate jobs; how we could both reduce the deficit 
and increase investment in our future; whether we could escape the trap that has afflicted so many 
wealthy countries, that even when their economies are growing now they don't seem to be 
creating jobs; how we could escape the policies of the seventies and the eighties which led middle
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class Americans to work longer work weeks for lower pay while they paid more for the essentials 
of life; whether we could bring the power of free enterprise to bear in the poor inner cities and 
rural areas of this country and lift people up with the force of the American dream; whether the 
short-term consequences of bringing the deficit down would be more than overweighed by the 
short-term benefits of lower interest rates and the long-term benefits of being in control of our 
economic destiny. These are the kinds of things that I wanted to see debated. And to be sure, to 
some extent, we did debate them. But for 5 months the American people heard too little about the 
real debate and too much from those who oversimplified and often downright misrepresented the 
questions of tax increases and spending cuts because they had narrow economic or political or 
personal reasons to do so.
Despite Clinton’s dismay at the character of the debate, and the imperfect results of the 
legislation, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was effective in starting a move 
away from the extreme deficits of the 1980s. Through Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993 the Clinton administration was successful in beginning deficit reduction, while 
simultaneously increasing spending on domestic programs such as healthcare and social services 
(President’s Report to Congress: 1994). This was done by rolling back defense spending in 
favour of domestic programs, and reversed a projection that previously forecast out of control 
deficits through the decade of the 1990s (President’s Report to Congress: 1994).
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was the second consecutive bill which 
sought to increase both tax revenues and spending, while closing the budget deficit. It has been 
established that the 1993 Act successfully accomplished the goal of measurably and substantially 
reducing the deficit (White House: 2015b). However, as with any policy implementation, debate 
remains with respect to its overall effectiveness and efficiency in accomplishing these goals. In a
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1995 campaign stop, Clinton himself offhandedly stated that he may have gone too far with his 
1993 budget (Purdum, 1995:1).
Probably there are people in this room still mad at me at that budget because you think I raised 
your taxes too much. It might surprise you to know that I think I raised them too much too.
Clinton echoed this sentiment during a second fundraiser in October 1995 (Cannon, 1995:1).
In the first week I showed up in Washington, the leaders of the minority in Congress—who are 
now the majority leader and the Speaker of the House—told me that I would not get one 
Republican vote no matter what I did. As a consequence, I had to raise your taxes more and cut 
spending less than I wanted too, which made a lot of you furious.
Clinton went on to state how Republican leaders were eager for him to fail (Cannon, 1995: 1).
[Dole and Gingrich] were very candid. They said ‘We want to be in a position to blame you if the 
economy continues to go down. And if it goes up, we want to be in a position to attack you for 
raising taxes.’
Clinton’s comments also seemed to confuse the Republican opposition, who felt Clinton’s 
remarks were not representative of their sentiments, or his, at the time (Cannon: 1995). Senator 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Democrat from New York, and ally of Clinton’s, also expressed his 
own confusion (Cannon, 1995: 1).
I confess to my distress at the President’s statement that we raised taxes too much. The President, 
in retrospect, says he made a mistake. But I think we did the right thing.
It seems likely that Clinton’s casual but public reflections were an expression of remorse for 
having to proceed in 1993 without any bipartisan support. Further, Clinton was actively
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campaigning for his second term in office in 1995. As a result this may have contributed to his 
uneasiness with unilateral Democratic actions, and partisan votes, associated with the 1993 Act 
(Purdum: 1995).
5.14 Legacy: Partisanship and Gridlock
The evolution of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 represented a major 
contrast to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. While the 1986 Act exemplified political compromise, 
complete with all of its positive and negative implications, the 1993 Act was an extreme example 
of partisanship and gridlock. Senior Fellow Bruce Bartlett has conjectured that gridlock is, 
ironically, a result of one party’s maintaining control of the Presidency and both Congressional 
bodies (Bartlett: 2002). Intuitively, it would seem that a party with control of the legislative and 
executive branches of government could impose its will on the other party. However, Bartlett 
conjectured that it is an American ideal to distrust any party that maintains effective control of 
the Federal government in this manner (Bartlett: 2002). During 1993, the Democratic Party held 
a 53-47 advantage over the Republicans in the Senate; a 58%-42% edge in seats in the House of 
Representatives; and, control of the White House (US House of Representatives: 2016). Though 
it seems the majority party, particularly when it controls several branches of government, can act 
almost unilaterally, the reality is much different. The minority party may begin to rely on more 
mechanical obstacles in order to maintain its sovereignty. Examples include tactics such as use 
of filibuster to prevent a vote on controversial legislation, as well as legal challenges to the law 
itself, as evidenced in US vs. Carlton.
Gridlock can also be explained by the concept of “representative dynamics.” This is the 
idea that when someone is designated to represent a constituency, they are expected to do so in a
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contractual sense. When they do not perform by representing the narrow interests of the 
constituents, they are accused of “selling out” and are punished by them (Armajani: 2012). This 
tends to push representatives away from compromise for fear of repercussions, furthering the 
gridlock. Also, supporting or opposing a policy in a public forum creates a “winning and losing” 
dilemma, to which neither side is willing to concede (Armajani: 2012). In order to solve 
gridlock, it is apparent that the paradigm must be reconceived: that it is possible for both sides to 
win, and both sides to lose (Armajani: 2012).
In explaining the extensive gridlock associated with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993, it is apparent that many of the characteristics that generate polarity were in place. 
Party leaders on both sides took stark positions, allowing very little room for deviation across 
party lines. The political climate was perfect for gridlock: Democrats controlled both legislative 
bodies and the White House. Accordingly, Republicans were unwilling to negotiate, and used 
political tactics to oppose the bill on philosophical grounds, including challenging the 
constitutionality of the law itself. The result was not surprising: the Democratic majority party 
pushed through the 1993 Act without any tangible support from the Republicans, and the 
Republicans were provided political cover with their home constituencies by maintaining their 
vehement opposition.
In 1982, President Ronald Reagan faced a similar situation as President Bill Clinton did 
in 1993. In a speech supporting a significant tax increase, he said the following (Burman, 2006: 
359; Reagan, 1982b: 4):
The single most important question facing us tonight is: Do we reduce deficits and interest rates 
by raising revenue from those who are not now paying their fair share—or do we accept bigger 
budget deficits, higher interest rates, and higher unemployment simply because we disagree on
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certain features of a legislative package? We’re within sight of a safe port of economic recovery. 
Do we make port, or go aground on the shoals of selfishness, partisanship and just plain 
bullheadedness?
Reagan’s speech resounded with a tone of compromise, in sharp contrast to the political rhetoric 
of 1993. Tax increases were not in line with Reagan’s core values, but he saw them as a 
necessity. Much had changed by 1993. There was no room by then for both sides to compromise, 
and the negotiations instead decayed into a face-saving effort.
5.15 Conclusion
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was a case study in partisanship and 
gridlock. However, in retrospect it appeared to be successful in stimulating the economy and 
closing the large deficits that had grown steadily since 1990. There is little doubt that Clinton’s 
economic plan was largely a success. However, its success came without any tangible 
Republican support. Blocked at every turn by conservatives like Newt Gingrich and John Kasich, 
the President was forced to work unilaterally to push the bill through Congress. In that sense, the 
1993 Act could not have been more different than the 1986 Act. Nonetheless, a closer look at the 
bill’s passage, and the personalities who supported and stifled it, offers three lessons for future 
tax reform.
First, as evidenced in the 1986 Act, effective control of the legislative and executive 
branch by one party appears to be a recipe for gridlock and divisiveness. In the 1993 Act, the 
Republican minority was clearly threatened by the electoral mandate achieved by the Democrats, 
and responded by standing even more firmly against change. As outlined earlier, this seemed to 
allow individual legislators to save face in their home districts by opposing any proposal the
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Clinton administration offered. Effectively, this meant that to the individual politician, it was not 
necessary to accomplish anything tangible while in Washington. Rather, the act of preventing 
any legislative progress was accomplishment enough.
Second, narrow interpretation of the bill along lines of “principle” rather than practicality 
made compromise very unlikely. When legislators approach certain elements of legislation as 
morally or fundamentally wrong, it leaves no room for the emergence of middle ground. While 
one could argue this was precisely the intent of the founders of the Constitution - to slow major 
legislative changes and prevent governmental institutions from turning over too quickly - this 
effect also makes substantive overhaul of the tax code very difficult. Instead of, as in 1986, 
moving change toward more broad changes that influence many taxpayers, this narrow approach 
to governing supported carve-outs and ideological stances that appealed to small slices of the 
electorate. Stated differently, when compromise is not seen as an option in the legislator’s 
toolkit, the overall electorate becomes much less important than the individual constituent and 
the home district that the legislator represents.
Last, the evolution of the 1993 Act seemed to suggest that the role of an elected 
Representative or Senator was changing. Were politicians elected to represent the narrow 
positions of their constituents, or were they elected to “do what was best” for their constituents 
within the framework of the nation as a whole? In 1993, it appeared that the Republicans in 
particular had moved toward the former position, though the Democrats also bore some 
responsibility for gridlock. The environment at the time was toxic for any politician who 
considered compromise as an option. This “toxicity” was likely the result of heavy accountability 
to party leadership, the home district, and special interest groups who kept scorecards as to 
politicians and their solidarity on particular issues. In 1993, politicians had fewer tools to work
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with than in 1986, mainly as a result of this change in tone. The result was predictable: any 
change that occurred did so along party lines, and was limited to what the party in power could 
pass with its own voting strength.
As will be discussed later in this research, the United States tax code and legislative 
process continued to move toward bitter partisanship after 1986, with little evidence of an end in 
sight. The passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was a significant shift in 
paradigm, away from the politics of compromise, and toward polarization. This sharp 
partisanship would become the rule rather than the exception. A new consequence-filled political 
environment had evolved since 1986, often devoid of substantive debate and statesmanship. Only 
seven years removed from one of the most hallowed political compromises in the history of U.S. 
taxation, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the landscape had changed immeasurably. While “Gucci 
Gulch” was gone, with its environment of both personal and pork-barrel compromise, it was 
replaced with a rigid and unyielding Congress. The battle against “sausage-making” and deal­
cutting may have been won, but the war against gridlock was just beginning.
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CHAPTER 6
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
6.1 Introduction
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 was the first major 
piece of tax legislation to take effect under the administration of President George W. Bush. 
Bush was elected in 2000 after a controversial and hotly-contested election in which he narrowly 
carried the state of Florida, thus winning the Presidential election, by only 537 votes out of tens 
of millions cast. His predecessor, President Bill Clinton, had served since 1993, nurturing a 
strengthening economy that produced solid growth and budget surpluses. However, Clinton only 
cut taxes once during his tenure, raising the widespread sentiment that a tax cut of some kind was 
in order during Bush’s tenure (Cato Institute: 2006).
The 2001 Act constituted the largest tax cut in the United States since 1981, reducing the 
overall tax burden by 1.35 trillion dollars over 10 years (Cato: 2006). Major provisions in the Act 
reduced individual tax rates, increased tax credits for dependent children, temporarily repealed 
and phased in reductions to the estate tax, and the introduction of favourable retirement plan 
provisions (Cato Institute: 2006). One of the most unusual aspects of the 2001 Act was the fact 
that it contained numerous and complicated timing provisions, with the majority of the plan’s 
provisions scheduled to sunset in 2010 (Cato Institute: 2006). The 2001 Act was the final step in 
a series of attempts by Republicans to implement tax-reduction legislation, efforts which had 
previously been blocked by Democratic President Bill Clinton.
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6.2 Background
From the mid-1990s to the end of the Clinton administration in 2000, American politics 
was characterized by bitter partisanship and budget impasses (Los Angeles Times: 1999). The 
government was actually forced to temporarily shut down during the 1995-1996 fiscal year due 
to legislative bickering and funding shortages. Republicans had, at the same time, grown 
frustrated with Clinton’s ability to push his agenda, while derailing their own (Los Angeles 
Times: 1999). Clearly, Clinton was a powerful negotiator, a relatively popular president, and a 
good steward of the economy. He held the political high ground. Clinton was said to have “taken 
credit for having ended a generation of deficit spending, having ushered in unprecedented 
prosperity and, in the words of one top staffer, having prevented the squandering of the surplus.” 
(Los Angeles Times, 1999: 3).
As early as 1999, Congress had begun to deliberate an 800 billion dollar tax cut package 
intended to stimulate economic growth and create jobs, known as the Taxpayer Refund and 
Relief Act of 1999. This bill would pass late in 1999, to be taken up by the President for his 
signature upon return from the Congressional recess in August of that year. Business leaders in 
particular expressed strong support for this tax cut. In a press conference hosted by Michael 
Baroody of the National Association of Manufacturers, executives called for a reduction in tax 
burden to stimulate the economy and improve economic growth (CSPAN, 1999: 2:00-3:00).
I want to make three points briefly and preliminarily in our discussion. The first is the primacy of 
economic growth. The second is our long-held view at the NAM is that our Federal income tax 
code is an anti-growth code. And, the third point is that this tax cut, despite the spin of its critics, 
is not by any stretch of the imagination, too big for an economy of our size.
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The National Association of Manufacturers expressed concern that then-President Bill Clinton 
might veto the Republican tax cut bill (CSPAN: 1999). Baroody expressed support for the tax cut 
bill’s cost-efficiency, and refuted the argument that the tax cut bill was too big. He cited the 
projected growth benefits of the tax reduction (CSPAN: 1999):
Even if there were no growth over the same ten years covered by this tax bill, the GDP of the 
United States economy would accumulate to more than 80 trillion dollars. 800 billion dollar tax 
cut over 10 years, as a percentage of an 80 trillion dollar GDP over the same 10 years, amounts to 
1%. In fact, if you add the increment of growth, even the conservative estimates of Federal 
budget analysts at the CBO and OMB, that 80 trillion dollars expands to 114 trillion dollars. 
Simply put, we don’t believe this is too big of a tax bill. Far from it.
These fears of a presidential veto proved to be well founded, as Clinton indeed vetoed the 800 
billion-dollar tax cut package. Clinton, along with many economists, supported the action 
because it increased the likelihood that the budget surplus might be used to instead pay down the 
national debt (Washington Post: 1999). The Republicans were instead forced to settle for the 
possibility of compromise for a potential deal that would be much smaller -  closer to 300 billion 
dollars (Washington Post: 1999). No deal would be reached on the proposed legislation in 1999, 
and Clinton would also go on to veto another tax relief measure as well -  the Marriage Tax 
Reconciliation Act of 2000. These two actions ensured that no substantial tax cuts would occur 
during Clinton’s presidency, while laying the groundwork for President George Bush’s view that 
tax relief should be a major policy goal (US Senate: 2016).
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6.3 Timeline
The timeline of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and its 
movement through the legislative process, is outlined below (Govtrack: 2015c).
• May 15th, 2001 introduced
• May 16th, 2001 House version passed
• May 23 , 2001 Senate version passed
• May 25th, 2001 House Conference report adopted
• May 26th, 2001 Senate Conference report adopted
• June 7th, 2001 signed into law by the President.
6.4 Key Figures in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
George W. Bush
George W. Bush became the 43 President of the United States in 2000, narrowly defeating 
former vice-President Al Gore. Bush is the son of former President George Bush, who was 
elected in 1988. George W. Bush served as governor of Texas, and was a graduate of Yale and 
the Harvard Business School. Bush was an executive in the energy industry, as well as an 
investor in a major league baseball franchise, the Texas Rangers, prior to his career in public 
office (White House: 2016b). Bush would serve two terms as President, focusing on tax relief, 
national security, and combatting terrorism. As a former business executive, Bush clearly sought 
to refocus the economy by re-introducing “trickle-down” principles implemented by Ronald 
Reagan. Bush inherited a significant surplus from the Clinton administration, though he would 
depart office having reversed the surplus and generated significant new budget deficits.
166
Alan Greenspan
Alan Greenspan was the Chairman of the Federal Reserve banking system, taking office in 1987. 
He would serve five terms, ending his service in 2006 (Federal Reserve History: 2016). 
Greenspan was a graduate of New York University, and presided over a number of significant 
economic events in the economic history of the country, including a 1987 stock market crash, 
two recessions, and the 2001 9/11 terrorist attacks (Federal Reserve History, 2016: 1). Greenspan 
played a role in helping lay the theoretical groundwork for supporting Bush’s proposed tax cuts 
(CSPAN: 2001).
6.5 Major Provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
The most substantial provisions of the 2001 Act, from an economic impact perspective, were 
arguably the reductions to the individual income tax rates. The Act sought to provide some 
immediate economic boost, as recommended by many experts (Greenspan: 2001). The major 
provisions are outlined below (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2001: 2-8):
• expansion of a number of tax-preferenced retirement plans;
• created a new 10% regular individual income tax bracket for taxable income that would 
have been otherwise taxed at 15%;
• the 28% individual income tax bracket was reduced to 27%, falling to 25% over the next 
5 years;
• the 31% individual income tax bracket was reduced to 30%, falling to 28% over the next 
5 years;
• the 36% rate would also fall immediately to 35%, down to 33% over the next 5 years;
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• the top tax bracket (39.6%) would be reduced immediately to 38.6%, falling to 35% over 
the next 5 years;
• an immediate credit was issued for the 2001 rate reduction differences, up to a maximum 
of $600 in the case of a married couple;
• phased out limitations on individual tax itemized deductions, beginning in 2006, to 
complete over the next decade;
• correction of the so-called “marriage penalty”; this is the difference between the tax rate 
applied to a given tax return filed by a married couple, and the tax rate(s) applied to the 
same income level filed under two single taxpayer returns;
• increased the child tax credit from $500 to $1,000, and made it fully refundable;
• expansion of dependent care tax credit; and
• phase out of the Estate and Gift Tax, including expansion of the exemption from 1 
million in fair value transferred to full repeal in 2010; this included a gradual rate 
reduction from 50% in 2001, down to 45% in 2010.
As will be discussed later in this research, it is notable that many of the provisions in this tax 
reduction plan would phase in gradually over a ten-year period. It also included a number of 
substantive sunset provisions that would require Congressional action beyond Bush’s terms of 
office. These were unconventional, and would prove to be both a catalyst for criticism, as well as 
a means for easing the bill’s passage.
6.6 The Transition to George W. Bush: Political and Economic Change
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Texas Governor, and soon to be President-elect George W. Bush, campaigned in 2000 
primarily on a platform of tax relief. The United States’ economy was in excellent shape and had 
been in a consistent state of expansion since Bill Clinton took office in 1993 (Boehne: 2000). In 
remarks made about the state of the economy in 2000, Philadelphia Federal Reserve Chairman 
Edward Boehne noted the strength of the economy (Boehne, 2000: 1):
The U.S. economy has grown at an average rate of more than 3-1/2 percent per year since 1991 
when our current expansion began. Growth has accelerated since the end of 1995, averaging 
about 4-1/4 percent per year. The strong pace of economic growth has been matched by the 
strong growth of employment. Since 1991, the U.S. has added about 2.5 million workers to 
payrolls each year, and the unemployment rate has fallen from above 7 percent to a 29-year low 
of just over 4 percent.
George W. Bush’s campaign against sitting vice-President and Democratic candidate Al Gore 
focused on putting tax revenues back in the pocket of the American taxpayer. Bush debated Al 
Gore in North Carolina on October 11, 2000, just prior to the November general election. The 
topic of taxes and the candidates’ approach to the economy was a significant point of discussion. 
In the debate Bush outlined the major components of his tax plan (Bush, 2000a: 1).
Let's talk about my tax plan. The top 1% will pay one-third of all the federal income taxes. And in 
return, get one-fifth of the benefits, because most of the tax reductions go to the people at the 
bottom end of the economic ladder. That stands in stark contrast, by the way, to a man who is 
going to leave 50 million -- 50 million Americans out of tax relief. We just have a different point 
of view. It's a totally different point of view. He believes only the right people ought to get tax 
relief. I believe everybody who pays taxes ought to get tax relief.
169
Bush’s rhetoric mirrored President Ronald Reagan’s, nearly twenty years previously, in his call 
for an “across the board” style tax reduction. However, the political landscape was markedly 
different in 2000. Reagan had inherited an economy in shambles in 1980, while Bush began his 
term with a much more stable economy. However, opponent Al Gore criticized Bush’s uniform 
tax cut plan by characterizing it as a gift to the wealthy (Commission on Presidential Debates: 
2016).
I think that what -- I think the point of that is that anybody would have a hard time trying to make 
a tax cut plan that is so large, that would put us into such big deficits, that gives almost half the 
benefits to the wealthiest of the wealthy. I think anybody would have a hard time explaining that 
clearly in a way that makes sense to the average person.
Gore also sought to remind voters about the danger of returning to post-Reagan era budget 
deficits. He echoed these concerns again in the final debate of the 2000 election cycle, on 
October 17, 2000, in Missouri (Commission on Presidential Debates: 2000b). Gore reiterated 
concern over the deficit potential of Bush’s plan, and the subsequent effect on the already 
burgeoning national debt. He cited the interest on the national debt as being as large, on its own, 
as almost any Federal program, but providing no tangible benefit to the public (Commission on 
Presidential Debates: 2000b). Bush defended his plan (Commission on Presidential Debates, 
2000b: 66):
Let me talk about tax relief. If you pay taxes, you ought to get tax relief. The vice President 
believes only the right people ought to get tax relief. I don't think that's the role of the President to 
pick you're right and you're not right. I think if you're going to have tax relief, everybody ought to 
get it.
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Bush’s comments are interesting in that he stressed that he wanted everyone who paid taxes to 
have tax relief. However, the reality is that the mechanics of any proposed tax reduction or 
increase is far more complicated. Obviously Bush was using these comments as a rhetorical 
device. However, it is evident that incremental rate reductions, even when fixed as a flat rate 
across all tax brackets, affect different classes of taxpayers differently. Further, one cannot make 
political decisions of any kind without them being inherently political in nature. Notably, Bush’s 
comments hearken back, again, to Ronald Reagan’s campaign to lower tax rates in the early 
1980s. Bush, as did Reagan, sought to position himself on the side of the taxpayer, not the side of 
government (Commission on Presidential Debates, 2000b: 6):
And therefore, wealthy people are going to get it (tax reductions). But the top 1% will end up 
paying one-third of the taxes in America and they get one-fifth of the benefits. And that's because 
we structured the plan so that six million additional American families pay no taxes. If you're a 
family of four making $50,000 in Missouri, you get a 50% cut in your federal income taxes. What 
I've done is set priorities and funded them. And there's extra money. And I believe the people 
who pay the bills ought to get some money back. It's a difference of opinion. He wants to grow 
the government and I trust you with your own money. I wish we could spend an hour talking 
about trusting people. It's just the right position to take.
The similarities between Bush’s political playbook and Reagan’s tax reform platform are 
striking: Bush referred to his strong belief in trusting Americans with their own money. While 
Bush phrased his tax cut plan in terms of “trust,” Reagan framed his in terms of freedom. 
Though they chose different terms, clearly Bush sought to capitalize on Reagan’s massive 
popularity with the American people by structuring his political positions parallel to Reagan’s. 
Bush sought to drive home the point that he trusted the American people, particularly with their
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own money, while vice-President Al Gore did not. The moderator of the debate pushed back and 
challenged Bush for clarity to which Bush responded (Commission on Presidential Debates, 
2000b: 6):
Let me finish. Under my plan, if you make -- the top -- the wealthy people pay 62% of the taxes 
today. Afterwards they pay 64%. This is a fair plan. You know why? Because the tax code is 
unfair for people at the bottom end of the economic ladder. If you're a single mother making 
$22,000 a year today and you're trying to raise two children, for every additional dollar you earn 
you pay a higher marginal rate on that dollar than someone making $200,000, and that's not right. 
So I want to do something about that.
Bush would go on to defeat Gore by the narrowest of margins in the November 2000 presidential 
election. Bush carried the state of Florida, a state of monumental electoral importance, by just 
537 votes of tens of millions of total votes cast. Numerous challenges to the electoral results 
ensued, including manual recounting of ballots, court challenges, and ultimately, the 
involvement of the US Supreme Court. Nearly a month later, the election results were still in 
doubt, unprecedented for an election in the United States. In Bush v. Gore the Supreme Court 
stopped the manual recounting process, effectively ending the controversy and handing the 
election to Bush. This was a rocky start to what would prove to be a tumultuous first year for 
Bush and the nation. Bush would go on to push for monumental tax reductions via the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. Would Bush’s plan produce large and lasting 
deficits, as Reagan’s plan did? Would it continue to grow the economy? Or would the United 
States return to a pattern of deficit spending?
6.7 Bush’s Proposal
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Bush’s plan to reduce taxes was built around the idea that economic conditions dictated the need 
for a tax cut; Bush touted his plan before a Joint Session of Congress on February 27, 2001 
(American Presidency Project, 2016: 28-30):
I hope you will join me in standing firmly on the side of the people. You see, the growing surplus 
exists because taxes are too high and government is charging more than it needs. The people of 
America have been overcharged and, on their behalf, I am here asking for a refund. Some say my 
tax plan is too big. Others say it’s too small. I respectfully disagree. This plan is just right. I didn’t 
throw darts at the board to come up with a number for tax relief. I didn’t take a poll or develop an 
arbitrary formula that might sound good. I looked at problems in the Tax Code and calculated the 
cost to fix them.
This simple rhetorical approach was typical of George Bush, and was one of the ways he 
connected so well with the general public. Bush would go on to highlight some of the specifics 
of his plan, including an interesting comment about the so-called “marriage penalty” (American 
Presidency Project, 2016: 29-30):
Our government should not tax, and thereby discourage marriage, so we reduced the marriage 
penalty. I want to help families rear and support their children, so we doubled the child credit to 
$1,000 per child. It’s not fair to tax the same earnings twice — once when you earn them, and 
again when you die — so we must repeal the death tax. These changes add up to significant help. 
A typical family with two children will save $1,600 a year on their federal income taxes. Now, 
$1,600 may not sound like a lot to some, but it means a lot to many families.
Bush would go on to highlight how his plan helps the average family, and how the surplus “is 
not the government’s money” but the people’s money (American Presidency Project, 2016: 30).
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It is interesting, and absurd however, that Bush suggested that tax policy was in some way 
discouraging marriage, as this lacks face validity. Further, there is no evidence that this was true. 
Bush also pushed the fairness of his cuts, in that they were applied evenly across income 
brackets. However, this argument is flawed because it clearly ignores the possibility that wealthy 
taxpayers did not in fact need tax cuts, and assumes, perhaps erroneously, that proportional cuts 
are not regressive to lower-income taxpayers, or more detrimental to the budget. For example, it 
is entirely possible that a hypothetical 1% tax reduction for low-income taxpayers would provide 
more direct relief to the taxpayer, at a lower cost to the treasury, than a 1% tax cut for a high- 
income taxpayer. The high-income taxpayer would, arguably, be more likely to spend the cut on 
non-essential items, while the cut would simultaneously represent a larger outlay in tax spending.
Bush also would place great weight on Alan Greenspan’s testimony about the economy 
in pushing his plan, while touting tax relief as patriotic, bipartisan, and urgent (American 
Presidency Project, 2016: 29-30):
Forty years ago, and then 20 years ago, two presidents, one Democrat, one Republican, John F. 
Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, advocated tax cuts to, in President Kennedy’s words, get this 
country moving again. They knew then what we must do now. To create economic growth and 
opportunity, we must put money back into the hands of the people who buy goods and create 
jobs. We must act quickly. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has testified before Congress 
that tax cuts often come too late to stimulate economic recovery. So I want to work with you to 
give our economy an important jump-start by making tax relief retroactive.
Ironically, the proposed retroactive approach to Bush’s tax cuts would be made easier due to 
President Bill Clinton’s successful use of retroactive tax increases in the 1990s. Bush would 
begin to encourage Congress to take up debate on this plan as soon as possible, again relying on
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Greenspan’s suggestion that tax relief typically takes too long to make a difference in economic 
stimulus (CSPAN: 2001).
6.8 Congress Takes up Bush’s Tax Cuts
As referenced by Bush in his February speech to Congress, Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan had delivered testimony on the state of the economy before the Senate Budget 
Committee on January 25, 2001. The economy had been performing very well throughout the 
Clinton administration (Boehne: 2000). However, Greenspan pointed out that projected 
economic growth rates had begun to fall, and he cautioned against continued creation of budget 
surpluses, as these had accumulated during the Clinton administration (CSPAN: 2001). 
Greenspan effectively called for responsible tax reductions, sooner rather than later, due to the 
lengthy and thorny legislative process required to implement changes to the tax code (CSPAN, 
2001: 35:00-36:30):
Moreover, the greater the drain of resources from the private sector, arguably, the lower the 
growth potential of the economy. In contrast to most spending programs, tax reductions have 
downside limits, they cannot be open-ended. Lately there has been much discussion of cutting 
taxes to confront the evident pronounced weakening in economic performance. Such tax 
initatives however have proved difficult to implement in the time frame in which recessions have 
developed and ended. For example, although President Ford proposed in January of 1975 that 
withholding rates be reduced, this easiest of tax changes was not implemented until May, when 
the recession was officially over, and the recovery was gathering force.
Greenspan stressed that weakening economic signals dictated that action was necessary, a 
position which ultimately supported Bush’s designs on a tax cut (CSPAN: 2001). He also 
cautioned against deficit spending and the accumulation of private assets by the public sector
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(CSPAN: 2001). In his words, a timely tax cut could do the economy “noticeable good.” 
(CSPAN, 2001: 38:00).
Congress began to debate potential tax proposals in the House on March 8, 2001. A 
precursor bill to the 2001 Act, H.R. 3, was considered as both sides debated the resolution. 
Democrats were generally critical of the proposed tax cuts, primarily citing the failure of Bush’s 
administration in three ways: failure to provide a budget, the allegation that Bush’s tax cuts 
disproportionally benefited the rich, as well as the fact that if budget projections were wrong, 
social programs would suffer (Congressional Record: 2001b). Republicans were generally 
supportive, citing the need to return surpluses to the public, and minimizing the issue of 
operating without a final budget for the fiscal year. Charles Rangel (Democrat, represented the 
state of New York) rose in opposition (Congressional Record, 2001b: 3):
This is not the tax bill that we hear the President talking about. This does not give relief to people 
who are married and suffer the marriage penalty. It does not take care of the estate tax. Who it 
takes care of politically are the top rollers in the United States.
Likewise, Congressman Matsui (Democrat, represented the state of California) of California 
criticized HR 3, citing the possible margin of error in the Congressional Budget Office’s 
projections and the associated risks. Congressman Matsui shared the fear that if budget 
projections were wrong, the tax cut refund could not simply be taken back. Rather, the difference 
would be made up using social programs such as Social Security and prescription drug benefits 
(Congressional Record, 2001b: 6):
Mr. Speaker, I will guarantee that we will have to make significant cuts in Social Security, if, in 
fact, this tax cut occurs and these numbers do not come up, and we know these numbers are just
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based upon nothing but guesswork, and it is my hope that the Members will come to their senses 
and be very, very cautious, because the Democrats have a tax cut that basically is modest. It is 
about $600 billion, which is a lot of money, but at the same time that tax cut is well within a 
budget framework and obviously will stay within these guesswork numbers.
The Congressman Jim Turner of Texas continued the Democratic opposition, lamenting the lack 
of a budget and citing the irresponsibility of approving potential tax cuts without first budgeting 
accurately for them (Congressional Record, 2001b: 6):
The 33 members of the Blue Dog Democrat Coalition are working hard today to send the 
message to all of our friends in this House that it is important to have a budget first. Democrats 
want the largest tax cut we can afford, but how in the world do you know how large a tax cut you 
can afford until you first go through a budget process? It matters not what budget I am for. It 
matters not what budget the President is for. It matters not what budget you are for. The process is 
that we all work together. We debate it out, and we vote and we have a budget. And when you do, 
you then know how big a tax cut you can afford.
As a member of the “Blue Dog Democrats”, Turner would have billed himself a social liberal 
and fiscal conservative (Bluedogdemocrats.com: 2016). Similar to the Boll Weevils who were 
prevalent during the Reagan years, Blue Dog democrats caucused with the Democratic party on 
most issues, but could sway votes toward Republicans in debates on financial matters. However, 
on this issue Turner toed the party line, using the lack of a budget to leverage the Democratic 
position.
Many Republicans spoke in support of the tax reduction efforts. In stark contrast to the 
Democrats, Republicans typically postured themselves as supporters of individual freedom, and 
stressed that taxpayers should be able to spend their own money the way they wished. Those
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who rose in support of a tax reduction bill stressed that taxes raised in excess of governmental 
needs fundamentally belonged to the individual taxpayer, and should therefore be returned rather 
than used to build a surplus. Members speaking in favour of a tax cut included Congresswoman 
Johnson (Republican, represented the state of Connecticut) who criticized the rising surplus 
(Congressional Record, 2001b:7):
Let us look at what is happening to those tax dollars that they are pouring into Washington. For 
one thing, they are building up a surplus faster than at any time in our history. Just yesterday, our 
Secretary of the Treasury said that right now, this month of March, our surplus is $75 billion. A 
year ago, in that economic year, at the same time, it was only $40 billion. So in spite of the 
leveling off of the economy, the surplus is growing more rapidly now than it was a year ago. The 
surplus dollars are our taxes. They are just the fruit of the hard labor of the American people. We 
can reduce the debt; pay it right down. We can spend on our priorities like education and health 
care; and, yes, we can and must reduce people's taxes. It is their money. They deserve a portion of 
it back, and they deserve that today.
Congressman Portman (Republican, represented the state of Ohio), a member of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, also rose to speak in favour of the legislation. He continued to frame the 
debate around freedom, specifically that tax dollars belong to the people (Congressional Record, 
2001b:8):
We are going to have some spending increases in places like education and the military, and still 
there is room for tax relief for the hard-working American people who created every dime of this 
big surplus we have. People are overtaxed. We just heard earlier people spend more on taxes now 
than they do on food, shelter, and clothing combined. We have the highest tax burden since 
World War II. Taxpayers in Ohio need some relief. I know they do. And they ought to get it.
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Finally, I want to say that we need to do this for the economy, even if it did not fit in the budget 
so neatly, even if taxpayers were not so overburdened with taxation. Do any of us want to see us 
go into a recession?
Congressman Camp (Republican, represented the state of Michigan) echoed the comments about 
tax dollars belonging to the American people, a populist stance which epitomized the Republican 
stance toward tax relief. This position was vastly different than the one taken by opponents of the 
bill, who sought to frame the debate not as an issue of individual freedom, but one of collective 
governmental responsibility to balance the budget and take care of its obligations such as 
education and health care. Camp’s comments were in strong support (Congressional Record, 
2001b:8).
High taxes are not only a tax on the ability to create wealth for working people, they are a tax on 
opportunity itself; the opportunity for Americans to determine their own destiny, make their own 
choices, and keep more of what they have worked so hard to earn. These values are the essence of 
democracy itself. It is the people's money. They worked hard for it, and they deserve it. They 
deserve a refund.
H.R. 3 would pass the House narrowly, 230-198, with its provisions ultimately included in the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, which would be taken up in just a few 
months. H.R. 3 contained the core of the individual tax rate reductions, as well as a guarantee 
that major social programs would not suffer as a result of the tax cuts, in the event of a budget 
shortfall (Congressional Record, 2001b:20). However, the final version of the bill would find 
itself much further to the left, moving from a Republican-centered tax cut that benefited the
179
wealthy, to a tax package that included relief from the so-called “marriage penalty”, increases in 
child tax credits, and a future estate tax repeal (Lewandowski: 2008).
6.9 The Conference Report
On May 15, 2001, House Members discussed the Conference Report, which reconciled 
differences between the House and Senate Versions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001. Democrats had recently regained a majority in the Senate for the 
first time since 1994 after the defection of Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont from the Republican 
ranks (Democracynow: 2001). Despite this development, Democrats conceded to the 
Republicans a majority on the Conference Committee taking up the efforts at reconciling House 
and Senate versions of the Bush tax cuts (Democracynow:2001). Representative Max Sandlin, of 
Texas, opened with remarks in support of the legislation:
Mr. Speaker, today, Congress will approve a significant tax relief package, outlining a fiscal path 
that promises lower taxes but creates a less certain budget picture. I believe Americans need tax 
relief, and I will support this tax cut bill because it is the best we can produce at this time. In 
many crucial respects, however, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act is flawed. In some 
cases, promised tax benefits are delayed for several years, while additional valuable tax credits 
for education and inducements for personal savings expire only a few years after enactment. 
Politics, however, is built on principled compromise between different policy positions and, in 
voting in favor of this bill, I will not let the friend of the perfect be the enemy of the good.
Sandlin noted some of the unique timing issues associate with the 2001 Act, including sunset 
provisions and expirations. Sandlin would go on to support the bill’s provisions which eliminated 
the estate tax, and corrected the “marriage penalty.” (Congressional Record: 2001c). The
180
marriage penalty was a provision of the Internal Revenue Code which resulted in a higher tax 
burden for the same couple, if married, than their tax burden would be if filing as single 
taxpayers. Though Republican support was strong, some members objected to elements of the 
plan. In particular, some members found objectionable the full “future” repeal of the estate tax in 
2010, a measure which was included in the tax reduction package. Representative Doug Bereuter 
(Republican, represented the state of Nebraska) voiced this sentiment, calling for changes to the 
estate tax but reminding the members that estate tax reductions only benefit the “super-rich.” 
(Congressional Record, 2001c: 118):
Mr. Speaker, while this member enthusiastically votes for H.R. 1836 to give a tax cut to 
American taxpayers he continues his strong opposition to the total elimination of the estate tax on 
the super-rich. The reasons for this opposition has been publicly explained on numerous 
occasions, including statements in the Congressional Record. On the other hand, this member is 
strongly in favor of substantially raising the estate tax exemption level and reducing the rate of 
taxation on all levels of taxable estates. However, to totally eliminate the estate tax on billionaires 
and mega-millionaires would be a terrible idea for the American society and for continuing to 
foster very large charitable contributions for colleges and universities and other worthy 
institutions in our country. Fortunately, I believe it will never be eliminated in the year 2010.
Unfortunately for Representative Bereuter, the estate tax was in fact repealed in 2010, then 
retroactively re-enacted in an unusual legislative move in 2011. The lengthy deferral associated 
with the estate tax provision of the Economic Growth and Tax Reform Reconciliation Act of 
2001 was symptomatic of its weaknesses. Many of its provisions were delayed in ways that, 
arguably, muted the impact of the provisions or muddled the ability of the general public to 
understand what they would be getting with the legislation.
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Opposition to the Conference report came from expected sources, but also from those 
moderate members of Congress who felt the bill did not accomplish clearly enough its intended 
goals. California Representative Jane Harman, a Democrat who supported other provisions of the 
bill, declined to support it (Congressional Record, 2001c: 117).
I expect to vote for needed tax cuts in the future, including true relief from the AMT [Alternative 
Minimum Tax], a package of relief for small business, and a permanent research and 
development tax credit. But none of these important tax cuts is included in today’s package. It 
includes some good features, such as improved pension portability, expanded IRA contributions 
and marriage penalty relief, but it is riddled with gimmicks and it is backloaded.
Harman opposed the bill in its amended version, as did Representative McDermott. His remarks 
would also prove to be prophetic, as Enron would fail spectacularly due to fraud and a flagging 
economy (Congressional Record, 2001c: 119):
So much for their earlier explanation that the economy was on the brink of a recession and could 
only be saved by this massive tax cut. I see—all the tax cut dollars will go towards paying energy 
bills and stimulating the profits of the big oil companies—oil companies such as Houston-based 
Enron and Dynegy that have reportedly seen revenues climb by 400 percent in the past two years 
while the Californian utilities spiraled into debt. As for the working American families who owe 
no federal taxes and get zero to nominal benefits from this blatant deception of a taxcut, how will 
we help them pay their energy bills?
Harman criticized the way the Bush administration pushed the urgency of the bill, asking 
Congress to act by Memorial Day to approve the cuts. Other remarks highlighted familiar 
criticisms of the bill: it did not fix the Alternative Minimum Tax, which had begun to creep into 
greater numbers of American tax returns; it did not provide immediate benefits, with its delayed
182
provisions hiding much of its real cost and the effects of interest; and it benefited big business 
(Congressional Record: 2001c).
Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank rose to point out what he felt was the odd 
timing provisions of the bill, as well to mock what he felt was Republican hypocrisy 
(Congressional Record, 2001c: 104):
This bill takes away from the people the funds that they could use to adequately fund Medicare, a 
prescription drug program, nursing homes, long-term care. None of those can be addressed 
without the revenues that this bill does away with. Now, I do understand that it sunsets the tax 
cuts. That is odd. When the Republicans were facing Bill Clinton as President, they said if they 
got in power, they would sunset the Tax Code. Apparently they misunderstood themselves, 
because this bill does not sunset the Tax Code, it sunsets the tax cuts.
The Conference Report would pass 240-154 on May 25, 2001. Bush signed the bill into law on 
July 5, 2001.
On September 5, 2001, three months after President Bush signed the 2001 Act, members 
of Congress discussed the budget and the future of the budget surplus on the floor of the House 
of Representatives. There was significant and ongoing concern about the magnitude of the cuts. 
Representative Tom Allen (Democrat, represented the state of Maine) was outspoken in his 
alarm (Congressional Record, 2001a:4):
Thanks to the President’s refund and the state of our economy, the government is facing financial 
shortfalls. Instead of operating in a surplus and each party claiming credit, we are blaming one 
another for a deficit. The other party’s leaders choose to ignore the advice of economists 
forecasting a shrinking surplus, and all indications are that the economy has begun to slow. The 
surplus was once expected to be about $125 billion. The Congressional Budget Office is
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estimating the present surplus is nearly zero. Things have changed over the last 3 months. The 
White House is spinning blame to the Congress, but it is unwilling to accept the fact that the 
President’s tax cut has eaten up the surplus. Just like an 800-pound gorilla would go at a banana, 
it is all gone.
Criticism also came in September 2001 from a number of other Congressional members in public 
statements to the press, including Missouri Representative Dick Gephardt, North Dakota 
Representative Tom Daschle, and Dick Durbin of Illinois. Bush was criticized as whipping up 
sentiment that the economy was in trouble, and that a tax cut was needed (Inside Politics: 2001). 
In particular, Gephardt and Daschle suggested that the need for a sweeping tax cut bill was a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. Gephardt referred to Bush’s leadership as irresponsible, and claimed 
Bush’s suggestion of a slowdown was simply a tactic to force Congress to accept a tax cut 
(Inside Politics: 2001). Durbin provided a “doughnut hole” metaphor for Bush’s negative 
outlook (Inside Politics, 2001: 1):
The president has talked down the economy in an effort to talk up his tax cut. It appears that when 
President Bush looks at the economy he doesn't see the doughnut -- he just sees the hole. We 
believe that there is strength in America and in our economy, and that we can recover. But the 
president has to change his tune.
Concerns about the tax bill continued as the economy cooled. With corporate failures such as 
Enron and WorldCom, there was plenty to be nervous about in the American economy. What 
had been a large surplus now must have certainly appeared to be a pending worst-case scenario.
Members of Congress continued to retrospectively praise, criticize, and analyse Bush’s 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recovery Act of 2001. On the floor of the Senate on February
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5, 2002, Senator Chuck Grassley commented in support of the bill, which was still in its infancy 
(Congressional Record, 2002a: 1):
I emphasize that because of all the people who say the Tax Relief Act of last year was for the 
wealthy. A refundable credit is helping people of the lower income tax bracket very much. For 
example, in the year 2001, a single mother with two children, making $15,000, received a credit 
of $500. This single mother likely now will receive a bigger tax refund check when she files her 
2001 tax return by April 15. This expansion of the child credit will ensure that millions of low- 
income families, not rich people, will now receive the benefit of this child credit. For those 
people who spend so much of their income, maybe all of it in some cases, they are going to have 
more money to spend, and that is going to stimulate the economy.
It appears, based on the criticism, that one universal truth could be gleaned from Bush’s cut. It 
spent more than it could possibly recover via economic growth or expansion of the tax base. 
Remarks made during 2001 on the floor of the House and Senate criticized giveaways to big 
business, the wealthiest taxpayers, the general public, and energy companies (Congressional 
Record: 2001c). In many ways, the debate seemed to coalesce around several ideas: that the 
economy faced an uncertain future; that Bush’s budgeting was not sound; and, with economic 
slowdown a possibility it was not the time to risk destroying a surplus that could cushion future 
shortfalls.
Bush lauded the cuts, but any political celebration would be short-lived, as the 9/11 
terrorist attacks intervened. To be fair, clearly this was an unprecedented event with enormous 
economic implications. However, over the next several years, Bush would continue to push his 
agenda of tax cuts as the engine of economic growth. He followed up the 2001 cuts with a 2003
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tax bill, and as late as 2008, just before a major banking crisis and economic recession, was 
proposing to extend and make permanent the tax reductions (Bush, 2008:3):
We have other work to do on taxes. Unless Congress acts, most of the tax relief we’ve delivered 
over the past seven years will be taken away. Some in Washington argue that letting tax relief 
expire is not a tax increase. Try explaining that to 116 million American taxpayers who would see 
their taxes rise by an average of $1,800. Others have said they would personally be happy to pay 
higher taxes. I welcome their enthusiasm. I’m pleased to report that the IRS accepts both checks 
and money orders. Most Americans think their taxes are high enough. With all the other pressures 
on their finances, American families should not have to worry about their federal government 
taking a bigger bite out of their paychecks. There’s only one way to eliminate this uncertainty: 
Make the tax relief permanent. And members of Congress should know: If any bill raises taxes 
reaches my desk, I will veto it.
Congress would ultimately extend the cuts, under the Obama administration. As evidenced in 
Bush’s speech to Congress, above, Bush postured that allowing a previous tax cut to expire 
would be a tax “increase.” The political implications would become more obvious later, as 
politicians, up for re-election, would face the decision as to how to handle these expiring 
provisions.
6.10 Legacy
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 was an important 
turning point for the United States’ economy. Most prominently, 2001 would be the last year the 
United States treasury would hold a budget surplus as a result of the dramatic reductions in tax 
revenue (Miller Center: 2016). Ultimately, Bush’s dramatic tax reductions were not accompanied 
by commensurate reductions in government spending, resulting in deep deficits. The economic
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effects of the cuts on the Federal budget were further magnified by two wars, in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, increased entitlement program spending, and devastating economic downturns late 
in Bush’s second term (Miller Center: 2016). The Miller Center’s Presidency Project summed up 
Bush’s 2001 tax program (Miller Center, 2016:1):
They reduced federal revenue by an estimated $4 trillion over a period of ten years, worsened 
wealth inequality in the United States, and increased the federal deficit. Meanwhile, the economy 
grew sporadically. In October 2007, the stock market topped 14,164, up from approximately 
8,000 in 2002. Unemployment declined from 6.3 percent in 2003 to 4.7 percent by 2007. Despite 
these signs of progress, the United States budget remained unbalanced, and a major economic 
catastrophe loomed in the final months of the Bush administration.
Bush’s 2001 tax program ultimately resulted in dramatically expanded government expenditures, 
and an explosion in the deficit (Tax Policy Center: 2015c). Bush increased the size of 
government, as defined by total government spending, associated with wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as well as spending on a Medicare drug provision. As indicated in figures 3.1 and 
7.4, Bush’s policies had erased the budget surplus by 2002, and begun to dig alarming deficits by 
2005. When President Barack Obama took office in 2009, it was clear that the United States 
economy was in “free fall” and the deficit had become acute, if not impossible to rationally 
reverse. Rapid fallout would occur, including failures of many major financial institutions, and 
ushering in what would be known as the “Great Recession.” It is also clear that, though the use 
of deficit spending and trickle-down tax policy remain open for debate, the Bush 
administration’s handling of the economy was a significant setback for its proponents. Bush’s tax 
cut program would inherit a largely negative legacy, and would subsequently be blamed for 
much of the economic malaise that would continue into the term of President Barack Obama.
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The Washington Post, in a 2013 article, echoed these implications, as it highlighted four 
major impacts the 2001 Act had on the United States for the foreseeable future. The article 
concluded that Bush’s policies, as enacted by Congress, increased income inequality; drove the 
deficit; disproportionately benefited the wealthy; and, in a more positive view, increased 
disposable income for the middle class (Washington Post, 2013:1). However, other analysts 
believe these outcomes were as much a result of faulty assumptions that growth would continue, 
as forecast in 2001, throughout the next decade, as it was any other reason (Bartlett: 2012). 
Analyst Bruce Bartlett contended that, while Bush was unlucky and presumptive in his reliance 
on poor forecasts, President Bill Clinton had previously been fortunate in that several unexpected 
developments cut his way. Referring to the Clinton surplus, Bartlett wrote (Bartlett, 2012:1):
The projected surplus was primarily the result of two factors. First was a big tax increase in 1993 
that every Republican in Congress voted against, saying that it would tank the economy. This 
belief was wrong. The economy boomed in 1994, growing 4.1 percent that year and strongly 
throughout the Clinton administration. The second major contributor to budget surpluses that 
emerged in 1998 was tough budget controls that were part of the 1990 and 1993 budget deals. 
The main one was a requirement that spending could not be increased or taxes cut unless offset 
by spending cuts or tax increases. This was known as Paygo, for pay as you go.
Bartlett would also point out that the abandonment in 2002 of the PAYGO policies, which 
required zero-based budgeting and offsets for each tax increase, was not necessarily Bush’s 
creation (Bartlett: 2012). PAYGO policies had unexpectedly benefited Clinton, and helped 
generate a surplus, while negatively affecting Bush, helping to grow the deficit (Bartlett: 2012). 
Bartlett’s belief is that Bush and the Republican Congress were primarily responsible for 
continuing poor policies for nearly a decade (Bartlett, 2012:1):
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The 2001 tax cut did nothing to stimulate the economy, yet Republicans pushed for additional tax 
cuts in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2008. The economy continued to languish even as the 
Treasury hemorrhaged revenue, which fell to 17.5 percent of the gross domestic product in 2008 
from 20.6 percent in 2000. Republicans abolished Paygo in 2002, and spending rose to 20.7 
percent of G.D.P. in 2008 from 18.2 percent in 2001.
It is notable that in his testimony in 2001, Alan Greenspan noted that most tax cuts do not occur 
fast enough to make a positive economic impact or avert a recession. This turned out to be the 
case with the 2001 Act as well (CSPAN: 2001). Clearly it was not enough, and not fast enough, 
to turn the tide.
The timing of the Bush tax provisions was also important. Their pending sunset, almost 
ten years after their passage, created a political quandary for politicians on both sides of the aisle. 
The main issue is that the sunset was scheduled to occur during a mid-term Congressional 
election cycle, making any serious change a political risk for those on Capitol Hill (McClatchy: 
2007). To extend the cuts was accepted by most pundits as politically expedient, the path of least 
resistance (McClatchy: 2007). Under President Obama, most of the Bush tax cuts would remain 
intact.
The Bush tax reductions, as begun under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001, began a dramatic downturn for the United States’ economy and 
arguably damaged the legacy of Reaganomics. According to the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, the economic damage is calculable: “Just two policies dating from the Bush 
Administration — tax cuts and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — accounted for over $500 
billion of the deficit in 2009 and will account for $6 trillion in deficits in 2009 through 2019, 
including the associated debt-service costs.” (CBPP, 2012: 1). What is less easy to calculate is
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the political damage to conservative economic ideology, namely the idea of trickle-down 
economics itself. Under both Reagan and Bush, deficit spending, poor forecasting, revenue 
decreases, and consequence-free spending clearly contributed to economic malaise. While 
Reagan was more fortunate in that his administration avoided substantial economic setbacks after 
the major tax cuts, allowing for economic growth, Bush was far less fortunate. Accordingly, it is 
arguable that reducing anticipated tax revenues based on projected, positive economic growth 
forecasts and economic responses to tax changes does not outweigh the risks that the projected 
growth will not materialize. The Bush tax cuts ultimately were an exemplary case of this: Bush 
relied on aggressive growth forecasts and a freed-up economy as justification to lower taxes, thus 
squandering away a substantial surplus. When the anticipated economic growth did not 
materialize, rates were too low to offset spending, both expected and unexpected. Ironically, the 
political conservative, George W. Bush, proved to be anything but a fiscal conservative.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusions and Implications
7.1 Introduction
In examining the evolution of the United States’ tax code from 1981-2001, this research 
has chronicled the change through the lens of four seminal acts of tax legislation: The Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981; the Tax Reform Act of 1986; The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993; and, The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. Figure 7.1 
below summarises these four acts -  the tax changes they introduced, the party support or lack of 
it and the main consequence of the measures introduced by the acts:
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Figure 7.1: Major Tax Acts 1981-2001
M ajor United States Tax Acts 1981-2001
Econom ic 
R eco very Tax 
A ct o f 1981
Tax Reform  A ct 
o f 1986
O m n ib u s Budget 
R eco ncilia tio n  A ct 
o f 1993
Eco n o m ic G row th 
and Tax Re lief 
R eco ncilia tio n  A ct 
o f 2001
I I I I
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These legislative developments covered or impacted the terms of six United States 
presidents, and were emblematic of the political forces and personalities that shaped them. While 
each particular act was forged under a unique set of circumstances, and influenced by the needs, 
hopes, and fears of those involved in the legislative process, a thorough analysis reveals a 
number of important themes.
This historical research has brought to light four major themes in the evolution of United 
States tax policy during the period under study. The first is the emergence of the budget deficit 
and deferred fiscal responsibility as political tools. Second, this analysis brought into sharper 
relief the conditions that contribute to tax reform, as well as those conditions that may hinder 
substantive, broad based change in the tax code, particularly partisanship. Third, this research 
revealed the manner in which tax increases and decreases have been cast in terms of personal 
liberty and social responsibility, most typically along partisan lines. Fourth, this analysis brought 
to light some misperceptions about presidential approaches to the budget: specifically, that the 
manner in which politicians cast themselves in rhetoric may be substantively different than their 
actual policies. Finally, and perhaps most troubling for the future of tax reform, it highlighted the 
manner in which partisanship has created a high-stakes environment where compromise is 
difficult.
7.2 Budget Deficits
The emerging issue of the budget deficit was one of the most important identified in this 
research. The United States ran extensive deficits during World War II, obviously as a result of 
war expenditures (Stelsel: 2011). However, after the close of the war, budget deficits represented 
a very small percentage of GDP until 1975, when they first began to emerge as a material portion
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of the budget, hovering just under 5% of GDP annually. This trend of annual budget deficits 
continued from 1975 until the present, with the only exceptions being the last few years of Bill 
Clinton’s presidency, and the year 2001 (Stelsel: 2011). 2001 would be the last year, as of this 
writing, that the United States has run a budget surplus (Stelsel: 2011).
Clearly, the approach to budget deficits had changed after the Carter presidency, most 
notably under Ronald Reagan. While Carter had run modest deficits, in the range of 2.5%, the 
Reagan administration began to create deficits as a matter of routine policy. The impact of such 
deficits, particularly when they are recurring, is that they have a profound cumulative effect. 
Periodic deficits create a progressively larger financial hole, contributing to rising debt and 
interest payments, which can stifle the economy by requiring ever greater outlays to service 
them. Reagan was aware that his administration had run extensive deficits, habitually, and had 
done so with the hope that by leveraging a deficit and lowering taxes, he could help jumpstart the 
economy. However, as chronicled earlier in this research, the results of this supply-side 
experiment were mixed at best. According to Professor Robert Kuttner, they were mostly 
unsuccessful: (Kuttner, 2008: 114)
President Reagan, as well as Bush I and II, insisted that deficits didn't matter as long as the 
proceeds were used for tax cuts that were supposed to stimulate savings and investment. The 
policy failed utterly. Savings and investment rates fell, despite the lower tax rates. America 
became increasingly reliant for its investment capital on borrowing from abroad. But this deficits- 
don't-matter theology liberated Republicans from their previous stance as the fiscally responsible 
party.
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In his farewell address to the nation, Reagan addressed the deficit: “I've been asked if I have any 
regrets. Well, I do. The deficit is one. I've been talking a great deal about that lately, but tonight 
isn't for arguments, and I'm going to hold my tongue.” (Reagan, 1989: 3). Reagan recognized 
that he had helped create a generational problem, but had run out of time to fix it. However, at 
the same time, Reagan did not take full responsibility for the deficit, blaming what he called an 
“iron triangle” that drove up spending, while driving down revenue (Jeffrey, 2011: 2).
It sometimes seems to many Americans that what might be called a 'triangle of institutions' -­
parts of Congress, the media and special interest groups -- is transforming and placing out of 
focus our constitutional balance, particularly in the areas of spending and foreign policy. Some 
have used the term 'iron triangle' to describe something like what I'm talking about. And with 
apologies to them, I'll borrow that term.
The deficits had indeed become structural, and since 1980 have become the rule rather than the 
exception. Bill Clinton’s administration was the only notable deviation from this trend, and when 
asked what his magic trick was for turning the deficit into a surplus, he famously replied 
“arithmetic.” (Kawa, 2013: 1). The use of deficits became more pronounced throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, though President Barack Obama slowed the pace slightly beginning in 2009 
(Newman: 2013). Analysis of each President’s approach to spending and taxes during this period 
has been conducted, and particularly revealing is the ratio of revenue increases to spending 
increases. This ratio reveals that only Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, as of his first term, 
increased revenue at a pace greater than the spending increases. President George W. Bush was 
considered to be the worst performer, with the percentage revenue increase just a small fraction 
of his spending increases (Newman: 2013).
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Though some of Bush’s deficit spending was unexpected, such as that required for 
terrorism response, other spending, such as a prescription drug benefit for seniors and across-the- 
board individual tax cuts, was fully anticipated and purposeful (Newman: 2013). Of all of the 
spending programs that contributed to the post-2010 deficit, the largest discretionary item was in 
fact the series of tax cuts pushed through in 2001, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001, discussed extensively in this study. However, Bush rejected the idea 
that Clinton and Gore’s policies had helped create the surplus that he inherited in 2001 
(Brownstein: 2000, 1):
Bush flatly rejected the contention from Clinton and Gore that their economic policies, 
particularly the 1993 deficit-reduction package that passed Congress solely on Democratic votes, 
had contributed to the nation’s boom times. “I think the economy has grown really in spite of 
government. This is an incredible period of time when productivity has been enhanced, not 
because of any great initiative of government, but because of the ability for entrepreneurs to stake 
a new claim.”
While it is unfair to lay the emergence of deficit spending as a political tool solely at George W. 
Bush’s feet, his administration became a case study in its negative effects, and accordingly, his 
presidency attracts much of the criticism. In his final State of the Union address, Bush spoke on 
the matter of deficits (Bush, 2008: 4):
There are two other pressing challenges that I've raised repeatedly before this body and that this 
body has failed to address: entitlement spending and immigration. Every member in this chamber 
knows that spending on entitlement programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid is 
growing faster than we can afford. We all know the painful choices ahead if America stays on this 
path: massive tax increases, sudden and drastic cuts in benefits, or crippling deficits. I've laid out
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proposals to reform these programs. Now I ask members of Congress to offer your proposals and 
come up with a bipartisan solution to save these vital programs for our children and our 
grandchildren.
Bush neglected to reflect fairly on his own contribution to the matter, namely pushing massive 
tax cuts for individuals in 2001, and assuming the best-case scenario in budget projections for the 
decade. Much like Reagan, he blames Congress for not making difficult choices. In reality, the 
demographics of the United States and its aging population has long been common knowledge: 
this is one of the reasons Bush pushed for increased medical coverage for senior citizens. On 
January 20, 2004, Bush did exactly what he would criticize four years later: pushed for increased 
spending on Medicare (Bush, 2004: 1):
Tonight members of Congress can take pride in the great works of compassion and reform that 
skeptics had thought impossible. You're raising the standards for our public schools, and you are 
giving our senior citizens prescription drug coverage under Medicare.
Bush’s prescription drug benefit, along with a number of other items in his political platform, 
were not supported by requisite tax revenue. This was emblematic of the problem: the most 
important conclusion is that since the Reagan administration, American politicians have begun to 
rely on the political expediency of the budget deficit. In the cases of Ronald Reagan and George 
W. Bush, it was much simpler to promise everything to everyone than make tough choices that 
might disappoint the electorate, or Congress. Instead they made no hard choices. Rather they 
provided what was demanded: massive tax cuts and increased spending on priority programs, 
without fiscal sacrifices. With the disappearance of PAYGO in 2002, there was nothing to 
administratively or mechanically prevent this behaviour. In addition, the political environment
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offers few consequences: it is clear that the average American voter has been relatively 
unaffected by issues such as budget deficits when they cast their votes.
Deficit spending, at the root, represents a government’s failure to effectively prioritize. 
Some unexpected spending is to be understood, if not condoned, such as war expenditures in 
World War II, and massive and unbudgeted costs associated with the 9/11 attack response. 
However, for other programs that are part of a political platform, it is clear that the political 
consequences of deficit spending, if any, are usually extensively delayed. By the time the 
consequences of deficit spending are felt, the administration is out of office, or the typical voter 
has forgotten where the problem originated. This phenomenon makes creating accountability for 
deficit spending a blurry and complex proposition. For example, Reagan and George W. Bush 
were elected to two terms each, despite having contributed to extensive deficits during their 
terms. Alternatively, individuals who have recognized that spending should be accompanied by 
revenue have been “punished” by the electorate.
Perhaps the best example of this “punishment” is the slate of tax increases proposed by 
President George H.W. Bush in his first term. In his acceptance speech for the Republican 
nomination in 1988, Bush spoke about his desire to cap tax revenues (Bush, 1988:5):
I'm the one who won't raise taxes. My opponent now says he'll raise them as a last resort, or a 
third resort. When a politician talks like that, you know that's one resort he'll be checking into. 
My opponent won't rule out raising taxes. But I will. The Congress will push me to raise taxes, 
and I'll say no, and they'll push, and I'll say no, and they'll push again, and I'll say to them, "Read 
my lips: no new taxes."
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This was a clear promise that likely swayed voters his way in the election. Ironically, Bush 
would soon face the reality of the 200-billion dollar budget deficit before him soon after 
defeating Democrat Michael Dukakis for the presidency. To Bush’s credit, he recognized that 
new revenue would be necessary—a hard political choice. He compromised with Democrats in 
Congress to close the budget gap, including provisions such as luxury taxes, which were 
unpopular with his own party supporters (Barber: 2014). Many believe his recasting of this 
promise was the primary factor in his subsequent election loss to Bill Clinton (Barber: 2014). For 
his political toughness in this endeavour, he would go on to receive the John F. Kennedy Profile 
in Courage Award for taking a stance that was not politically expedient (Barber: 2014). Unlike 
Reagan and his son, George W. Bush, George H.W. Bush paid the price for trying to balance the 
budget. His granddaughter attended the ceremony, and observed (Barber, 2014:1):
Candidly speaking, my grandfather did not want to raise taxes in 1990, but in our constitutional 
system of governance, Congress also gets a say - and more than that, he felt he owed the 
American people action and results.
This research helped illuminate this trend toward the use of budget deficits as a political tool. 
The lessons gleaned from deficit politics are grim: the American voter either does not recognize 
the issue of budget deficits as an important one, or they are unable perform the research 
necessary to understand the consequences of these deficits. For the politician, the lesson is that 
courageous steps have political consequences: it is much safer to lower tax revenue and increase 
spending on key programs. This approach keeps much of the electorate happy, and defers the 
political consequences to the future.
Figure 7.2 and 7.3, following, highlight the modest deficit growth in the 1980s, the Bill 
Clinton era deficit reduction, and finally, the explosion in the deficit beginning after 2001, as
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functions of tax rates and revenue generation. While expenditures and revenues drive the deficit, 
the association between revenues and the deficit can be seen very clearly. It is apparent that tax 
revenues, in general, are excellent predictors of deficit activity.
Figure 7.2: Average Individual and Corporate Tax Rates, 1980-2010
200
Figure 7.3: Receipts, Outlays, and Cumulative Budget Deficit by Year in Constant Dollars,
1980-2010
4 , 000.0
Tax Receipts, Outlays, and Cumulative Budget Deficit by Year (in Billions of
Dollars)
(Source: Tax Policy Center, 2015c)
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7.3 Tax Reform and Partisanship
This research also brought into greater focus the conditions which contribute to, and 
hinder, the possibility of comprehensive tax reform. There are two major conditions that 
historically have helped set the stage for broad-based tax reform: the first is divided political 
leadership between the legislative and executive branches of government, and the second is 
solidarity between individual legislators and loyalty to their own party leadership. Conversely, 
unified leadership between executive and legislative branches of government, as well as 
practically independent, individual legislators effectively discourage comprehensive reform.
Broad-based tax reform, as was forged in 1981 and 1986, fit both of the ideal conditions. 
A democratic Congress was led by a powerful House Speaker, Tip O’Neill, who was able to 
keep individual legislators mostly in line with party expectations. There was also strong 
leadership continuity between both 1981 and 1986, with O’Neill and Rostenkowski establishing 
compromise as a baseline principle, and limiting the concerns individual members had for voting 
against the ideals of their home districts. In 1981 and on into the 1980s, there were also a large 
number of centrist legislators, known as “Blue Dog Democrats” who were willing to maintain 
flexible voting patterns that did not always reflect static party affiliation. This presence of a 
balance of power between executive and legislative branches helped both sides recognize that 
they needed to negotiate to accomplish anything. Alternatively, when one party is in the 
overwhelming minority, the minority party tends to resort to mechanical means to prevent the 
majority party from succeeding, such as through filibuster, bill riders, and informal means to 
slow down the path of legislation.
Though President Reagan was responsible for the mobilization of deficit spending, he did 
so with bipartisan support in 1981, and in 1986. Both the 1981 Act and the Tax Reform Act of
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1986 were passed with significant investment across the aisle. Tip O’Neill and Ronald Reagan 
had a unique personal relationship that bridged their political differences; they cared enough 
about one another, and their respective offices, to work through differences. In consort with Dan 
Rostenkowski, the Democratic leadership accepted Reagan’s mandate while working to forge an 
acceptable deal for their own party. This spirit of compromise and flexibility in the conduct of 
individual legislators during the 1980s allowed for the passage of two exceptional tax reform 
bills in 1981 and 1986.
Beginning with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and culminating with the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, compromise was a baseline expectation of political conduct in terms of 
budgets and taxes. The 1981 Act was ushered in with a spirit of compromise, with the primary 
catalyst being Reagan’s overwhelming mandate by way of his landslide victory in the 1980 
election. It is apparent that Reagan’s overwhelming win encouraged the Democrats in Congress 
to compromise with Reagan in response to strong national sentiment. Further, the personalities 
involved in the legislative process during Reagan’s administration were men open to the idea of 
principled compromise: Congressman Dan Rostenkowski; Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill; 
and, Reagan himself.
In contrast, this spirit of compromise began to wither in the early 1990s. George H.W. 
Bush’s 1990 “no new taxes” compromise would be the last major tax bill to pass with significant 
bipartisan support. Bill Clinton’s Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 passed without a 
single Republican vote; it did not need one, because Congress was Democrat-controlled. George 
W. Bush’s 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act passed with minimal and 
begrudging bipartisan support, primarily because Bush benefited from a Republican-controlled
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Congress during all but a small period of time during his presidency. Neither of these bills 
represented comprehensive tax reform, though Clinton’s bill at least began to tackle the deficit.
Though beyond the primary scope of this research, it is important to note that this theme 
of bitter partisanship would continue to dominate American politics up to the time of this 
writing. Repeated controversies involving the national debt ceiling, attempts at budget 
sequestration, and use of filibuster to prevent legislative votes became the theme of budget and 
spending politics in the 2000s and beyond. This would culminate with the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010, signed into law by President Barack Obama. The bill was 
filibustered by Republicans, and the debate around the bill was bitterly partisan. In order to pass 
the bill, the Democratically-controlled Congress was forced to employ seldom-used rules, known 
as budget reconciliation, to pass the act over the filibuster. There were also attempts made by 
conservatives in Congress to administratively rein in deficit spending by refusing to raise the 
debt ceiling; ultimately these were unsuccessful, but the level of brinksmanship involved in such 
a campaign served to sound an alarm to political purists.
The theme of partisanship and its effects on tax reform are clear: comprehensive, broad- 
based tax reform stands its best chance with a divided Congress and executive branch, strong 
party leadership, and centrist legislators willing to compromise without fear of electoral 
consequences. Divided executive and legislative branches appear to promote reconciliation, as 
both sides recognize the necessity of compromise. Since 1990, compromise-friendly conditions 
have deteriorated rapidly in American politics. An increase in polarity between both the 
Republican and Democratic parties, particularly in Congress, make it unlikely that the United 
States would be able to successfully implement broad tax reform anytime soon.
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Though a number of presidential and Congressional candidates have offered tax reform 
as a part of their political platform since 2000, the collective political will to see such a 
movement through apparently does not exist. Individual legislators face retribution in their home 
districts when their votes in Washington compete with or deviate from home district 
expectations. Accordingly, they appear increasingly unwilling to be brought into the party fold at 
the expense of their re-election bids. Party leaders, particularly the House Speaker, have faced 
leadership challenges, a far cry from the solidarity achieved by Tip O’Neill in the 1980s. Tax 
reform, though widely desired, seems unlikely to occur in the United States unless conditions 
similar to those during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administration can be replicated. The 
political stakes are high, and use of the deficit as a political tool allows the President and 
Congress to soften the electoral blow, or at least delay it.
7.4 Taxes and Personal Liberty
One critical theme that emerged in this research was the differing lenses through which 
presidents and Congresses viewed budget management and tax policy. Rather than view taxes 
and revenue through the lens of traditional budgeting, in the accounting sense, this research 
revealed that politicians during the period under study chose to view taxes through a politicized 
lens. Often this took the shape of taxes as either a usurpation of individual liberty, or as a civic 
duty to government. This is a critical point because it is apparent that many budgeting problems, 
though inherently political due to the political processes involved, are also non-political. Issues 
such as tax rates, population trends, the state of the economy, and demographics all impact 
budgets in a way that is not political. For example, one of the emerging issues in the American 
economy has been the effect of an aging population. The effects of such a large demographic 
shift are substantial: greater outlays for medical expenditures, pressure on insurance markets, and
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the need for greater revenue to cover outlays under existing laws. These effects are apolitical. 
While politicians can argue about how to respond to them in political terms, the underlying 
issues themselves are beyond party lines. Accordingly, presidents during the period 1981-2001 
usually viewed the response to such demographic issues as a struggle between individual liberty 
and collective responsibility.
For Republicans, particularly George W. Bush and Ronald Reagan, taxes were viewed as 
wealth that originated with the people, and therefore it inherently belonged to the people. 
Accordingly, tax revenues should be returned to the people when possible. George W. Bush 
made this particular argument strongly in pushing for tax cuts in 2001 that would cut into the 
surplus that had built over the decade of the 1990s (Bush, 2001: 3):
It's up to the American people; it's the American people's choice. We recognize, loud and clear, 
the surplus is not the Government's money. The surplus is the people's money, and we ought to 
trust them with their own money. This tax relief plan is principled. We cut taxes for every 
income-tax payer. We target nobody in; we target nobody out. And tax relief is now on the way.
In Bush’s view, he made it clear that government should not hold a budget surplus or build one, 
because the government does not “need” the funds. Obviously Bush also intended the tax refunds 
created by the 2001 Act to be an economic stimulus as well, but he did not view the refunds 
themselves as a “use” of funds in the same way as he did if they were expended. As discussed 
previously in this research, such a surplus might have proven useful as a hedge against future 
uncertainties, such as terrorism and economic crises.
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Reagan took a similar posture: he pushed for across-the-board rate reductions in 
individual taxes under the 1981 act, citing the fact that individual Americans knew better than 
the government how to spend their earnings (Reagan, 1981b: 7):
But by holding the people's tax reduction hostage to future economic events, they will eliminate 
the people's ability to plan ahead. Shopkeepers, farmers, and individuals will be denied the 
certainty they must have to begin saving or investing more of their money. And encouraging 
more savings and investment is precisely what we need now to rebuild our economy.
In hindsight, Reagan’s comment about “holding the people’s tax reduction hostage” is striking. 
Not only does it sum up Reagan’s view of the issue -  that tax reduction is a way to boost 
economic activity and promote individual freedom -  it is a perfect parallel to Bush’s positions 20 
years later. It also foreshadowed Bush’s miscalculation by also overlooking the government’s 
own responsibility to “plan ahead.” Though he was also unlucky in facing unprecedented 
economic challenges, Bush would have certainly benefited from holding a surplus as a type of 
emergency fund against future economic events, rather than returning it immediately to 
taxpayers.
Bill Clinton, as well as George H.W. Bush, took the view that paying taxes as part of a 
balanced budget was a collective responsibility that Americans had to the government, and to 
one another. This is a significantly different paradigm than Reagan and George W. Bush took on 
tax policy. In his 1993 speech before a Joint Session of Congress, Clinton outlined his view of 
this collective responsibility (Miller Center, 2015: 4):
Over the long run, all this will bring us a higher rate of economic growth, improved productivity, 
more high-quality jobs, and an improved economic competitive position in the world. In order to 
accomplish both increased investment and deficit reduction, something no American Government
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has ever been called upon to do at the same time before, spending must be cut and taxes must be 
raised.
Clinton’s view, in some sense, was that there were certain ideals that should be supported by the 
collective. In this case, budgetary responsibility dictated that Americans needed to pay more, 
because the government’s fiscal health was the responsibility of all.
George H.W. Bush echoed this sentiment. Despite speaking vehemently against tax 
increases, Bush’s pragmatic nature and collective view of government responsibility encouraged 
him to change his position, and perhaps compromised his potential for a second term as President 
(Bush, 1990: 2):
This agreement will also raise revenue. I'm not, and I know you're not, a fan of tax increases. But 
if there have to be tax measures, they should allow the economy to grow, they should not turn us 
back to higher income tax rates, and they should be fair. Everyone who can should contribute 
something, and no one should have to contribute beyond their fair share. Our bipartisan 
agreement meets these tests.
George H.W. Bush, like Clinton, viewed balancing the budget and deficit reduction as the 
responsibility of most, if not all Americans.
The idea of taxes as an ideological struggle between individual liberty and collective 
responsibility emerged strongly in the period 1981-2001. Clearly, the political party contributed 
to the positions of political figures: Republicans used an individual liberty argument to support 
tax cuts, while Democrats used a “civic duty” or collective responsibility argument to raise taxes. 
George H.W. Bush, as an exception, raised both arguments. When campaigning as the
208
Republican successor to Reagan, he pushed for lower taxes. However, as a pragmatic politician, 
when more revenue was required, he adopted the language of the collective view.
7.5 Rhetorical and Policy Differences
This research also revealed an important trend exemplified by several U.S. presidents: 
they used rhetoric in a way that departed significantly from their actual policies, in terms of the 
role of government in tax policy. In particular, this manifested with Ronald Reagan and George 
W. Bush. Both Reagan and Bush touted themselves as traditional Conservatives, which would 
mean that in general they should traditionally support more limited government, lower taxes, and 
less expansive government services.
Ronald Reagan couched himself as a defender of traditional American values, individual 
liberty, and limited government. Primarily, this study considered “limited government” in terms 
of taxes and economic investment -  more spending and revenue was interpreted as “more” 
government, while less spending and revenue was considered to be “less” government. In his 
first inaugural address, Reagan postured himself as believing in limited government (Reagan, 
1981c: 1):
The economic ills we suffer have come upon us over several decades. They will not go away in 
days, weeks, or months, but they will go away. They will go away because we, as Americans, 
have the capacity now, as we have had in the past, to do whatever needs to be done to preserve 
this last and greatest bastion of freedom. In this present crisis, government is not the solution to 
our problem; government is the problem.
George W. Bush also ran on a plank of limited government, even going as far as to label his 
Democratic opponent Al Gore a “big spender” in the 2000 campaign cycle, stating: “He’s the
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biggest spender we’ve ever had in the history of politics.” (Sack, 2000: 1). In a speech to a Joint 
Congressional Session Bush also stated (American Presidency Project, 2016: 24):
Year after year in Washington, budget debates seem to come down to an old, tired argument: on 
one side, those who want more government, regardless of the cost; on the other, those who want 
less government, regardless of the need. We should leave those arguments to the last century, and 
chart a different course. Government has a role, and an important role. Yet, too much government 
crowds out initiative and hard work, private charity and the private economy. Our new governing 
vision says government should be active, but limited; engaged, but not overbearing. And my 
budget is based on that philosophy.
However, a number of analyses support the proposition that both Bush and Reagan expanded the 
government, both in terms of numbers of government employees per capita and in terms of 
government spending, annualized. In measures of government employees per population, George 
W. Bush was responsible for the largest increases in government employees per population 
between 1980 and 2010, at 7.4% from beginning to end of his term in office, with Reagan a close 
second (Patton: 2013). Bush was also the largest spender, with government spending growing at 
approximately 7.5% for both of his terms, with Reagan spending growth a close second, at 
around 6.5% across both of his terms (Ungar: 2012).
These analyses are independent of revenue decreases, such as tax rate reductions and 
credits. As every accountant is aware, spending can be achieved by both the use of assets and 
through the use of borrowed funds. Though Bush and Reagan reduced individual tax burdens and 
provided some corporate tax relief provisions, they did not reduce the size of government. 
Rather, they simply borrowed to increase the level of government services. This is ironic, given 
the ideological positions both men took. Despite public rhetoric to the contrary, each man relied
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on government spending to achieve economic stability and growth. This covertly makes the case 
that the government has a critical role to play in the economy and lives of the average American, 
if only as a failsafe in times of catastrophe. Reagan used tax outlays to improve the economy, 
though with arguably mixed results. Bush used military spending, which is also governmental, to 
respond to 9/11 and to pursue military objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq. Later in his term, he 
would use astronomical sums to bail out financial institutions to prevent their failure. While 
these were unexpected events, when pressed both Reagan and Bush relied on government 
spending, and government lines of credit to accomplish major goals.
This finding is most interesting because of the “folklore” surrounding both Reagan and 
Bush. Both were clearly seen in popular culture as Republicans, conservatives, tax cutters, and 
waste-reducers. Reagan’s maintains legendary status among Conservatives. This was the image 
both presidents sought to cultivate. However, in examining tax outlays and expenditures across 
the period 1981-2001, and extending such analysis through the end of George W. Bush’s second 
term, a pattern emerges. It seems clear that Bush and Reagan continued to increase government 
spending; they simply ceased to “pay” for the spending with tax collections (Tax Policy Center: 
2015c). In examining the trend line and relationship between outlays and tax collections across 
the time period 1981-2001, only George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton slowed the overall increase 
in government spending. Coupled with their increased revenues, they achieved progress against 
the deficit (Tax Policy Center: 2015c). Ironically, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush’s 
practical policies did not accurately reflect their rhetoric and their popular legacies. This begs the 
question: how can the public achieve greater understanding, or accountability for closing this 
rhetorical gap?
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7.6 Conclusion
Since 1981, the United States tax code has expanded, becoming increasingly complex 
and nuanced. There have been few successful reform efforts that involved broad support across 
the political spectrum, for a common political goal. The most notable exception to this 
contention was the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In many ways it was the only “perfect storm” in 
American politics with respect to comprehensive tax reform: it relied on willing and capable 
party leaders; individual legislators, open to compromise; and, a president who paved the way 
with very public support for bipartisan efforts. It came with the requisite situational factors, 
including public support for reform, a pressing economic need, and a division of power in 
Washington that forced compromise onto the table. However, beyond the 1986 Act, there are 
few examples of government working to develop the tax code in a way that is pragmatic. It 
increasingly appears that the 1986 Tax Reform Act was a fleeting political anomaly.
Other than the 1986 Act, the trend from 1981-2001, and beyond, has instead been 
expansion of deficit spending, increased political polarity, and politicians’ use of inconsistent 
rhetoric that is out of line with actual policy. Tax increases are couched by politicians as civic 
duty, while tax decreases are said to be in defense of individual liberty. The budget deficit or 
surplus is no longer a concrete measure of responsibility, but a sinewy, vague suggestion for 
what ought to be done—unless the political cost is too high. The result is that over the twenty 
years examined, the United States has developed a complicated and inefficient tax system, a 
budgetary climate that shirks responsibility accounting, and an electorate that is unresponsive 
and minimally aware of these trends, and what they mean.
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The Internal Revenue Code itself has also become a means to accomplish political ends, 
increasingly differentiating between groups of taxpayers and their particular activities rather than 
broadly generating revenue commensurate with economic activity. The Internal Revenue Code is 
instead built upon exceptions, with each exception creating a kind of political currency that 
individual legislators may use to “bring home” benefits to their constituents or respective 
political parties. Alternatively, the Code is used to punish political enemies or discourage 
undesirable activities. Constituents, increasingly, have punished their legislators when they 
compromise on issues, including the very notable example of George H.W. Bush and his “no 
new taxes” pledge. This has also extended to current issues, such as the United States’ debt 
ceiling, with individual legislators facing tremendous pressure to conform to their constituents’ 
demands, against the compromises suggested by party leaders. This divisiveness has increased 
the level of brinksmanship, and decreased the level of trust held between parties, colleagues in 
Congress, and between the American people and their government.
It remains to be seen the direction the United States’ tax system will take. However, as 
this research has demonstrated, true reform in tax policy requires special political conditions, the 
right personalities, and a unifying motive. The cycle of deficit spending, much of it generated 
under the George W. Bush presidency, continues to trouble the U.S. economy. Interest payments 
on the Federal debt remained the fourth largest government program, behind only Social 
Security, Medicare, and the military (National Priorities Project: 2016). As in previous years, a 
leader or leaders with the courage to risk their own political career, as George H.W. Bush did, 
and to a lesser extent Bill Clinton, will be needed to bring equilibrium to the federal budget. In 
addition, solving this leadership crisis also demands greater responsibility and understanding by 
the American people of the critical nature of long-term government needs. However, the inherent
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nature of the individual is to respond to the current situation, or the present crisis. This kind of 
long-term vision is unlikely to spawn on its own, in the electorate. Rather, perhaps through a 
strong president, it may be possible in the future to open the conversation. Reagan certainly 
accomplished this, with his rhetoric around the Tax Reform Act of 1986. President Barack 
Obama has also done this, slowing government spending to the lowest rates since 1981. Such 
efforts may reduce the ever-growing distance between governmental revenue and expenditure, 
and the political and economic costs that accompany budget deficits.
214
REFERENCE LIST
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE. 2012. Did Reagan’s tax cuts cause those big 1980s 
budget deficits? Or was it Paul Volcker’s inflation fighting? [Online]. Available: 
https://www.aei.org/publication/did-reagans-tax-cuts-cause-those-big-1980s-budget-deficits-or- 
was-it-paul-volckers-inflation-fighting/ [Accessed 06/08/2016]
AMERICAN RHETORIC. 2001. George W. Bush Speech to the Joint Session of Congress. 
American Rhetoric. [Online]. Available:
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/stateoftheunion2001.htm [Accessed 01/06/2014]
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT. 2015a. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25958
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT. 2015b. Clinton Remarks on Signing the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. August 10, 1993. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46972
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT. 2016. Bush Address Before a Joint Session of the 
Congress on Administration Goals. February 27, 2001. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29643 [Accessed 2016/20/06].
Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States (1993). 987 F.2d 1174, 1175 (5th Cir).
ARMAJANI, B. 2012. Three Keys to Breaking Government Gridlock. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/col-three-keys-breaking-government-gridlock.html 
[Accessed 07/08/2012]
215
AUERBACH, A. & SLEMROD, J. 1997. The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Journal of Economic Literature XXXV, 589-632.
BABBIE, E. & MOUTON, J. 2009. The Practice of Social Research. Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press Southern Africa.
BARBER, E. 2014. George H.W. Bush honored for courage with 1990 tax hikes. Reuters. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-kennedy-bush- 
idUSBREA4308G20140505 [Accessed 20/06/2016]
BARTLETT, B. 2011. Much Ado About Nothing. Tax Notes, October 17, 2011.
BARTLETT, B. 2012. The Fiscal Legacy of George W. Bush. [Online]. Available: 
http://economix.blogs.nvtimes.com/2012/06/12/the-fiscal-legacv-of-george-w-bush/? r=0 
[Accessed 20/06/2016].
BARTLETT, B. 2002. Government in Gridlock. National Center for Policy Analysis. November 
6, 2002. [Online}. Available: http://www.ncpa.org/sub/dpd/index.php?Article ID=5972 
[Accessed 09/10/2015]
BALLASY, N. 2010. IRS Commissioner: ‘I Find the Tax Code Complex, So I Use a Preparer’ 
[Online]. Available: http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/irs-commissioner-i-find-tax-code- 
complex-so-i-use-preparer [Accessed 04/06/2014]
BEACH, W. 2005. Measuring the Fairness of a Tax System. Testimony Before the House Ways 
and Means Committee. June 8, 2005. [Online] Available:
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimonv/measuring-the-fairness-of-a-tax-svstem
BEDARD, P. 2010. Tip O’Neill and Ronald Reagan a Model for Breaking Partisan Gridlock. US 
News and World Report. [Online]. Available: http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-
216
whispers/2010/02/17/tip-oneill-and-reagan-and-model-for-breaking-partisan-gridlock [Accessed
12/01/2016].
BIERMAN, H. 1987. Deferred Taxes, Income and the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Financial Analysts 
Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3 pp. 72-73
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE US CONGRESS. 2015. Martin Olav Sabo. [Online]. 
Available: http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000005 [Accessed 
06/10/2015]
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE US CONGRESS. 2015b. Newt Gingrich. [Online]. 
Available: http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000225 [Accessed 
06/10/2015]
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE US CONGRESS. 2015c. Daniel Patrick Moynihan. 
[Online]. Available: http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M001054 
[Accessed 06/10/2015]
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE US CONGRESS. 2015d. Thomas P. O’Neill. 
[Online]. Available: http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=o000098 
[Accessed 20/01/2016].
BIRNBAUM, J. & MURRAY, A. 1992. Showdown at Gucci Gulch. Vintage Books. Random 
House.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY. 2015. [Online]. Available: http://thelawdictionary.org/ 
[Accessed 06/08/2015]
217
BLOCH, S. 2014. US Federal Deficits, Presidents, and Congress. [Online]. Available:
http://home.adelphi.edu/sbloch/deficits.html
BLOOMBERG. 2004. The Real Economic Legacy of Ronald Reagan. June 20, 2004. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2004-06-20/the-real-economic-legacy-of- 
ronald-reagan [Accessed 24/01/2016]
BLUEDOGDEMOCRATS.COM. 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.bluedogdems.com/ 
[Accessed 27/02/2016].
BOEHNE. 2000. Economic Forecast Breakfast. January 7, 2000. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/publications/speeches/boehne/2000/01-19-00 main-line- 
chamber [Accessed 1/2/2016]
BRIKCI, N. 2007. A guide to using qualitative research methodology. [Online]. Available: 
http://fieldresearch.msf.org/msf/bitstream/10144/84230/1/Qualitative%20research%20methodolo 
gy.pdf [Accessed 10/06/2014]
BROWNLEE, W.E. 1996. Federal Taxation in America. A Short History. Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press.
BROWNSTEIN, R. 2000. Los Angeles Times. August 13, 2000.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. 2015. Data Tools. Databases, Tables, and Calculators by 
Subject. [Online]. Available: http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet
BURMAN, L. 2006. The Tax Reform Act of 2010. Tax Notes. October 23, 2006. Page 359 
BURMAN & PHAUP. 2012. Tax Expenditures, the Size and Efficiency of Government, and 
Implications for Budget Reform. Tax Policy and the Economy. Volume 26. University of 
Chicago Press, 2012, 93-124.
218
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014 134 S.Ct. 2751
BUSH, G.H.W. 1988. Acceptance Speech for the Republican Nomination. August 18, 1988. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25955 [Accessed 08/07/2016]
BUSH, G. H.W. 1990. Address to the Nation on the Budget. October 2, 1990. [Online]. 
Available: http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3427 [Accessed 24/05/2016]BUSH, 
G.W. 2001. Remarks on Signing the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2001. June 7, 2001. [Online] Available:
http://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/speeches/speech-3986 [Accessed 24/05/2016]
BUSH, G.W. 2004. State of the Union Address. January 4, 2004.
BUSH, G.W. 2008. State of the Union Address to the 110th Congress. January 8, 2008.
CANNON, C. 1995. Clinton Admits Tax Mistake, but Still Blames Republicans. The Baltimore 
Sun. [Online]. Available: http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995-10- 
19/news/1995292099 1 newt-gingrich-clinton-raising-taxes [Accessed 06/10/2015]
CARON, P. 2014. The media ignore the IRS scandal. USA Today. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/05/12/president-obama-irs-scandal-watergate- 
column/8968317/. [Accessed 15/06/2014]
CARTER LIBRARY. 2014. State of the Union Address 1981. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.iimmycarterlibrary. gov/documents/speeches/su81jec.phtml [Accessed 06/06/2014]
CASTANHEIRA, M. & NICODEME, G. 2012. On the Political Economics of Tax Reforms: 
Survey and Empirical Assessment. 1st March 2012. European Union Seventh Framework 
Programme.
219
CATO INSTITUTE. 1991. Summit on the Reagan Tax Cuts. Reagan Supply-Side Tax Cuts 
After Ten Years: Economic Miracle or Voodoo Economics? [Online]. Available: http://www.c- 
span.org/video/?19852-1/reagan-tax-cuts-ten-years-later [Accessed 07/01/2016]
CATO INSTITUTE. 2006. Tax Policy Under President Bush. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentarv/tax-policv-under-president-bush [Accessed 
27/01/2016]
CBPP. 2012. Center for Budget and Policy Priorities. Downturn and Legacy of Bush Policies 
Drive Large Current Deficits. [Online]. Available: http://www.cbpp.org/research/downturn-and- 
legacy-of-bush-policies-drive-large-current-deficits [Accessed 26/04/2016]
CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE. 2000. In Defense of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Citizens for 
Tax Justice Report. [Online]. Available:
http://cti.org/ctireports/2000/01/in defense of the 1986 tax reform act.php [Accessed 
02/12/2014]
CLINTON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY. 2015. Biography of William J. Clinton. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/william-i.-clinton-bio.html [Accessed 3/27/2015]
CNNMoney. 2010: Taxes: What People Forget About Reagan. [Online]. Available: 
http://monev.cnn.com/2010/09/08/news/economv/reagan years taxes/index.htm [Accessed 
5/1/20116]
220
COBHAM, A. 2005. Taxation Policy and Development. Oxford Council on Good Governance. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.taxiustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/OCGG - Alex Cobham - 
Taxation Policy and Development.pdf. [Accessed 26/05/2014]
COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES. 2000a. October 11, 2000 Presidential Debate. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.debates.org/?page=october-11-2000-debate-transcript [Accessed 
08/02/2016]
COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES. 2000b. October 17, 2000 Presidential Debate. 
[Online]. Available: http://debates.org/index.php?page=october-17-2000-debate-transcript 
[Accessed 08/02/2016]
COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET. 2015. Martin Sabo. [Online]. 
Available: http://crfb.org/biography/martin-sabo [Accessed: 06/10/2015]
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. 1981. Effects of the 1981 Tax Act on the Distribution 
of Income and Taxes Paid. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/16332?index=6173&type=0 [Accessed 08/01/2016] 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. 1986. Staff Working Paper. Effects of the 1981 Act on 
Income and Taxes Paid. [Online]. Available: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/99th- 
congress-1985-1986/reports/doc20a-entire.pdf [Accessed 18/06/2016]
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. 1993. Economic Outlook Fiscal Years 1994-1998. 
[Online]. Available: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/103rd-congress-1993- 
1994/reports/93doc03.pdf [Accessed 18/06/2016]
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. 2001a. 147 Cong. Rec. H5380-H5386 (2001). September 5, 
2001. [Online] Available: https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2001/9/5/house-
221
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. 2001b. March 15, 2001 [Online] Available: 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2001/3/8/house-section/article/h761- 
3?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%222001+tax%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=6 [Accessed 
06/02/2016]
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. 2001c. May 25, 2001 [Online] Available: 
https://www.congress.gov/crec/2001/05/25/CREC-2001-05-25-bk2.pdf [Accessed 05/03/2016] 
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. 2002a. February 5, 2002. [Online] Available: 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2002/2/5/senate-section/article/s316- 
1?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%222001+tax%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=2 [Accessed 
06/02/2016]
CORDES, J. 1999. Horizontal Equity. The Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy. Tax Policy 
Center. [Online]. Available: http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?ID=1000533 
[Accessed 03/24/2015].
CORKER, R. et al. 1989. Tax Policy and Business Investment in the United States: Evidence 
from the 1980s. Staff Papers- International Monetary Fund, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Mar.1989), pp. 31-36
COWAN, D. 1981. Reagan’s 3-year 25% Tax Cut Voted by Wide Margins in House and Senate. 
New York Times. July 30, 1981. [Online]. Available:
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/30/politics/30REAG.html [Accessed 26/01/2016]
CSPAN, 1986. Senate Session to Debate HR 3838. September 27, 1986. [Online] Available: 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?45951-1/senate-session. [Accessed: 12/10/2015]
section/article/h5380?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%221993+budget%22%5D%7D&resultI
ndex=17 [Accessed 05/02/2016]
222
http://www.c-span.org/video/?47271-1/budget-reconciliation-legislation [Accessed 04/10/2015].
CSPAN, 1993a. Budget Reconciliation Legislation. Public Meeting Prior to Closed Door 
Session. July 15, 1993. [Online] Available: http://www.c-span.org/video/?45326-1/budget- 
reconciliation-legislation. [Accessed: 03/10/2015]
CSPAN, 1993b. Interview with reporters. [Online]. Available: http://www.c- 
span.org/video/?47134-1/housesenate-budget-negotiations [Accessed 04/10/2015].
CSPAN, 1993c. Interview with John Kyl. [Online]. Available:
CSPAN, 1993d. Press Conference with Dennis DeConcini. July 30, 1993. [Online] Available: 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?47264-1/budget-reconciliation-legislation. [Accessed: 03/10/2015]
CSPAN, 1993e. Interview in Live Call-in program. August 2, 1993. [Online] Available: 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?47387-1/events-news [Accessed: 03/10/2015]
CSPAN, 1993f. Interview in Live Call-in program. August 10, 1993. [Online] Available: 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?48270-1/budget-reconciliation-legislation [Accessed: 06/10/2015]
CSPAN. 1993g. House Republican Conference Forum. August 11, 1993. [Online] Available: 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?48455-1/budget-reconciliation-act [Accessed: 06/10/2015]
CSPAN. 1993h. Press Conference. August 6, 1993. [Online] Available: http://www.c- 
span.org/video/?48003-1/constitutionality-retroactive-taxation [Accessed: 06/10/2015]
CSPAN. 1993i. Economic Roundtable. [Online] Available: http://www.c- 
span.org/video/?45331-1/budget-reconciliation-legislation [Accessed: 06/10/2015]
223
CSPAN. 1993j. House Debate on Republican Substitute. [Online] Available: http://www.c-
span.org/video/?41206-1/budget-reconciliation-republican-substitute [Accessed: 15/10/2015]
CSPAN. 1999. National Association of Manufacturers. [Online]. Available: https://www.c- 
span.org/video/? 151853-1/tax-cut-legislation [Accessed 08/01/2016]
CSPAN. 2001. Alan Greenspan speech on tax policy. [Online]. Available: https://www.c- 
span.org/video/?162141-1/fiscal-policy [Accessed 08/01/2016]
DAVIES, D. 1986. United States Taxes and Tax Policy. Cambridge University Press.
DELUCA, M. 1993. Lobbying Allowance Provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993. Tax Executive. November 1st 1993. [Online]. Available:
http://www.thefreelibrarv.com/Lobbving+disallowance+provisions+of+the+Omnibus+Budget+R 
econciliation...-a014673624. [Accessed 29/03/2015]
DEMOCRACYNOW. 2001. Vermont Senator Jeffords Defects from the Republican Party. 
[Online]. Available:
http://www.democracynow.org/2001/5/25/vermont senator james jeffords defects from 
[Accessed 10/03/2016]
DUBIN, J. 2004. Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer Noncompliance. 
IRS Research Conference 2004. [Online]. Available: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04dubin.pdf. 
[Accessed 04/06/2014]
ENTIN, S. 1991. The slump: Causes and cures, The Wall Street Journal, A16. October 30, 1991.
EVANS, M. 2008. The New Rules for Limited Tax Benefits in Tax Legislation. Tax Analysts. 
Tax Notes Special Report. May 12, 2008. P. 597-598
224
EVANS, O. & KENWARD, L. 1988. Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Reform in the United
States. Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Mar., 1988), pp. 141-165
FEC. 1993. http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1992/federalelections92.pdf
FEDERAL HIGHWAY TAX ADMINISTRATION, 1993. Available: 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/gastax.cfm. [Accessed 03/10/2015]
FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY. 2016. Alan Greenspan. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/People/DetailView/6 [Accessed 08/01/2016]
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 1993. Tax Expenditures Deserve More Scrutiny. June 
1994. [Online] Available: http://www.gao.gov/products/GGD/AIMD-94-122
GEPHARDT, R. 2010. Statement before the Senate Finance Committee. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/92310DGTEST.pdf [Accessed 20/06/2016].
GEPHARDT COLLECTION. 2014. The Bradley-Gephardt Fair Tax. Missouri Natural History 
Museum. [Online] Available:
http://gephardt.mohistory.org/timeline/enlarge.php?image=RAG1096AM.jpg [Accessed 
17.12.2014]
GLECKMAN, H. 2009. Jack Kemp. TaxVox Tax Policy Center Blog. [Online]. Available: 
http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2009/05/03/iack-kemp/ [Accessed 10/12/2014]
GLESNE, C. 2011. Becoming Qualitative Researchers. Fourth Edition. Pearson Education. 
GOVTRACK. 2015. S. 2817 (97th): Fair Tax Act of 1982. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/97/s2817 [Accessed 08/01/2016]
225
GOVTRACK. 2015b. H.R. 4242 (97th): Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/97/hr4242 [Accessed 08/01/2016] 
GOVTRACK. 2015c. H.R. 1836 (107th) Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2001. [Online]. Available: https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/hr1836 [Accessed 
10/03/2016]
HALL, A. 1993. OBRA 1993: What Taxpayers Can Expect in 1994. Tax Foundation Special 
Report No. 26. [Online]. Available: http://taxfoundation.org/article/obra-1993-what-taxpayers- 
can-expect-1994
HENDERSON, R. 2006. Stuck: Why it’s so hard to do new things in old organizations 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [Online]. Available: http://video.mit.edu/watch/stuck- 
why-its-so-hard-to-do-new-things-in-old-organizations-9319/ [Accessed 20/01/2016]. 
HOFFMAN, HOELZL, & KIRCHLER 2012. Preconditions of Voluntary Tax Compliance: 
Knowledge and Evaluation of Taxation, Norms, Fairness, and Motivation to Cooperate. National 
Institutes of Health. [Online]. Available:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3303158/ [Accessed 17/12/2015)
HOLID, D. & LABATE, L. 1985. Individual Income Tax Rates, 1985. IRS Publication. 
Available:
http://r.search.yahoo.com/ ylt=AwrBT79e 5RUXYEA6zBXNyoA; ylu=X3oDMTByMG04Z2o 
2BHNlYwNzcgRwb3MDMQRib2xvA2JmMQR2dGlkAw-- 
/RV=2/RE=1419079646/RO=10/RU=http%3a%2f%2fwww.irs.gov%2fpub%2firs- 
soi%2f85inintxr.pdf/RK=0/RS=HpfIHBrzG0O0JSSuH6X6e.JwxV4-
INSIDE POLITICS. 2001. Democrats say Bush’s comments helped bring downturn. March 15, 
2001. [Online]. Available:
226
http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/03/15/democrats.tax.cuts/index.html [Accessed 
06/02/2016].
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. 2013a. Publication 556. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p556.pdf. [Accessed 17/06/2014]
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. 2014a. The Truth About Frivolous Tax Arguments.
[Online]. Available: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/friv tax.pdf. [Accessed 11/06/2014]
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. 2014b.Form 1040. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-1040,-U.S.-Individual-Income-Tax-Return. [Accessed 14/06/2014]
IRS TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE. 2012. Report to Congress. Volume One. [Online]. 
Available:
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Most-Serious-Problems-Tax- 
Code-Complexity.pdf [Accessed 6/12/2014]
JACK KEMP FOUNDATION. 2014. Who Was Jack Kemp? [Online] Available: 
www.iackkempfoundation.org [Accessed 15/12/2014]
JEFFREY, T. 2011. Reagan’s Farewell Regret. [Online}. Available:
http://townhall.com/columnists/terrvieffrev/2011/02/09/reagans farewell regret deficit hed put 
nation on track to eliminate [Accessed 18/05/2016]
JEFFREY, T. 2015. Debt Headed to 103% of GDP. CNS News. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/ [Accessed 06/08/2016]
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION. 1986. General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986. [Online]. Available: http://www.ict.gov/ics-10-87.pdf [Accessed 20/06/2016]
227
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION. 1993. Summary of the Revenue Provisions of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. August 
23, 1993.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION. 2001. Summary of Provisions Contained in the 
Conference Agreement for H.R. 1836, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001. May 
26, 2001. JCX-50-01
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 1996. The Reagan Tax Cuts: Lessons for Tax Reform. Joint 
Economic Committee Report. [Online]. Available:
http://crab.rutgers.edu/~mchugh/taxes/The%20Reagan%20Tax%20Cuts%20Lessons%20for%20 
Tax%20Reform.htm [Retrieved 11/12/2015]
KAMERY, 2004. A Brief Review of the Recession of 1990-1991. Allied Academies 
International Conference.
http://www.sbaer.uca.edu/research/allied/2004_maui/legal_ethical_regulatory_issues/14.pdf
KASICH, J. 2013. John Kasich for America. Campaign website. [Online}. Available: 
www.iohnkasich.com [Accessed 11/10/2015]
KATZ, B. 2015. What the US Government Can Learn from Pope Francis. Napa Valley Register. 
September 26, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://napavalleyregister.com/news/opinion/editorial 
[Accessed 11/10/2015].
KAWA, L. 2013. How Clinton’s Surplus Became a 6 Trillion Dollar Deficit. Business Insider. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.businessinsider.com/how-clinton-surplus-became-a-6t-deficit- 
2013-1, [Accessed 15/05/2016]
228
KEMP, J. 1985. Statement on the Kemp-Kasten Fair and Simple Tax. January 30, 1985. [Online] 
Available: http://www.iackkempfoundation.org/kemp-legacy-proiect/locally-hosted-kemp- 
collection/?pg=5
KLOTT, G. 1986. Tax Transition Rules Detailed. The New York Times. September 20, 1986. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/20/business/tax-transition-rules- 
detailed.html
KUTTNER, R. 2008. Obama’s Challenge. Chelsea Green Publishing. 114 
LEWANDOWSKI, M. 2008. Harvard Law School. Federal Budget Policy Seminar Paper #37. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hiackson/2001-2003TaxCuts 37.pdf 
[Accessed 10/03/2016]
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 2014. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985. Bill Summary. [Online]. Available: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi- 
bin/bdquery/z?d099:SN01702:@@@D&summ2=m&
LOS ANGELES TIMES. 1986. Rostenkowsi Vows to Keep Tax Breaks for Middle-Income 
Payers. Los Angeles Times. [Online] Available: http://articles.latimes.com/1986-07- 
13/news/mn-20741_1_tax-rates [Accessed 28.11.2014]
LOS ANGELES TIMES. 1999. Clinton Vetoes What He Calls “Bloated” GOP Tax Cut Bill. Los 
Angeles Times [Online] Available: http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/24/news/mn-13506 
[Accessed 02/02/2016]
MAHER, B, 2016. An Inside Look at the Reagan Revolution, Part I. [Online]. Available: 
https://dailyreckoning.com/85145-2/ [Accessed 08/03/2017]
229
MALONE, J. 1983. Reagan’s boll weevil friends get warning. Christian Science Monitor. 
January 5th, 1983. [Online]. Available: http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0105/010542.html 
[Accessed 25/01/2016]
MANUEL, D. A History of Surpluses and Deficits in the United States. [Online]. Available 
http://www.davemanuel.com/history-of-deficits-and-surpluses-in-the-united-states.php 
[Accessed 14/01/2016]
MCCALEB, T. 1984. Deficits and Taxes: Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy in the 1980s. Cato 
Institute. [Online]. Available: www.cato.org/publications/policyanalysis/deficits-taxes-federal- 
budget-fiscal-policy-1980s [Accessed 13/10/2015]
MCCLATCHY. 2007. Expiration of Tax Cuts Sparks Battle in Congress. May 4, 2007. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics- 
government/congress/article24463450.html [Accessed 08/02/2016]
MCCLURE, C. 1988. The 1986 Act: Tax Reform’s Finest Hour or Death Throes of the Income 
Tax? National Tax Journal 41(3), 303-315MCCLURE, C. 1992. The Political Economy of Tax 
Reforms and Their Implications for Interdependence. The Political Economy of Tax Reform. 
NBER-EASE Volume 1. University of Chicago Press. 97-116
MCDOWELL, W.H. 2002. Historical Research: A Guide. Pearson Education Limited. 
MCKERCHAR, M. 2008, Philosophical Paradigms, Inquiry Strategies and Knowledge Claims: 
Applying the Principles of Research Design and Conduct to Taxation. [Online] eJournal of tax 
Research.p1 -  21. Available: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/iournals/eJTR/2008/1.html (Accessed 
7/4/2014).
230
MILLER CENTER. 2011. Jack Kemp and the Tax Reforms of 1981 and 1986. The Jack Kemp 
Oral History Proiect. [Online] Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. 
Available: http://millercenter.org/conferences/2011/kempk [Accessed 16/12/2014]
MILLER CENTER. 2015. Bill Clinton, Address Before A Joint Session of Congress. February 
17, 1993. [Online] Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. Available: 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3435 [Accessed 16/10/2015]
MILLER CENTER. 2016. George W. Bush: Domestic Affairs. [Online] Miller Center for Public 
Affairs at the University of Virginia. Available:
http://millercenter.org/president/biography/gwbush-domestic-affairs [Accessed 20/04/2016] 
MITCHELL, M. 2013. A Time When Politicians Tried to Coax ‘the Opposition’ to their View. 
February 28, 2013. [Online] Neighborhood Effects. Mercatus Center at George Mason 
University. Available: http://neighborhoodeffects.mercatus.org/2013/02/28/a-time-when- 
politicians-tried-to-coax-the-opposition-to-their-view/ (Accessed 29/11/2014) 
MUCENSKI-KECK, L. 2012. U.S. Corporate Tax Reform Proposals. The CPA Journal. 
December 2012.
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 2012 132 S.Ct 2566 
NATIONAL PRIORITIES PROJECT. 2016. Available:
https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/spending/, [Accessed 
25/05/2016]
NEWMAN, R. 2013. Why A Bill Clinton Style Budget Miracle Won’t Happen Again. US News. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2013/02/20/why-a-bill- 
clinton-style-budget-miracle-wont-happen-again [Accessed 018/05/2016]
231
NEW YORK TIMES. 1981a. Conservative Democrats Urge More Budget Cuts. March 6, 1981. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/ 1981/03/06/us/conservative-democrats-urge-more- 
budget-cuts.html [Accessed 26/01/2016]
NEW YORK TIMES. 1981b. The Troubles of Tip O’Neill. August 16, 1981.
NEW YORK TIMES. 1981c. Reagan Exemptions Make the Budget Fight Even Grittier. New 
York Times. February 15, 1981. [Online]. Available:
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/15/weekinreview/maior-news-in-summary-reagan- 
exemptions-make-the-budget-fight-even-grittier.html [Accessed 26/01/2016]
NEW YORK TIMES. 2010. Dan Schneider. Dan Rostenkowski, Lawmaker, is Dead at 82. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/12/us/politics/12rostenkowski.html? r=0 
[Accessed 18/06/2016]
O’NEILL, T. 1988. Man of The House: the Life and Political Memoirs of Tip O’Neill.
O’NEILL, J. 2001. The Story of the Surplus. Hoover Institution. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.hoover.org/research/story-surplus [Accessed 07/01/2016].
O’NEILL, T. 2012. Frenemies: A love story. [Online]. Available:
http://campaignstops.blogs.nvtimes.com/2012/10/05/frenemies-a-love-storv/? r=0 [Accessed 
20/01/2016]
PATTON, M. 2013. The Growth of Government: 1980-2012. Forbes. January 24, 2013.
[Online]. Available: http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2013/01/24/the-growth-of-the- 
federal-government-1980-to-2012/#78f4f8c777bd [Accessed 24/05/2016]
PATTON, M.Q. 2002. Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods. Sage Publications.
232
PECHMAN, J. 1990. Why We Should Stick with the Income Tax. The Brookings Review, Vol.
8, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), pp. 9-19
PETERSON, P. 1985. The New Politics of Deficits. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 4 
(Winter, 1985-1986), pp. 575-601
PETHOKOUKIS, J. 2014. Did Reagan’s tax cuts cause those big 1980s budget deficits? Or was 
it Paul Volcker’s inflation fighting? American Enterprise Institute. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.aei.org/publication/did-reagans-tax-cuts-cause-those-big-1980s-budget-deficits-or- 
was-it-paul-volckers-inflation-fighting/ [Accessed 09/11/2014]
PEW RESEARCH, 2010. Reagan’s Recession. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/12/14/reagans-recession [Accessed 11/21/2015].
POLLACK, S. 1996. The Failure of U.S. Tax Policy. Revenue and Politics. Pennsylvania State 
University Press.
PPSSC. 1984. President’s Cost Control Commission Discloses 424 Billion in Waste. Press 
Release. [Online]. Available: http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs9044/m1/
PRASAD, M. 2012. The Popular Origins of Neoliberalism in the Reagan Tax Cut of 
1981. Journal of Policy History (24, 3) 351-383
PRESIDENT’S REPORT TO CONGRESS. 1994. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/economic_reports/1994.pdf [Accessed 08/01/2016]
233
PURDUM. 1995. Clinton Angers Friend and Foe in Tax Remark. New York Times. [Online] 
Available: http://www.nytimes.come/1995/10/19/us/clinton-angers-friend-and-foe-in-tax- 
remark.html [Accessed 06/10/2015]
RAHN, R. 2009. The Worst Recession? Washington Times. October 14, 2009. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/worst-recession [Accessed 20/10/2015]
RAUB, B. 2005. Recent Changes in the Estate Tax Exemption Level and Filing Population. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05estate.pdf. [Accessed 04/06/2014]
REAGAN, R. 1980. Televised Campaign Address. A Vital Economy: Jobs, Growth, and 
Progress for Americans. 10/24/1980. [Online}. Available:
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/10.24.80.html [Accessed 14/01/2016]
REAGAN, R. 1981. Address to the Nation on the Economy. February 5, 1981. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/20581c.htm [Accessed 
20/01/2016].
REAGAN, R. 1981b. Address on Federal Tax Reduction Legislation. July 27, 1981. [Online]. 
Available: http://millercenter.org/president/reagan/speeches/speech-5676 [Accessed 24/05/2016]
REAGAN, R. 1981c. First Inaugural Address. January 7, 1981. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-sources/reagans-first-inaugural- 
government-is-not-the-solution-to-our-problem-government-is-the-problem [Accessed 
24/05/2016]
REAGAN, R. 1982. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of 
the Union. January 26, 1982. [Online]. Available:
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/12682c.htm [Accessed 16/10/2014]
234
REAGAN, R. 1982b. Address to the Nation on Federal Tax and Budget Reconciliation 
Legislation. August 16, 1982. [Online]. Available:
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/81682a.htm [Accessed 11/10/2015] 
REAGAN, R. 1985. Address to the Nation on the Federal Budget and Deficit Reduction. April 
24, 1985. [Online]. Available:
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/42485b.htm [Accessed 16/10/2014]
REAGAN, R. 1986a. State of the Union Address, February 9, 1986. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=36646 [Accessed 05/10/2014]
REAGAN, R. 1986b. Message to the Congress Transmitting the Annual Economic Report of the 
President. February 6, 1986. [Online]. Available:
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/20686d.htm [Accessed 17/10/2014]
REAGAN, R. 1989. Farewell Address to the Nation. January 11, 1989. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29650
REAGAN, R. 1990. An American Life. pp. 232
REDBURN, T. 1986. Metzenbaum Seeks to Curb 'Transition Rules' : Exemptions in Tax Bill 
Under Fire. Los Angeles Times. June 16, 1986. [Online]. Available: 
http://articles.latimes.com/1986-06-16/news/mn-10849 1 tax-bill
ROBERTS, C. 1993. Clinton’s Budget Isn’t Just Bad It’s Unconstitutional. Bloomberg Business. 
August 29, 1993, p. 2. [Online]. Available: www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1993-08- 
29/clintons-budget-isnt-iust-bad-its-unconstitutional [Accessed 08/10/2015]
235
ROBERTS, S. 1981. 3 Conservative Democrats Wary on Tax Cuts. New York Times. May 17, 
1981. [Online]. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/17/us/3-conservative-democrats- 
wary-on-tax-cut.html [Accessed 26/01/2016]
ROBSON, J. 2015. Today in History: Reagan’s Economic Recovery Tax Act. Rebel Media. 
[Online]. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsR5ZkZkGAI [Accessed 11/12/2015]
ROSENBAUM, D. 1986. The Senate Tax Plan: The Lawmakers and What They Forged; Tax 
Writers Discover Little Favors Mean A Lot. The New York Times. May 9, 1986.
ROSENBAUM, D. 1993. New York Times. August 7th, 1993. Available:
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/07/us/budget-struggle-clinton-wins-approval-his-budget-plan- 
gore-votes-break-senate.html [Accessed 15/10/2015]
ROSTENKOWSKI, D. 1981. Speech to Chicago Chamber of Commerce. April 9, 1981.
SACK, K. 2000. THE 2000 CAMPAIGN: THE VICE PRESIDENT; For Limited Government? 
That's Me, Gore Says. The New York Times. October 25, 2000. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/25/us/the-2000-campaign-the-vice-president-for-limited- 
government-that-s-me-gore-says.html [Accessed 24/05/2016]
SCHOLTZ, T; MCGRAW, K. & STEENBERGEN, M. 1992. Journal of Economic Psychology. 
13(4), 625-656.
SCHROEDER, P. 2004. Nothing Stuck to Teflon President. June 6, 2004. [Online]. Available 
http://usatodav30.usatodav.com/news/opinion/editorials/2004-06-06-schroeder x.htm [Accessed 
18/10/2014]
236
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE. 2010. Tax Reform: Lessons from the Tax Reform Act of
1986 Statement of Dick Gephardt, President and CEO of Gephardt Government Affairs and 
Former House Democratic Leader. September 23, 2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gephardtdc.com/articles/092310-SenateFinanceTestimony.php [Accessed 
24/11/2014]
SLEMROD, J. 1992. Do Taxes Matter? Lessons from the 1980s. The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fourth Annual Meeting of 
the American Economic Association (May, 1992), pp. 250-256
SMITH, H. 1981. Rostenkowski: Tax Pragmatist. New York Times. June 4, 1981. [Online]. 
Available:http://www.nvtimes.com/1981/06/04/business/rostenkowski-tax-pragmatist.html 
[Accessed 24/01/16]
STELSEL, D. 2011. 2012 U.S. Federal Budget and a History of Federal Government Outlays 
Since 1940. [Online]. Available: http://www.valeofinancial.com/2011/02/2012-u-s-federal- 
budget-and-a-historv-of-federal-government-outlavs-since-1940/ [Accessed 18/05/16]
STENHOLM, C. 2015. How Ronald Reagan and Tip O’Neill Would Make this Congress Work. 
The Hill. [Online]. Available: http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/lawmaker-news/235409- 
how-ronald-reagan-and-tip-oneill-would-make-this-congress [Accessed 11/1/2016]
STONE, L. 2014. Inflation Indexing in the Individual Income Tax. Testimony before the 
Maryland House Ways and Means Committee. Tax Foundation. February 18, 2014. [Online]. 
Available: http://taxfoundation.org/article/inflation-indexing-individual-income-tax [Accessed 
17/12/2014]
237
TAX ANALYSTS. 2006. Tax Reform 20 Years Later: Time for Another Round?. [Online]. 
Available: http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411375 tax reform.pdf [Accessed 
05/08/2016]
TAX ANALYSTS. 2014. Tax History Project. [Online]. Available:
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/website.nsf/Web/1040TaxForms?OpenDocument. [Accessed 
12/06/2014]
TAX FOUNDATION. 1983a. Evolution of the Federal Tax System: 1954-1983. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.taxfoundation.org/article/retrospective-1981-reagan-tax-cut [Accessed 
20/10/2015]
TAX FOUNDATION. 1983b. Restrospective on the 1981 Reagan Tax Cut. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/article/retrospective-1981 -reagan-tax-cut [Accessed 20/10/2015]
TAX FOUNDATION. 2013. U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1862-2013. 
[Online]. Available: http://taxfoundation.org/article/us-federal-individual-income-tax-rates- 
history-1913-2013-nominal-and-inflation-adjusted-brackets [Accessed 08/06/2014]
TAX FOUNDATION. 2014. Inflation Indexing in the Individual Income Tax. February 18, 
2014. [Online]. Available: http://taxfoundation.org/article/inflation-indexing-individual-income- 
tax [Accessed 08/06/2014]
TAX POLICY CENTER. 2011. Selected Provisions of Major Tax Legislation by Act 1981 to 
2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/legislation/upload/legislation by act- 
2-28-11-4.pdf [Accessed 25/05/2014]
238
TAX POLICY CENTER, 2015a. Summary of Major Enacted Tax Legislation, 1940-2009. 
[Online] Available:
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/major_bills_description.pdf [Accessed 
12/03/2015]
TAX POLICY CENTER. 2015b. Summary of Major Tax Provisions by Act 1981-2006.
[Online]. Available: www.taxpolicycenter.org/legislation/upload/ByAct 81 06-2.pdf [Accessed 
21/12/2015]
TAX POLICY CENTER. 2015c. Historical Federal Receipt and Outlay Summary. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.taxpolicvcenter.org/taxfacts/displavafact.cfm?Docid=200 [Accessed 
24/01/2016]
http://r.search.yahoo.com/ ylt=AwrBT.Q6p3hWhDIAY8ZXNyoA; ylu=X3oDMTEyZ2xzNTg4 
BGNvbG8DYmYxBHBvcwM3BHZQaWODOiEzMiVfMORzZWMDc3I- 
/RV=2/RE=1450776506/RO=10/RU=http%3a%2f%2fwww.taxpolicycenter.org%2flegislation% 
2fupload%2fByAct 81 06-2.pdf/RK=0/RS=7utLvy 0OmaiMx0LOomALOE7JLI-
TAX POLICY CENTER. 2016. Historical Average Federal Tax Rates. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-average-federal-tax-rates-all-households 
[Accessed 5/07/2016]
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986. Sec. 2656(b)(8)
TENENBAUM, J. 2002. Lobbying Tax Law: A Summary and Overview for Associations.
Center for Association Leadership. June 2002. [Online] Available: 
http://www.asaecenter.org/Resources/whitepaperdetail.cfm?ItemNumber=12223
239
THORNDIKE, J. 2013. The Gas Tax Doesn’t Work Because Politicians Broke It. Forbes. 
October 24th, 2013. [Online]. Available:
http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2013/10/24/the-gas-tax-doesnt-work-because- 
politicians-broke-it/ [Accessed 28/03/2015]
TUMULTY, K. & EATON, W. 1993. Gore Casts Tie-Breaking Vote as Senate OK’s Clinton 
Budget. Los Angeles Times. August 7th, 1993. [Online]. Available: 
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-08-07/news/mn-21221 1 tie-breaking-vote/2 [Accessed 
25/03/2015]
UNGAR, R. 2012. Who Is The Smallest Government Spender Since Eisenhower? Would You 
Believe It's Barack Obama? Forbes. May 24, 2012. [Online}. Available: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/05/24/who-is-the-smallest-government-spender- 
since-eisenhower-would-you-believe-its-barack-obama/#52c723d957ec, [Accessed 24/05/2016]
United States vs. Kjellstrom (1996). 916 F. Supp. at 907 (W.D. Wis. 1996)
United States vs. Carlton (1994) (92-1941), 512 U.S. 26 (1994)
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY. 2014. Fiscal Politics and Policy from the 1970s 
to the Present: Slaying the Dragon of Debt. [Online]. Available:
http://bancroft.berkelev.edu/ROHO/proiects/debt/1985grammrudmanhollings.html [Accessed 
25/03/2015]
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-SANTA BARBARA. 2014. The American Presidency 
Project. [Online]. Available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/budget.php [Accessed 
05/10/2014]
240
URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CENTER. 2002. EGTTRA: Which provisions spelled 
the most relief? Number 3, June 2002, [Online]. Available:
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/310510-EGTRRA-Which- 
Provisions-Spell-the-Most-Relief-.PDF [Accessed 19/04/2016]
US CONGRESS. 2010. Tax Reform: Lessons from the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Hearing Before 
the Committee on Finance, 111th Congress. September 23, 2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://r.search.yahoo.com/ vlt=A0LEVwixNlxUxi8ANxhXNvoA; ylu=X3oDMTEzMWxncjY2 
BHNlYwNzcgRwb3MDMORib2xvA2JmMOR2dGlkA1ZJUDU0MV8x/RV=2/RE=141535825 
8/RO= 10/RU=http%3a%2f%2fwww.fmance.senate.gov%2fhearings%2fhearing%2fdownload% 
2f%3fid%3d54f47fb3-231f-48bf-a535-
4bcd16b9a5bc/RK=0/RS=r OPh5JwWVn7F1iBHVPVsBdFaKg-
US CONGRESS. 2015. 103rd Congress. Legislation. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.congress.gov/amendment/103rd-Congress/house-amendment/20 [Accessed 
09/10/2015]
US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 1985. Report 99-433. Increasing the Statutory Limit on 
the Public Debt.
US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 2014. The Legislative Process, US House of 
Representatives (2014). [Online]. Available:
http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative process/ [Accessed 08/16/2014]
US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 2016. Congress Profiles. [Online]. Available: 
http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/103rd/ [Accessed 18/06/2016]
241
US DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY. 1984. Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and 
Economic Growth (1984). [Online]. Available: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax- 
policy/Pages/tax-reform-index.aspx [Accessed 7/10/2014]
US SENATE. 2016. Clinton Vetoes. [Online]. Available:
http://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/Presidents/ClintonW.pdf [Accessed 
2/2/2016]
US SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE. 1986. Report 99-313 on the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
[Online]. Available:
http://www.finance.senate.gov/library/reports/committee/?c=99&maxrows=15 [Accessed 
7/10/2014]
US TREASURY. 1984. Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Tax-Reform- 
v1-1984.pdf [Accessed 20/06/2016]
VOTESMART.ORG. 2015. Legislative history. [Online]. Available: www.votsemart.org 
[Accessed 11/10/2015]
WASHINGTON POST. 1993. 1993 State of the Union Address. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou93.htm [Accessed 
06/08/2016]
WASHINGTON POST. 1999. Clinton Vetoes GOP Tax Cut Bill. Washington Post. September 
24, 1999. [Online]. Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
srv/politics/special/budget/stories/veto092499.htm [Accessed 2/2/2016]
242
WASHINGTON POST. 2013. The Legacy of the Bush Tax Cuts, in Four Charts. Washington 
Post. January 2, 2013. [Online]. Available:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/02/the-legacy-of-the-bush-tax-cuts-in- 
four-charts/ [Accessed 21/04/2016].
WEINBERG, D. 1987. The Distributional Implications of Tax Expenditures and Comprehensive 
Income Taxation. National Tax Journal, 40 (June 1987) 237-253
WEISS, R. 2010. How Did the 1986 Tax Reform Act Attract So Much Support? Testimony 
Before the Senate Committee on Finance. September 23, 2010.
WHITE HOUSE. 2011. Issues: Taxes. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/taxes/ [Accessed 06/06/2014]
WHITE HOUSE. 2014. Presidential Biographies. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/ronaldreagan/ [Accessed 13/12/2014]
WHITE HOUSE. 2015. The Sequester. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/sequester [Accessed 10/03/2015]
WHITE HOUSE. 2015b. Office of Management and Budget. Historical Tables: Federal Debt at 
the End of Year, 1940-2020. [Online]. Available:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historicals/ [Accessed 06/10/2015]
WHITE HOUSE. 2016. Office of Management and Budget. Historical Tables: SUMMARY OF 
RECEIPTS, OUTLAYS, AND SURPLUSES OR DEFICITS (-) AS PERCENTAGES OF GDP: 
1930-2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/
[Accessed 19/01/2016]
243
WHITE HOUSE. 2016b. George W. Bush Biography. [Online]. Available: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/president/biography.html [Accessed 28/03/2016]
WHITE HOUSE. 2016c. Jimmy Carter Biography. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/presidents/iimmycarter [Accessed 04/08/2016]
WILKIE, P., YOUNG, M., & NUTTER, S. 1986. Corporate Business Activity Before and After 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Internal Revenue Service. [Online]. Available: 
http://r.search.yahoo.com/ vlt=A0LEVwrGkJVUAvQABRdXNvoA; ylu=X3oDMTByMG04Z2 
o2BHNlYwNzcgRwb3MDMQRib2xvA2JmMQR2dGlkAw-- 
/RV=2/RE=1419116870/RO= 10/RU=http%3a%2f%2fwww.irs. gov%2fpub%2firs- 
soi%2f86cobusact.pdf/RK=0/RS=zlPTnm2Rn6BBBWJVRBA45Cu7v08- [Accessed 
20/12/2014]
244
